CENTRE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN KARACHI SERIES

Introduced and Edited by

MATTHEW A. COOK

Willoughby's Minute

Treaty of Nownahar, Fraud, and British Sindh



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WILLOUGHBY'S MINUTE

TREATY OF NOWNAHAR—FRAUD, AND BRITISH SIṆDH

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The Sindh Blue Books

compiled by

C. Napier

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WILLOUGHBY'S MINUTE

TREATY OF NOWNAHAR—FRAUD, AND BRITISH SINDH

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Dedication

In Memory of Owen M. Lynch

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

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INTRODUCTION

Criticizing Colonialism

Willoughby's Minute and Sindh

Histories of Sindh often stress the military dimensions of its 1843 conquest and annexation by the East India Company. By emphasizing the Company's defeat of Sindh's Talpur rulers at the Battle of Miani, these accounts highlight how decisive military encounters can shape the course of history. Such accounts also reflect an ethnocentric view of battle. This view, based in western military paradigms, represents a battle as an event for decisively annihilating an enemy.[1] In contrast, Kaushik Roy, in *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia*, argues that South Asia's indigenous sovereigns approached battle not merely as an opportunity to defeat an enemy but equally as a tool for political posturing and bargaining.[2] On account of this more ambiguous divide between making war and politics, the Company often dismissed 'country' (i.e., indigenous) battles as insignificant military skirmishes.[3]

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Nonetheless, battles among South Asia's sovereigns were often important events. Between the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries there were many intra-Indian battles in South Asia.[4] The military historian G.J. Bryant observes correctly that the Company was usually a 'bystander' at these battles.[5] One such battle occurred at Nownahar in Sindh. This 1842 'country' battle was historically noteworthy due to the animosity that it fanned between two Talpurs: Ali Morad and Roostum Khan. This animosity was the basis for a subsequent power struggle for the northern Sindh state of Khairpur. The Company, by initially supporting Ali Morad's sovereignty claim, set in motion events that lead directly to the Battle of Miani.[6] The spark that ultimately ignited military conflict at Miani (and the Company's subsequent conquest and annexation of Sindh) can thus be traced historically—through Ali Morad and Roostum Khan's animosity—to an intra-Talpur 'skirmish' at Nownahar.

Most histories of Sindh ignore the Battle of Nownahar and, instead, focus on the Company's defeat of the Talpurs at Miani. In contrast, the influential Bombay Council member John Pollard Willoughby makes the Battle of Nownahar the historical centerpiece of his minute on Sindh.[7] To contextualize the importance of Nownahar, Willoughby micro-historically details the battle and Ali Morad's subsequent attempt to falsify a peace treaty between him and Roostum Khan. Willoughby concludes by linking Ali Morad's actions to the actual focus of his minute: the conduct of Sir Charles Napier, the British general who conquers and annexes Sindh in 1843. Rather than examine the minute's copious details, this introduction analyzes it 'along the grain' of sources that Willoughby does not cite.[8] It focuses on wider economies of imperial debate and contact to detail the minute's historical production and its relationship to Charles Napier's actions in Sindh.

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Criticizing Conquest

Willoughby and Others on Sindh's Annexation

In his 14 December 1850 Bombay Council minute, Willoughby denounces the East India Company's actions in Sindh. He states these actions 'will constitute one of the most melancholy chapters of the history of British India.'[9] Quoting Shakespeare's *Othello*, Willoughby characterizes the conquest and annexation as a deed that will 'make heaven weep [and] all earth amazed.'[10] He protests its negative impact on the Company's finances.[11] Labeling the Company in Sindh as 'impolitic and unjust,'[12] he condemns the conduct of Charles Napier by calling his actions 'a series of the most arbitrary measures.'[13] High on Willoughby's list of 'arbitrary measures' is Charles Napier's assumption of unchecked governing power by replacing political agents in Sindh with military officers. He identifies this change in the Company's governing machinery as the primary cause for a major falling out between Napier and James Outram, the chief British negotiator in Sindh. He frames this conflict in terms of a violated division of labour within the Company that bifurcates civil and military forms of authority.[14] He calls Napier's neglect of this imperial principle the chief cause of 'our [i.e., British] misfortunes in Sinde.'[15]

Napier's words and deeds in Sindh did little to correct such criticisms. He arbitrarily fired the only three civilian administrators in Sindh on 24 August 1843. He subsequently ordered the men's supervisor, Captain Pope, to 'select from the corps at Sukkur the military officers to fill [the] vacancies occasioned by the removal of these gentlemen.'[16] In a memorandum to critics, Napier was unrepentant about his government's lack of a civil-military division of labour:

> There are many points relating to the system which I have followed that are explained by the military orders I have issued. . . . My

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> only motive for taking the liberty to mention this is that my Government here had been so entirely conducted by military men on a military plan, that it is not easy to separate the civil and military operations.[17]

Napier's rule of Sindh diverged from attempts by the Company to increase civil authority over its military. The Charter Act of 1833 gave the Governor General full authority over the Company's military employees.[18] Military advice on the Bengal Council was the province of the Commander-in-Chief before 1833.[19] The Company curtailed this influence in 1834 by adding a 'military member' to the Bengal Council. This member—who was not an active military commander—advised the Governor General directly and, over time, inspected and passed judgment on the Commander-in-Chief's administrative and financial plans.[20]

Napier disregarded the Company's conventions for dividing the labour of imperial conquest between political agents and military officers. This disregard dove-tailed into Napier's actions in Sindh, which ran counter the Company's attempts in the 1830s to amplify civil authority over the military. It thus generated criticisms by imperialists, like Willoughby, who operated within the ideological and political structures of the Company. In addition to Willoughby, Captain William Eastwick was a critic of Charles Napier. As early as 26 January 1844, Eastwick—who corresponds with Willoughby as a friend and later serves with him on the Court of Directors—denounced British actions in Sindh to stockholders at the Company's London headquarters:

> I deem it my imperative duty, as a friend to the natives of India, as an enemy to oppression, and as a Christian, to protest most solemnly against those proceedings, and to lend my humble aid to any attempt that may be made, to draw the attention of the Court, and the public at large, to a line of policy, so repugnant to my

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> notions of justice, and, in my opinion, so discreditable to the British name.[21]

Eastwick goes on to state that, 'By an act of gross oppression we have become the sovereigns of Sinde.'[22] On account of this oppression, he concludes that the Company's sovereignty in Sindh will depend on 'cannon and bayonets.'[23] Eastwick—a stockholder—is quick to criticize the negative financial impact that this military force will have on the Company. Nonetheless, his harshest criticism declares the conquest and annexation of Sindh as immoral and reckless:

> Looking at it morally, a more disgraceful act never stained the history of our country. From the first step to the final scene, the same reckless injustice predominates.[24]

Eastwick, like Willoughby, considers Napier the fountainhead of this reckless immorality. He condemns 'Sir Charles Napier's repeated acts of hostility' and complains of 'his ignorance of the languages, manners, and habits of the people with whom he had to deal.'[25] In response to Napier's argument that Sindh's annexation will benefit its masses, Eastwick describes him as a conquistador:

> To overlook the wrongs inflicted on individuals, on the general principle of benefiting the masses, is no new doctrine . . . this was the doctrine of the Spanish adventurers in the new world, who marked their path with rapine and murder, and still regard themselves as the soldiers of the church, armed messengers of the gospel of peace. Thus we, under the specious plea of ameliorating the conditions of society, and advancing civilization, are privileged to carry misery home to every hearth, and bring each independent nation under the yoke of our all-grasping rule.[26]

After comparing Napier's despotic conduct to that of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, Eastwick labels the conquest of Sindh an 'unjust and unnecessary war.'[27] He considers the annexation avoidable: Had

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Napier not supported Governor General Ellenborough's policy of replacing political agents with military officers, adequate diplomatic machinery would have been in place to assuage tensions between the Company and Sindh's Talpur rulers. Instead, Ellenborough sweeps away this machinery by dissolving the Sindh and Baluchistan Political Agency in late 1842. Eastwick, predating Willoughby's same criticism by eight years, deems this move particularly problematic due to the unchecked power that Ellenborough subsequently gives Napier:

> He [i.e., Ellenborough] most unnecessarily, in my opinion, gives unlimited power to Sir Charles Napier, and writes that he will abide by his decisions; thereby removing all check upon Sir Charles Napier's proceedings.[28]

Similarly, Sir Henry Pottinger—who (along with Eastwick) served as a political agent in Sindh during the 1830s—wrote critically of Napier. Regarding a 17 February 1844 *Bombay Times* letter, Napier complained to the Governor General that Pottinger (who was, at the time, the Governor of Hong Kong), 'Expresses himself in abusive terms with respect to those with whom the recent transactions in Sindh originated [i.e., Napier himself].'[29] These criticisms caught the attention of officials in London. John Hobhouse, the President of the India Board of Control, subsequently exploited them to block the Company's 1846 nomination of Pottinger to be the Bombay Presidency's Governor.[30] Such controversies and criticisms blurred simple polarities about being pro or anti-imperialism.[31] Napier's actions on the margins of the Bombay Presidency thus gushed into larger debates about colonialism and the nature of its 'moral imperatives'.[32] In this broader sense, Sindh's conquest and annexation—which starts as a 'minor' colonial event—cascaded into a not so trivial historical episode.[33]

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From Bombay and Elsewhere
Further Contextualizing Willoughby's Minute

Willoughby's colonial colleagues—through their 1850–51 reactions to his minute—understand that Sindh's conquest and annexation was not an ideologically and/or politically trivial event. Bombay Council member David Blane writes that the minute 'appears to me to be tantamount to reopening the whole question as to the cause of the quarrel & consequent seizure & annexation of the province.'[34] A purportedly bygone event for transforming the Company along a military rather than a civil trajectory, Blane shirks debating Willoughby's minute. Lord Falkland (Bombay's governor), rather than re-debate Napier breaking the Company's seals of convention, concurs with the minute. He also diverts attention from Napier's conduct by focusing on the behavior of Ali Morad:

> After an attentive perusal of the accompanying papers and a deliberate consideration of their contents, I cannot but entirely concur in the opinion that His Highness Ali Morad has been guilty of a gross and culpable fraud towards the British Government.[35]

This focus is diversionary in that it dresses larger imperial debates about Sindh in the 'simpler' clothing of a fraud by Ali Morad. Rather than engage in these debates, Falkland uses a symbolically sartorial sidestep and then prevaricates: He refers Willoughby's minute to Governor General Dalhousie, in whose 'hands the whole matter must ultimately rest.'[36]

Dalhousie, like Falkland, avoids debating Willoughby's minute. He maintains that a detailed review of it would 'only waste the time of others.'[37] Nonetheless, unlike Falkland, he explicitly addresses Sindh's annexation:

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> Mr Willoughby enters at great length into the circumstances connected with the commencement of the war in Scinde in 1842 . . . and with the subsequent annexation of Scinde to the British Empire in India. His discussion of this subject is marked by all the research and extensive knowledge of public affairs, and distinguished ability which are the characteristics of every important document that issues from Mr Willoughby's hands. But I not think it requisite that I should record any opinion on the conclusions he has formed, because it does not appear to me to be necessary for determining the policy we are now to pursue towards Meer Ali Morad, that we should reopen the general question so much controvertered [*sic*] formerly. However widely men's opinions differ respecting the events connected with our annexation of the Province of Scinde, all agree in this, that the act is now irrevocable. I therefore desire to avoid reviving this controversy on the records of the state.[38]

After consigning debate about Sindh's annexation to his historical dustbin, Dalhousie focuses on Ali Morad. He proclaims him guilty of possessing Company territory. He agrees with Falkland that Ali Morad—by altering the treaty that concluded the Battle of Nownahar—falsely profited from districts that had the same names as towns, which he rightfully owned. Dalhousie describes this fraud as a 'gross violation of good faith and honor.'[39] Nonetheless, despite tacitly confirming Willoughby's characterization of Napier as 'impolitic and unjust', he refuses to remove Ali Morad as Khairpur's ruler:

> I do not propose to dethrone the Meer . . . such an act on the part of this Government would be liable to misrepresentation. It might give a plausible presence for our enemies to say that it was but another instance of insatiable aggression; and that having used Ali Morad as long as he was useful, we have found means of involving him in the common sacrifice when he was not longer profitable to

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us. The imputation would be unjust but it should not be needlessly incurred.[40]

Dalhousie's ultimate solution was to reclaim Company territory and make Ali Morad pay back taxes for the lands that he possessed fraudulently. He concluded: 'By these cessions a considerable revenue will be placed at the disposal of the Government of India'.[41] This solution not only helped pay for Dalhousie's own annexations but shed poor light on Charles Napier, whose rule of Sindh never turned the Company a profit.

Dalhousie had a poor relationship with Napier. They quarreled in 1850 about the seizure and selling of the Talpurs' private property. The Company put the profits from this property into a prize fund to distribute to Napier and his soldiers. An implicit critique of Napier's conduct, Dalhousie ordered that a half million rupees from the fund be repaid to the Talpurs. Napier, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Company's military in 1850, resisted repayment. In reply, Dalhousie wrote: 'I consider that the document forwarded to me by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was most irregular in form, offensive in its manner and unreasonable in its demands'.[42]

After this and other disagreements with Dalhousie, Napier returned to London in 1851. Nonetheless, Dalhousie attempted to sabotage Napier's portion of the prize fund. By deferring a solution for Ali Morad's fraud to the Company's Court of Directors, he resurrected the issue of Sindh's conquest and annexation from his dustbin. With critics—like Willoughby's friend Eastwick—now on the Court, Dalhousie ensured that the Company debated past colonial conduct in Sindh while Napier worked to secure his share of the prize money.

Despite Napier securing his money and retiring, Sindh's conquest and annexation remained a live topic in London. The Court of

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Directors attempted to conclude debate about Sindh and Ali Morad in 1851. With the fraud as its pretext, the Directors ordered the Governor General to remove Ali Morad as Khairpur's ruler:

> The Hon'ble Court of Directors having finally determined that in consequence of the fraud of which Meer Ali Morad has been convicted he shall be deprived of the turban and all his territories, except those which he obtained by the will of his father; the Governor General has only to provide for the immediate execution of these orders and to endeavor to have them carried into effect without resistance on the part of the Meer.[43]

However, this termination of sovereignty did not end debate. Ali Morad challenged his removal and traveled to London, where he 'added to the extensive controversy about Sindh'.[44] His lawyer bribed a Member of Parliament to get the Talpur Amir's case considered. The M.P. was subsequently charged with a breach of privilege. Parliament then ordered the Company to make all documents related to Ali Morad's fraud public for its inspection. Michael Fisher, in *Counterflows to Colonialism*, concludes that these events did little to further Ali Morad's case but, instead, ensured that 'the issue of the Sindh annexation continued to be a contested political topic in London'.[45]

The Minute's Objectivity and Willoughby's Partiality

In addition to the actions of Ali Morad, Willoughby's minute also ensured that Sindh's annexation remained a contested topic. To have a lasting effect, Willoughby believed—despite partisan language—that his minute had to appear factual and fair. Literary techniques like embedding other people's voices via quotation, including numerous citations and micro-historically detailing characters in-

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depth (even minor ones) facilitated Willoughby's claim that he was factual. According to him, the events in his minute were 'described without exaggeration from published documents'.[46] He additionally asserted that the minute's quotes were extensive 'in order to give both sides of the question'.[47] Willoughby's apparent fairness extended to suggesting a lenient punishment for Ali Morad's fraud:

In my opinion all we should do is 'to give him an impressive warning and leave him to himself'. For this Chief [i.e., Ali Morad] we have sacrificed so much (and so many) that if, after the warning, he is not reclaimed to a course more creditable to our adoption I would not hesitate to wrest his territory from him.[48]

A commitment to the facts also appears to shade Willoughby's impact on the commission that investigates Ali Morad. The commission—located in Sukkur (Sindh)—writes to Lord Falkland on 5 March 1850 and asks if its mandate extends to investigating all instances of 'bad faith' by Ali Morad.[49] In a minute concurred to by Willoughby, Falkland restricts the commission's mandate:

> I [i.e., Falkland] think it would be both useless and highly inexpedient for the Commission to enter on the investigation of any acts of Ali Morad which do not directly bear on the matter into which they are charged to examine [i.e., fraud].[50]

Willoughby later second-guesses this restriction but, nonetheless, supports it since it makes the commission appear objective and impartial.[51] By repeatedly praising the commission's impartial conduct in his minute, Willoughby highlights vicariously—notwithstanding harsh language—his own supposed objectivity concerning Ali Morad and British actions in Sindh.[52]

Despite claims of objectivity, Willoughby was never actually impartial about Sindh. A sophisticated political operator, Willoughby used

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backchannel relationships with other Napier critics to discredit its conquest and annexation. In 1845, James Outram—Napier's negotiator in Sindh—contacted Willoughby (who was, at this point, the Bombay Presidency's Chief Secretary). Acquaintances since the 1830s, Outram revealed that he was writing a critique of Sindh's conquest and annexation.[53] Based on his experiences with Napier and those of friends who wrote him from Sindh, Outram requested Willoughby's input. Willoughby not only gave his input but also secretly edited the entire critique, which Outram published in 1846 as a multi-volume book titled *The Conquest of Sindh: A Commentary*.[54] In 1847, Outram covertly contacted Willoughby on behalf of Major John Jacob (commander of the Sindh Irregular Horse). Jacob—who was a major source for Outram's book—complained that the pro-Napier Commissioner of Sindh, Keith Pringle, persecuted him by revoking his authority on the region's frontier. Outram requested that Willoughby (now a member of the Bombay Council) advocate for Jacob. Without revealing his connections with Outram, Willoughby successfully restored Jacob's authority by discrediting Pringle within the Bombay Council.[55] Willoughby, Outram, and Jacob subsequently exchanged secret correspondences about Napier and Sindh. On 7 November 1848, Outram wrote Jacob:

> I have shown your correspondence with Sir Charles to Willoughby. He, as well as I, is of course vexed that you should have been subjected to this annoyance and I am much grieved that your generous defence of me should have exposed you to it and I fear you have irritated enemies in consequence. . . . Pray continue to write to me as often as possible. Enclosing your letters open under cover to Willoughby who is your staunchest friend.[56]

Through exchanges mediated by Outram, Willoughby and Jacob developed a trusting relationship.[57] Willoughby and Jacob both increasingly became Outram's supportive friends. During a Middle

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East assignment in 1849, Outram wrote Jacob: 'Thanks for all your interesting letters. They and Willoughby's are my only solace in Egypt'.[58] A further example of these men's closeness was that Jacob trusted Willoughby with his private letters to Outram when he was not in Bombay to receive them.[59]

Willoughby, Outram, and Jacob's close relationship also informs a backchannel attempt to influence the commission investigating Ali Morad. In a 21 February 1850 minute, Lord Falkland orders Keith Pringle to form a commission and to include John Jacob and Major Lang, the Company's political agent in Kathiawar.[60] On its own, this minute is clear-cut and unambiguous. However, the original draft letters appointing Pringle, Jacob, and Lang are irregular because they are in Willoughby's handwriting rather than that of Arthur Malet, the Bombay Presidency's Chief Secretary.[61] Also irregular is Willoughby's drafting parts of a letter by Malet to the Government of India about Pringle, Jacob, and Lang's appointments.[62] Willoughby subsequently gives Outram inside information about the commission's appointments and progress.[63] Outram writes Jacob on 16 March 1850 to influence the commission:

> Your first letter dated 1st March came very opportunely to enable Willoughby to add a good deal to what he had been writing to the chairman about you and your glorious corps. . . . I cannot deny the exposure of Ali Morad's rascality gives me great pleasure for I do hope something may come out of it to benefit his victims. . . . Had you deferred writing to me a day or two longer, you could not have entered on the subject perhaps as you would have found yourself a member of the commission, which has been directed to enquire into the Koran Affair [i.e., the fraud]. But tho' you can no longer communicate what transpires before you in your official capacity, you will not take amiss the request I now make. Which is that as the commission may not take cognizance of any matter not strictly assertaining [*sic*] to the forgery question, you will take care

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> that Pringle (who, between ourselves, is suspected of strongly Napierean tendencies) brings all other rascality which transpires officially to the notice of Govt. in his general capacity as guardian of the interests and honour of his Govt. in Sinde, however extraneous it may be to the enquiry on which the special commission is engaged. You will have many opportunities of eliciting information on other points from witnesses when before the commission, which tho' it may not be recorded on the face of the procedure of the commission as irrelative to the subject of enquiry. Still which you as a member of the commission may call upon Mr. P. [i.e., Pringle] to take note of and he could not then refrain from reporting the circumstance. . . . I shall be very anxious to learn from you what occurs. I write in haste by mail day, but I will endeavor heretofore to say more.[64]

With concern, Jacob replied: 'My Dear Outram, restrain those violent energies of yours and do not put yourself in a rage'.[65] He explained that he could not influence the commission in the ways that Outram wants. Jacob described how the commission only focused on Ali Morad's fraud:

> Not a word about any other delinquencies of Meer Ali Morad was mentioned in evidence or otherwise before the commission and had it been otherwise the introduction of such subjects must have been at once put a stop to by the commission.[66]

In addition to orders from Bombay restricting the investigation, Jacob cited Pringle as a pro-Napier roadblock to expanding the commission's mandate. He maintained that, 'I saw plainly enough at Sukkur that Mr. P. is as perfect a worshipper of the Napier idol as mild energies enable him to be'.[67] Despite Pringle, Jacob reassured Outram that the commission produced adequate dirty laundry: 'Criminality enough came out of the enquiry God knows'.[68] He concluded that the commission's proceedings are 'all before the

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[Bombay] Government and if further enquiry be thought proper there is ample means of prosecuting it'.[69]

Further inquiry is exactly what that commission's proceedings produce in Bombay. Willoughby accesses the proceedings as a Bombay Council member and uses their 'ample means' to write his minute. In this light, Outram's failure to influence the commission is actually a sophisticated insurance policy for Willoughby. After helping restrict the commission's scope, Willoughby must ensure that it can still adequately provide 'impartial' facts for his arguments. By resisting the influence of Outram, Jacob makes certain that the commission remains 'clean' while its proceedings simultaneously produce sufficient 'criminality'. The commission on one important level is not at all about Ali Morad's fraud. Instead, it is a public stepping-stone shaped partially by Willoughby to secretly support his minute's broader arguments against Napier and his actions in Sindh.

Interpreting the Minute and the Company's Records

In addition to micro-historically detailing events associated with subsequent British actions in Sindh, Willoughby's minute raises interpretive issues about East India Company records. In contrast to Willoughby's spurious claim that they are 'the most authentic data in existence', these records are best read as elements within complex economies of debate.[70] By reading Willoughby's minute through imperial debates and their machinations, my introduction calls attention to how Company records have diminished storytelling capacity when cut off from the histories of their production. Attention to restoring this capacity is all the more important since individuals within the Company's administrative structures could deliberately curtail these histories by removing records. After the 1847 integration of Sindh into the Bombay Presidency, there is an

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audit of Charles Napier's records. This audit compares the Sindh Government's foreign and secret records with the letters that Napier sends and receives from Calcutta. It determines that key letters detailing Napier's differences with Outram are missing.[71] Such tampering leads Eastwick to characterize Napier's compiled records (i.e., the Sindh Blue Books) as 'completely *ex parte*' or one sided.[72] He also damningly concludes that, 'If the Ameers had a Blue Book of their own, it would tell a different tale'.[73]

In addition to Napier's Nixon-like erasures, Willoughby's minute exposes how individuals shape the storytelling capacity of records in less crude ways. In 1843, Napier directs the Collector of Sukkur, Captain Pope, to investigate the transfer of Khairpur's chieftainship from Roostum Khan to Ali Morad. After this investigation, Napier reports to the Governor General that the 'Government has received all proofs that Captain Pope could collect relative to the transfer made to Ali Morad by Meer Roostum and states his opinion that the transfer is valid'.[74] Willoughby, in his minute, disputes Napier characterizing Pope's investigation as comprehensive.[75] This retort secretly depends on private letters that Pope sends to Outram. Outram receives these letters in 1845 while preparing *The Conquest of Sindh: A Commentary* for publication. He later shares them with Willoughby, who copies them into his private letter book. These letters are critical of Napier for misrepresenting Pope's investigation into the transfer of Khairpur's chieftainship. While describing his notes on the transfer to Outram, Pope writes:

> I am not certain that I touched in the notes on the vile farce of the pretended voluntary resignation of the 'Turban' of Upper Sinde [i.e., Khairpur] and all his personal estate by Meer Roostum Khan to Alee Morad but I am certain that I most intelligently denounced the whole as a shameful trick to Sir G. Arthur [Governor of Bombay, 1842-1846] personally and that I told him that I should

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be happy in any place and before any person whomever to give testimony on the subject and explain how more than absurd it was to pretend (as I had reason to believe was stated) that the voluntary nature and legality of the transfer were fully established by an official report by me.[76]

Irate at being made accountable for validating the chieftainship transfer, Pope accuses Napier of knowingly mischaracterizing his investigation:

> And I am further ready to make oath that I repeatedly at Kurachee—long after the report in question was received—expressed to him [i.e., Napier] personally my abhorrence of Alee Morad's conduct in this matter. Which he moreover attempted to hint he was not fully aware of. If he were an honest man, then how could he act on a report—which is as asserted—was in the very truth of the repeated personal communication of the very public officer who made it.[77]

Pope also argued that it is a distortion to treat his 'investigation' as an inquiry. He, like Willoughby, portrayed it as a consultation that records Ali Morad's views rather than a search for testimony. He additionally asserted that he was not authorized to pronounce his opinions about the chieftainship transfer:

> I was directed to Khyrpoor where Alee Morad resided in person and hear what he or his minster had to adduce on the subject . . . what honest man would allow himself to form any decided opinion upon it, far less to act thereon when the fate of a crown and a kingdom were concerned. . . . I must have been more than mad to express any opinion that the transfer was voluntary. I was not authorized to pronounce any opinion. I was a mere recorder of evidence! And did I feel the awkwardness of my position. Would to God, I had been ordered to 'investigate' assuredly I

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> should have given in a report which would have been anything but pleasant to the parties.[78]

Despite begrudging Napier for treating his investigation as 'waste paper', Pope—who was conscious of imperial debates about Sindh—remained hesitant about exposing its details: 'I have no reason so far as I yet know to wish to come forward in my own name and attack Sir Charles Napier'.[79] He subsequently requested that Outram not cite his letters in *The Conquest of Sindh:*

> With reference to my letter this morning, it occurs to me on consideration that as the intercourse between the Gov. of Scinde and myself was to a certain extent confidential I have no right to authorize in the present state matters the printing of a statement of what he [i.e., Napier] may have said or wrote to me while I was under him. . . . Do not therefore now publish from me what I know.[80]

Pope's reluctance to attack Napier over the transfer of Khairpur's chieftainship results in his investigation being cut off from the actual history of its production. Anxiety about Napier thus diminishes the investigation's storytelling capacity by preventing the exposure of key details. Nonetheless, Willoughby's minute re-exposes these details through a backchannel relationship with Outram. By re-extending the investigation's storytelling capacity, Willoughby not only furthers his critique of Napier but also illustrates how Company records—rather than simply being 'the most authentic data in existence'—are produced within wide economies of contact.

The micro-historical detail of Willoughby's minute is not, like many Company records, a closed form of communication. Such records have storytelling capacities that agents work to actively open up and/or close down. One historical way into this opening and closing process is to be mobile in one's archival approach. Multi-site research

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can help offset silences in one location with records from another.[81] This introduction mixes public and private materials from the British Library in London into the same field of analysis as handwritten records from the Maharashtra State Archives in Mumbai, India.[82] By exploring how agents, perspectives, and intentions vary within and across regions (which are frequently outside of Sindh), this approach facilitates untangling often silent bundles of colonial relationships and their impact on the production of Company records. By reading Willoughby's minute 'along the grain' of sources from different locations, this methodological crosscutting aims to contrast with the colony-focused conceit of nationalist histories and the metropolitan-centered smugness of imperial histories.[83] It also aims to illuminate one 'multi-storied' way to explore imperial debates about Sindh while, simultaneously, advocating for a mobile approach toward interpreting the Company's records.

Matthew A. Cook

Notes

1. Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge Press, 2011), 3. Also see: Victor Davis Hason, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York: Double Day, 2001).
2. Roy, 3. Also see: G.J. Bryant, 'Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth Century India', *Journal of Military History* 68 (2004): 448.
3. Bryant, 447.
4. Pradeep Barua, 'Military Developments in India, 1750-1850', *Journal of Military History* 58 (1994): 600–601.
5. Bryant, 442.
6. Robert Huttenback, *British Relations with Sind, 1799-1843* (London & Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007[1962]), 65–85.
7. For a detailed historical analysis of Willoughby, see: Matthew A. Cook, *After Annexation: Colonialism and Sindh in the 1840s* (Ph.D. dissertation in anthropology at Columbia University, 2007), 107-205.

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8. Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 50.
9. Maharashtra State Archives (MSA)/Bombay Records (BR)/Political (P)/1850/177-2544/648/para. 63 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850). For a complete copied version of the minute, see: MSA/BR/P(mixed)/1850/1-246.
10. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 104 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
11. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 103 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
12. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 104 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
13. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/paras. 103 and 104 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
14. While the Company blurred this division in practice (i.e., many military officers held civil appointments), it was generally pointed to as a key difference between British forms of governance and those of indigenous 'despots'.
15. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/paras. 103 and 104 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
16. MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/16 September 1843 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848).
17. MSA/BR/P/1848/38-2144/24(J693/33).
18. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 22.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. British Library (BL)/Oriental and India Office Collection (OIOC)/European Manuscripts (MssEur)/E293/284/3. Willoughby served on the Court of Directors from 1854 to 1858 and Eastwick from 1849 to 1852. Eastwick served a second time on the Court from 1854 to 1858 and was Deputy Chairman. For examples of some early exchanges between Willoughby and Eastwick see: BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/170 (26 January 1844); BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/187.
22. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/17.
23. Ibid.
24. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/44.
25. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/25 and 49.
26. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/26.
27. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/32-33.
28. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/25-26.

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29. MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/11 July 1844 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848).
30. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E342/10/12.
31. Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2008[1968]), xii; Fredrick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 24.
32. Irene Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Civilized World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 165.
33. Mrinalini Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 1; Stoler, 7.
34. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 10 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
35. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 1 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
36. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 2 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850). Officials in Sindh also avoided the issues raised by Willoughby's minute. Keith Pringle, Napier's successor and the Commissioner of Sindh, failed to pass judgment and deferred to his superiors (MSA/BR/P/1850/176-2543/3-6 [Secret Compilation No. 26, 1850]).
37. British Library (BL)/Oriental and India Office Collection (OIOC)/India Office Records (IOR)/Official Publications Series (V)/Session 4-9/Paper 169/342 (27 February 1851).
38. BL/OIOC/IOR/V/Session 4-9/Paper 169/344 (27 February 1851).
39. BL/OIOC/IOR/V/Session 4-9/Paper 169/342 (27 February 1851).
40. BL/OIOC/IOR/V/Session 4-9/Paper 169/344-345 (27 February 1851).
41. BL/OIOC/IOR/V/Session 4-9/Paper 169/345 (27 February 1851).
42. British Library (BL)/Oriental and India Office Collection (OIOC)/India Office Records (IOR)/Departmental Records (L)/Military (MIL)/5/419/360/138 (22 July 1850).
43. MSA/BR/P/1852/163/3 (Secret Compilation No. 6, 1852).
44. Michael H. Fisher, *Counterflows to Colonialism: Indian Travellers and Settlers in Britain, 1600-1857* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), 405.
45. Ibid., 285.
46. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 104 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
47. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 63 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
48. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 24 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850). Willoughby's suggested punishment is that Ali Morad should lose his royal title but retain his inherited lands.
49. MSA/BR/P/1850/176-2543/617/445 (5 March 1850).

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50. BL/OIOC/IOR/V/Session 4-9/Paper 169/132 (12 March 1850); MSA/BR/P/1850/176-2543/620/134 (12 March 1850).
51. Willoughby writes: 'Although, therefore (as I have already stated) I regret that the Commission's enquiry was not extended to his additional charge, I see no reason for discrediting the evidence obtained by Mr. Pringle' (MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 99 [Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850]).
52. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/paras. 10 and 21 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
53. Outram, like Willoughby, also knew William Eastwick: BL/OIOIC/MssEur/E293/307; BL/OIOC/MssEur/B330/38; BL/OIOC/MssEur/B330/35; BL/OIOC/MssEur/B330 (28 November 1838).
54. Cook, 132–63.
55. Ibid., 230–54.
56. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F75/3/118-119 (7 November 1848).
57. For further examples of this friendship, see: BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/C/49-50 (3 September 1848).
58. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/F/6-7 (28 March 1849).
59. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/F/13-14 (10 February 1850).
60. MSA/BR/P/1850/176-2543/605-607 (21 February 1850).
61. MSA/BR/P/1850/176-2543/609-610.
62. MSA/BR/P/1850/176-2543/613-615 (Secret Letter No. 19, 1850).
63. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F75/3/141-142 (20 July 1850).
64. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F75/3/135-137 (16 March 1850). For additional correspondences between Outram and Jacob, see: BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/F20-F22 (2 April 1850); BL/OIOC/MssEur/F75/3/138-139 (17 May 1850).
65. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/F25 (28 May 1850).
66. Ibid.
67. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/F26 (28 May 1850).
68. BL/OIOC/MssEur/F208/109/F27 (28 May 1850).
69. Ibid.
70. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 58 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
71. MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/15 August 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/3 August 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/4 September 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/14 August 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/3 September 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/26 September 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/21 August 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848); MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/9 September 1845 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848).

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72. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/284/22.
73. Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the Sindh Blue Books, see: Sarah Ansari, 'The Sind Blue Books of 1842 and 1843: The Political "Laundering" of Historical Evidence', *The English Historical Review* 120.485: 35–65.
74. MSA/BR/P/1848/141A-2149/21 September 1843 (Secret Compilation No. 113, 1848).
75.. MSA/BR/P/1850/177-2544/684/para. 81 (Secret Compilation No. 78, 1850).
76. BL/OIOC/MssEur/E293/171 (9 July 1845).
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Penelope Papailias, *Genres of Recollection: Archival Poetics and Modern Greece* (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 20.
82. Since all but one of the military units used in the annexation were from the Bombay Presidency, the Maharasthra State Archives is a rich (and ignored) archive for studying Sindh (Cook, 14–25).
83. Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3; Tony Ballantyne, 'Rereading the Archive and Opening Up the Nation-State: Colonial Knowledge in South Asia (and Beyond)', in Antoinette Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking Through and With the Nation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), 112–13.

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MINUTE BY THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLOUGHBY

dated the 14th December 1850.

1. I now proceed to offer my remarks on the report of the Commission which assembled at Sukkur, in April last, for the purpose of investigating a charge of fraud and forgery committed against the British Government by His Highness Meer Ali Morad of Khyrpore.[1] In explaining the long period I have detained these important papers, I annex the minute I recorded on the 18th September last—in reply to an inquiry for them—made by the Right Honourable the Governor.

2. I propose to divide my remarks under the five following heads: 1st I shall state the circumstances which led to the Battle and Treaty of Nownahar (which are prominently alluded to in these proceedings); 2nd I shall describe the nature and object of the fraudulent act imputed to His Highness Ali Morad and the manner in which it was perpetrated; 3rd I shall briefly recapitulate the evidence (oral as well as documentary) by which the charge has been supported; 4th I shall offer my opinion as to how it appears to me the case should be disposed of; 5th (and lastly) I shall notice several points which are alluded to in the proceedings—in connection with our relations with His Highness Ali Morad—upon which it seems requisite to solicit the instructions of the Most Noble Governor General of India.

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3. In regard to the circumstances which led to the Battle and Treaty of Nownahar, when (in 1838) the British entered Sinde, the rulers of Upper Sinde were three brothers: Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Mobarick Khan, and Meer Ali Morad Khan. Before them, their father Meer Sohrab Khan was the Rais—or head of the Khyrpore branch of the Talpoors—and possessed of the whole of Upper Sinde (which at the time we entered the Province yielded a revenue of Rupees 2,039,000 per annum).[2] He divided his country into four parts. Each of his three sons, above mentioned, receiving one portion as his hereditary property. The eldest son, Meer Roostum, also had a life interest in the fourth part, which was attached to the Turban (in Sinde the badge of sovereignty) or the Chiefship. Meer Sohrab Khan left a will dividing his property and regulating the succession among his sons as followed: "I write this to be let known that I have divided my country among my sons and I have given certificate showing what his share is. I have divided the whole between my three sons Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Mobarick Khan and Meer Ali Morad. I have divided the country (with whatever may be its annual produce) into four shares. Two shares to Meer Roostum Khan as specified below: The district of Nowshera, Kundeeara, Suddagagun, Boordikar, Roopa, Oboura, Bhoongbara, part of Subzulkote, Fort Bukkur and some few scattered places. The revenue of half of these—with the Seer Shumame, Ijara, Tukat, Mehabarree (of all the country)—is for the expense of the Turban and to belong to whoever holds it. The other share is to belong to Meer Roostum Khan as one of the three brothers. The third share—consisting of Ghotkee, Syndpore, Mahisra, Jamsyra, with its dependant villages Mahtela Meerpoor and Mehurkee, Mooghle and surely other places—to Meer Mobarick Khan. The fourth share, consisting of Gajree, Khumhyla, Fort of Ahmedabad, City of Khyrpore (with its dependant villages), Nara and sundry other places, to Meer Ali Morad. I have put each in possession of his district and have written

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this will to prevent any quarrelling, for the peace and quiet of my family and that other Ameers, rulers and Beloochees may know that the country is to remain in the possession of my posterity according to this my will. If anyone deviates from this, it will be unlawful. I, being of sound mind and body, have written this my will to prevent any further quarrelling (dated the 24th Tilkad 1244 Hijises [18th May 1829]. Sohrab Talpoor [sealed])."[3] Sir C. Napier forwarded this will to the Governor General on the date noted in the margins.[4] In this summary, prepared in the Foreign Office of the Government of India, it is stated that Meer Sohrab regulated the succession in the following manner: "I do hereby make a will to the effect that upon my death the Guddee and Turban of the Chiefship shall devolve upon Meer Roostum Khan. In failure of Meer Roostum, they shall belong to Meer Mobarick Khan. In failure of Meer Mobarick Khan they shall pass to Meer Ali Morad Khan." I am unable to reconcile these two accounts of what purports to be from the same document but they involve an important question (as affecting our proceedings before the conquest of Sinde), namely whether—by the custom of that Province—the Turban or Chiefship should devolve on the son or brother of the last possessor.[5] There can be no doubt that a very short time before his downfall Meer Roostum had entertained the design of transferring the Turban to his eldest son Meer Mahomed Hussein and that this was probably one of the causes which induced Meer Ali Morad to plot the ruin of his family (and which he soon after so successfully accomplished).[6] To resume, however, Ali Morad (the youngest of Meer Sohrab's sons) was considerably younger than the other two and, when a minor, placed under the guardianship of Meer Mobarick. During his minority, he was unjustly deprived by his guardian of a part of his inheritance. A dispute arose in consequence which was at its height when we entered Sinde. Meer Mobarick died on the 19th July 1839 and his son Meer Nusseer Khan (now state prisoner at Poona) succeeded to his share of the

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Government and to the dispute with Ali Morad.[7] Meer Roostum, in consequence of an insult offered to his Minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree by Ali Morad, espoused his nephew Meer Nusseer's course. Towards the end of 1840, Mr. Ross Bell (the Political Agent in Upper Sinde) investigated and decided the dispute in Ali Morad's favour. But, before this decision had been agreed to by the parties, Mr. Bell quitted Sinde for Quetta (dying soon afterwards) and the Upper Sinde Ameers brought the case to the notice of his successor: Major Outram. This officer, after inquiry, reported on it to the Governor General and confirmed Mr. Bell's decision. Upon this, the Governor General confirmed the decision but, unfortunately, the confirmation was not communicated to the disputing parties. The following extracts from the Digest of Intelligence received from Upper Sinde Agency clearly explain the subsequent progress of the dispute until, at last, the two Ameers called out their troops. On the 15th September 1843 a battle was fought in the vicinity of Nownahar. Ali Morad being completely victorious, his opponents were obliged to purchase peace by ceding to him nine villages (seven of which belonged to Meer Roostum Khan and two [Mahtela and Dadaloo] to Nusseer Khan and Meer Mahomed Ali)—Meer Roostum being induced to make this humiliating sacrifice in order to effect the liberation of one of his sons named Meer Goolam Mahomed Khan.

"A reconciliation has been affected between Meer Ali Morad Khan and the other members of the Khyrpore family with whom he had been at feud for years past. This was brought about by Futteh Mahomed Ghoree—Meer Roostum's Minister and, heretofore, the implacable enemy of Meer Ali Morad—visiting that Ameer at Dejee Ke Kote, humbling himself before the Ameer for his own previous enmity and soliciting a reconciliation on behalf of Meer Roostum Khan. On which Meer Ali Morad consented to accompanying Futteh Mahomed to Khyrpore where, accordingly, they proceeded some days ago."[8]

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"Meer Ali Morad's vakeel [i.e., legal representative] Sheikh Ali Hussein waited upon Captain Brown and appeared anxious to persuade him that a second boundary dispute was likely to spring between his master and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore. To avoid bloodshed, it would be necessary for the British Government to interfere. Captain Brown informed him that Government did not wish to interfere and that the Rais should settle such matters."[9]

"During the last week, the followers of Meer Ali Morad and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore have come into collision in the neighborhood of Soonderbeila. One man on each side is said to have been killed. From what I have learnt, Meer Ali Morad was the aggressor. I have sent out an agent to enquire. I informed his vakeel [i.e., Ali Morad's] that the case should be referred to the Rais of the family (Meer Roostum Khan) not him [i.e., Captain Brown] in the first place." To the British Government, in a postscript, Captain Brown adds: "The disputed boundary lies between the village of Sooderbeila (the property of Meer Nusseer Khan) and Shabeila (the property of Meer Ali Morad Khan), about 12 koss from Sukkur. In the commencement, Meer Ali Morad's party took by force 700 Rupees from the ryots [i.e., peasants] of the land disputed. The followers of Meer Nusseer Khan, in return, attacked some grain boats of the former and carried off about 26 khurwars of grain.[10] In this attack, one man on each side was killed and one on Meer Nusseer's wounded. In addition to this, the followers of Meer Nusseer Khan have burnt 9 houses in Oudur Tukya, the property of Ali Morad. There are now about 200 men of each party on the ground."[11]

"On the 13th July, more troops of Ali Morad's crossed over the river with the order of opposing those of Meer Nusseer Khan in the neighborhood of Shabeila. On the 15th, Ali Morad left Dejee Ke Kote and moved to Khanpore with the avowed intention of attacking Meer Nusseer Khan in the neighborhood of Khyrpore. Meer

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Roostum sent his minister and one of his sons to dissuade him from further prosecuting the quarrel but, apparently, without effect. On the 18th, I received a letter from Meer Roostum to the above effect that requested me [i.e., Captain Brown] to interfere. I, accordingly, addressed Ali Morad by stating that it would be right and proper were the dispute between him and Meer Nusseer Khan referred to the Rais of the family for adjustment. As he had referred his grievances to the Political Agent, he ought not (pending a reply) further agitate the matter. In this—as in past disputes—Ali Morad would willingly abide by the decision of Meer Roostum himself but is aware that the minister hostile to him (not the Ameer) would decide the case."[12]

"The dispute between Meers Ali Morad and Nusseer has been adjusted by Meer Roostum Khan, who has promised to proceed to the disputed boundary and himself decide the case. To this Meer Ali Morad was willing from the first to agree."[13]

"The Ameers of Khyrpore remain quiet tho' Meer Ali Morad and Meer Nusseer Khan continue to collect troops in the villages near Shabeila, 12 miles from Shikarpore. The former is said to have invited 500 sowars [i.e., cavalrymen] from Mooltan and made large promises to Beloochees at Shikarpore and Khyrpore to induce them to enter his service."[14]

"On the 4th August, Ali Morad lost his eldest son—Meer Sohrab Khan." But in the digest of the 8th it is noted: "Meers Ali Morad and Nusseer Khan continue collecting troops." On the 15th on the other hand, it is stated: "Meer Ali Morad and Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore have made up their past differences but still continue collecting troops." On the 22nd, there is an entry: "Meers Roostum and Ali Morad continue collecting troops under the plea of family differences." On the 29th, it states: "The Ameers continue as heretofore collecting troops, on the old plea of existing differences

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between Meers Ali Morad and Nusseer Khan." On the 3rd September, it also states: "Shadee Boota—a vakeel of Meer Ali Morad—waited on His Highness Meer Roostum with a message bidding him to prepare his forces to meet him (Ali Morad). Meer Roostum's reply is given to the effect that his followers are collecting."[15]

"At Khyrpore, the Ameers continue collecting their followers. Meer Ali Morad had a large force assembled at Dejee Ke Kote. One reason given for this is that Meer Roostum Khan has it in contemplation to transfer his Turban or Chiefship to his eldest Son, Meer Mahomed Hussein. This arrangement is said to have been agreed to by all the Chiefs of Upper Sinde, except Meer Ali Morad, Meer Ali Murdhan (son of Meer Roostum) and his three brothers. Meer Nusseer Khan and Futteh Mahomed Ghoree (the Minister), have, I know, been deputed from Khyrpore to Bortee (where Meer Mahomed now is) to accompany him to Khyrpore. Three vakeels have been deputed to Meer Ali Morad in the hope of being able to bring over that Chief, as it is of importance at this present time there should be but one party among the Ameers. He, however, declines having any connection with a party with Meer Mahomed Hussein at its head." In the digest of the 13th September, it is mentioned that, "Meer Mahomed Hussein would not proceed to Khyrpore and that Ali Morad continued to decline to join the party. A new point of dispute had arisen between Meers Roostum and Ali Morad—the former refusing to give in marriage a daughter—who had been betrothed to the eldest son of Ali Morad (recently deceased)—to the second son of Meer Ali Morad. These stated to be the causes why Meer Roostum had issued purwannahs [i.e., government orders] calling on all his followers to assemble."[16]

"As far as I [i.e., Captain Mylne] can learn, it is not understood at Hyderabad that the troops collected by the Khyrpore Ameers are

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intended for any other purpose than that of supporting their internal feuds."[17]

"On the evening of the 13th September, Meer Ali Morad's force marched to the neighborhood of Khyrpore, near the kote [i.e., fort] of Meer Nusseer Khan and fired—as is apparently customary in this country (guns in defiance)—with blank ammunition." Heard of the arrival of Major General Sir Charles Napier at Kurrachee with a detachment of His Majesty's 28th Regiment of Foot. On the 14th September, a deputation waited on Captain Brown with a letter from Meer Roostum. The deputation at once alluded to the unjustifiable conduct of Meer Ali Morad and stated that the dispute existing between him and Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Roostum was willing to decide. On this, Captain Brown addressed a letter of remonstrance to Ali Morad informing him that, "He could see no necessity for his acting thus hastily. That dissensions in a country were bad (most particularly so among relations) and that, when they do exist, the parties should listen to the advice and decision of the Rais or the head of the tribe." He concludes by observing that, "With the exception of this dispute (which I conclude will end as usual without bloodshed as Meer Roostum, I understand, had written to inform Meer Ali Morad of his intention of moving out to decide the case which is a petty village quarrel and which has been allowed—by interested parties—to be made much of), all remains quiet in Upper Sinde."[18]

Before, however, Captain Brown's letter reached Ali Morad the parties had fought the Battle of Nownahar. In the Digest of the following date [i.e., 16th September, 1842] it is reported: "An action took place yesterday in the neighborhood of Khyrpore between the followers of Meer Ali Morad and those of Meers Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan in which the former were victorious. The loss was very trifling: 60 killed of the latter party and 12 of the former. Meer

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Mahomed Ali (brother of Meer Nusseer Khan) is said to have been wounded. The hostilities have, for the present, ceased." The following is a clear account of the action: "Yesterday morning (15th September) Meer Ali Morad took up a position with his whole force at Buksh, Ali Khan Talpoor's village. Meer Roostum, Meer Nusseer, Meer Zangee Khan, Meer Mahomed Ali Khan, Ali Mahomed Khan, Meer Shere Mahomed, Wullee Mahomed Khan, Meer Ali Buksh, Meer Ali Akhbar, Meer Ali Murdhan, Meer Morad Hyder and a host of their allies and retainers took up their ground on the salt manufacturer's mill near Captain Kennedy's old quarters (near Khyrpore). Meer Mahomed Ali Khan, Meer Ali Buksh and Meer Wullee Mahomed immediately advanced rapidly to the nullah [i.e., ravine] near the Sekunder bridge and commenced hostilities. Goolam Mahomed Beloochee Charikzye (a follower of Meer Nusseer Khan) rushed forward with a body of men and seized one of Ali Morad's guns. Hookumut Khan and Syed Ahmed Shah, however, with an overpowering force rushed forward with determined violence and drove back Mahomed Ali Khan's men with great slaughter until they fled to where Meer Roostum Khan and the other Ameers were seated. Then the whole of the Meers Roostum and Nusseer Khan's force fled back on Khyrpore. Meer Mahomed Ali Khan (wounded in the leg with a matchlock ball) was so hard pressed by the enemy that—with some 40 or 50 men—they were obliged to take refuge in koomor (a salt hill). There, surrounded by Ali Morad's force without food or water, they were virtually prisoners when my informant came away. Nor can Nusseer Khan's force afford any assistance. Meer Roostum, seeing the state of things, sent his seal by his son Meer Ali Murdhan to Ali Morad with a carte blanche for any terms he might choose to dictate. Meer Ali Morad replied that, 'He came there to fight and to recover the lands and properties that Meers Roostum and Mobarick unjustly seized of his when he was a boy.' On the return of Meer Ali Murdhan, Meer Roostum and Syed Ali Gohur—taking with them

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the Koran—proceeded to Ali Morad's quarters to entreat him to cease fighting and to withdraw. When my informant came away, Meer Roostum and Ali Gohur were still at Ali Morad's camp. The loss on Ali Morad's side has been some 11 or 12 killed and a few wounded. On the side of Nusseer Khan, 60 killed and a considerable number wounded. Sultan Shah Syed is among the killed. Meer Ali Buksh is badly wounded through the arm."[19] At the conclusion of the same Digest, it is stated: "Meer Roostum Khan and Meer Nusseer Khan have satisfied the claims of Meer Ali Morad by transferring to him nine villages. Hostilities have—for the present—been suspended but for Meer Roostum continuing to collect troops and repair his guns. It is generally believed that he is temporizing and intends, when in sufficient force, to meet Ali Morad in the field again."[20]

"Meers Roostum and Nusseer Khan continue to collect troops and repair their guns, with the avowed intention of attacking Meer Ali Morad. Meer Roostum had again summoned Meer Mahomed Hussein (his eldest son) to Khyrpore—threatening to make Meer Nusseer Khan head of the Talpoor family should he any longer refuse to obey the summons. Meer Roostum issued orders to seize certain jagheers [i.e., feudal lands] belonging to persons who aided Ali Morad in the late fight."[21]

"Sheikh Ali Hussein (vakeel of Meer Ali Morad) waited upon Captain Brown to show him the agreement written in the Koran of his Master, consequent on the late fight at Khyrpore with Meer Roostum Khan. Captain Brown declined having any more to say in the matter as the Ameer had not thought fit to follow the advice he had formerly given to him on the subject. It appears that the Ameer sent his mother and aunt to Meer Roostum Khan to endeavor to persuade him to act up to the agreement lately written in Ali Morad's Koran. In this, however, they failed. On the contrary, the Chief calls on Ali Morad to return

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Bubhaloo and the other villages, the right to which (after being so long disputed) had been given in his [i.e., Ali Morad's] favour."[22]

4. Such were the circumstances under which the Treaty of Nownahar originated. I now proceed to the second head of my minute, namely to describe the nature and object of the fraudulent act imputed to His Highness Ali Morad and the manner in which it was perpetrated. This charge was first officially brought forward in a memorandum without date—but written shortly before he relinquished the Government of Sinde—by His Excellency Sir Charles Napier.[23] It was to the effect that—by means of substituting a fabricated for a genuine document—he had appropriated to himself a district instead of certain villages. In other words, by making interpolations and additions in the Treaty of Nownahar, he obtained the possession of the purgunnahs [i.e., districts] of Meerpoore, Mahtela and Mehurkee instead of the villages of Dadaloo, Mathela and seven others. That he afterwards substituted a leaf in the Koran containing these alterations, copied fairly, in lieu of the one on which they had been originally made. In the first instance, the alterations were made in the original Treaty. It happens that from some cause, however, a suspicion arose that a forgery had been committed and Captain Pope (Collector of Sukkur) requested that the Koran containing the original Treaty might be sent to him for inspection. This demand threw Meer Ali Morad into great perplexity for the interpolations and erasure in the original were too manifest to escape detection. In the words of one of the witnesses: "After much consideration (Ali Morad) proposed that the Treaty was written on four pages. The alternations and erasures had only been made on the first and the one containing the seals was perfect. The first leaf should be taken out and another written by Peer Ali Gohur substituted for it." This was accordingly done. The Peer employed to extract the old and substitute the new leaf was no doubt selected by Ali Morad because he was the writer of the original Treaty. But he could not be

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prevailed upon to commit the fraud until Ali Morad had given him a certificate of indemnity relieving him from responsibility, in the event of the fraud being (at any future period) detected by the British Government. The Peer is one of the witnesses in support of the charge and states: "The difference made in the Treaty, as originally written, was purgunnah (districts) was substituted for deh (villages) before Mahtela and the words "Meerpore barnae Mehurkee" were written after Mahtela." The original Treaty of Nownahar was written on the 9th Shabhan 1258 (5th September 1842). The fraud was committed on the issue of the proclamation confiscating Subzulkote and Bhoongbara but the leaf was not extracted until 3rd Rujub 1259 (31st July 1843). Between the two transactions there was an interval of nearly 11 months.[24]

5. It now remains to explain the object of this barefaced fraud. Sir Charles Napier arrived at Sukkur on the 4th October 1842.[25] On the 1st December following, he informed the Ameers that—in consequence of certain infractions of the Treaty on their part—he was ordered by the Governor General to confiscate Roree and the left bank of the Indus up to the Bhawulpore frontier.[26] His Excellency also desired them to meet at Hyderabad and subscribe their names to a draft Treaty that he had received from the Governor General. The confiscated territory yielded an annual revenue of Rupees 610,500 and contained the following districts [i.e., Subzulkote and Bhoong-Bhara].[27] On the 18th December, Sir Charles Napier issued the following Proclamation: "The Governor General of India has ordered me to take possession of the districts of Subzelkote and of Bhoong-Bhara and to re-annex the said districts to the territory of His Highness the Nawab of Bhawulpore, to whom they will be immediately made over. His Highness guaranteeing all contracts made between the Ameers and private individuals not within the said districts, in such manner as shall hereafter arranged in fulfilling the detail of the Treaty.[28] It is hereby also made known that if the Ameers

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collect any revenue in advance of the 1st January 1843 or shall impose any new tax upon the ryots of the above named districts, the said Ameers shall be amerced to that amount in arranging the new Treaty and this amercement shall be enforced to a larger amount than the Ameers may have so levied upon the people of the said Districts. C.J. Napier Major General (signed)."[29]

6. Shortly after the conquest of Sinde, "Sir Charles Napier reported to the then Governor General (Lord Ellenborough) the principles by which he had been guided in the occupation of the territory acquired by that event. These principles were recognized as being conformable to the law of the country and creed of the parties (which we were bound by Treaty to abide) by the assumption of the Turban, or badge of sovereignty, by Meer Ali Morad, in virtue of the voluntary resignation in his favour by his elder brother Meer Roostum (any retraction of which was—by the same law—inadmissible).[30] Sir C. Napier also reported on the appropriation of the lands that had belonged to Meer Roostum, both in right of the Turban and as his personal patrimony under a will of their father Sohrab (in as far as they were in Meer Roostum's rightful possession) at the outbreak of the war. Sir C. Napier also recognized Ali Morad's right to all such lands as were in his own rightful possession at the same period and retained all the rest for the British Government, in right of conquest or of forfeiture imposed on the Khyrpore Ameers generally for breach of engagements previous to the war." As I shall hereafter have occasion to show, Lord Ellenborough assented to these principles with one important exception.[31] With much reason His Lordship questioned the legality, freedom and authenticity of the transfer of all personal patrimony by Meer Roostum to Meer Ali Morad.

7. Hence it will be at once seen that it was Ali Morad's interest to establish as large a possession as possible north of Roree at the

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outbreak of the war. In order to effect this, he did not scruple (immediately after he had raised himself to power on the ruin of his brother Ameers) to practice a shameless fraud on the British Government by deceiving Sir Charles Napier in the manner above mentioned. Accordingly, on the 7th October 1843, he addressed the following letter to Sir Charles Napier: "Meer Nusseer Khan, son of the late Mobarick Khan, had given me in writing on the Koran the purgunnah Meerpore Mahtela, deh Dadaloo and Soonderbugla and three villages which were formerly in his own possession. A copy of the page in question has already been seen by you and the matter is as clear as the sun at noonday. About a month ago, Captain Pope came to Khyrpore to enquire into the question of the transfer of the 'Pugree' and, at that time, also examined into the above case—taking the evidence of many respectable witnesses as to the writing in the Koran (such as Meer Shungi Khan, Kumal Khan Tulbanee, with many others). Besides this, you wrote me—just before you left Sukkur—that you would confirm me in the possession of the aforesaid purgunnah and villages. I therefore now write that I may be confirmed in the purgunnah and villages aforesaid."[32] Captain Pope was directed by Sir C. Napier to report upon the matter.[33] After having inspected the original Treaty of Nownahar (of course in absence of any charge against Ali Morad) and failing to detect the fraud he was practicing, he reported as follows: "Peer Ali Gohur (the principle syed in Sinde) avowed the deed to be in his handwriting. Of the fact, therefore, of the deed having been duly written and sealed little doubt can exist. The balance of testimony, however, as well as the universal voice of the whole country is decidedly against it having been sealed voluntarily by Meer Nusseer Khan. He appears to have been seated sullenly on the ground, some 10 or 20 paces from the rest of the Chiefs. On being applied to for his seal, he is stated to have said that he had it not with him. The ex-Ameer Roostum Khan then went up to him and—after trying all in his

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power to reconcile him to what he said was inevitable—put his hands in his nephew's waistband, from which he drew the seal and applied it to the deed. His Highness never appears to have obtained possession of the places thus ceded until the whole of the country came temporarily into his possession in January 1843.[34] His Highness had frequently and fully admitted to me in conversation that the cession was not willingly made. I give His Highness' exact words: 'Luskur Leea' (i.e., it was conquered country or one that he won in war). This is apparently irreconcilable with His Highness' allegations in his letter to the Government of India."

8. Although in his correspondence with the Governor General (alluded to in paragraph 6 of this minute) Sir Charles Napier advocated His Highness Ali Morad's claim to retain the country he possessed north of Roree, his right thereto has never been recognized by the British Government. The following extract from a memorandum prepared by the Commissioner in Sinde explains the reason why it still remains in abeyance: "In the meantime a circumstance had come to Sir C. Napier's knowledge (or, rather, he obtained proofs corroborative of former suspicion in respect to it) which tended to invalidate the authenticity of one of the documents on which the application of his principles to the forfeited territory north of Roree had been based. This document was a Treaty purporting to have been executed between Meer Ali Morad, Meer Roostum and Meer Nusseer Khan (the son of their brother Meer Mobarick) towards the close of the year 1842 and shortly before the events which led to the war with the British. At that time, the family dissensions of these Ameers had been brought to arms and (in an action in which Ali Morad had the advantage) peace was purchased by the other two by the cession to him of certain lands enumerated in this Treaty, which was written in a copy of the Koran. In virtue of this document, the lands ceded by Meer Nusseer Khan (and which would, otherwise having belonged to neither to Meer Roostum nor to Meer Ali Morad, have been

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appropriated by us in the application of Sir Charles Napier's principles) had been appropriated by favour to Meer Ali Morad as having been in his rightful possession at the time of the conquest. It was, however, brought to Sir Charles Napier's knowledge that a fraud had been committed by Ali Morad in respect to this document by endeavoring to substitute in it the word 'district' for 'village' in the designation of a place in which the village and its surrounding district bore the same name and interpolating the names of some districts altogether. When this attempt was unsuccessful, the leaf itself—on which the names were written—had been extracted and the matter which it bore was written afresh with the desired alterations and additions on another blank leaf of the same Koran by the same person by whom the original Treaty had been written. The effect of which was to convey to Ali Morad districts of considerable value in place of villages of trifling extent."[35]

9. It must have been mortifying, indeed, to Sir Charles Napier to have discovered that one (for whom he had done and sacrificed so much) could have been guilty of such an imprudent fraud.[36] I now pass on to the third head of my minute, namely, to recapitulate the evidence—oral and documentary—by which the charge against Ali Morad has been supported.

10. I would first notice in terms of great satisfaction, the ability, care and impartiality with which the Commission conducted the inquiry. The inquiry commenced on the 20th April at Sukkur and terminated on the 8th May. At the outset, the Commission addressed a letter to His Highness Ali Morad explaining the nature of the charge against him. It invited him to suggest the mode in which the inquiry could proceed with the least violence to his feelings, informed him that all the evidence would be taken de novo and that it was optional for His Highness either to attend in person or by vakeel to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to produce

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evidence in refutation of their allegations. His Highness resolved to appear before the Commission in person, attended by such persons as he desired to be present. In availing himself of his right of cross-examination and in his comments on the evidence, he exhibited much acumen and ability.[37] At his own request, he was supplied with copies—not only of the depositions taken before the Commission but also those which had been previously taken during the preliminary inquiry conducted by Mr. Pringle—and was thus afforded the opportunity of exposing the mis-statements and discrepancies which false witnesses examined at distant intervals are likely to commit. When during the progress of the inquiry the documentary evidence was found to press so hard against His Highness, the Commission addressed His Highness in writing by noticing the points which particularly called for explanation. His replies will be found recorded on the proceedings. Finally, the Commission adjourned from the 22nd to the 26th April to enable His Highness to prepare his defence. It must, I think, be admitted that—with all these facilities and advantages—His Highness has failed to establish his innocence. This has arisen from the irresistible and conclusive nature of the evidence adduced in support of the charge and from no other course.

11. The oral evidence consists of the testimony of 1st Sheikh Ali Hussein, who at the time of the imputed fraud was the confidential Minister to His Highness Ali Morad but whose service he left in consequence of a quarrel.[38] He states that the main cause of the quarrel was a remonstrance on his part pointing out how wrong it was on the part of Ali Morad "deceitfully to appropriate any possessions which belonged to the British Government who had been so kind to him" and recommending him to restore them. I do not believe this. I have no doubt the ex-Minister was originally a party to the fraud and that the motive which has now induced him to denounce his Master is irritation in consequence of his not having been sufficiently awarded with a due share of what Ali Morad had

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unlawfully acquired. It was this person who first communicated the fraud to Sir Charles Napier as being within his personal knowledge, supporting his accusation by asserting that the leaf extracted from the Koran was in his possession. Fortunately, this person and a second witness were examined several times at distant intervals. He was first interrogated by the late Captain Brown by order of Sir Charles Napier. Again by Mr. Pringle on the 9th January 1850 and, finally, by the Commission. A careful comparison of the testimony he gave on each of these occasions will show that it is consistent throughout and this therefore is much in favour of his veracity.[39] On the supposition that his testimony is false, discrepancies and contradictions could scarcely have been avoided but none, of any consequence, are observable. Sheikh Ali Hussein was present at the Battle of Nownahar and was an eyewitness of the Treaty that was then conducted. This Treaty was written in a Koran by Peer Ali Gohur, the second witness. The cession originally made consisted only of the villages of Dadaloo and Mahtela and seven villages belonging to Meer Roostum. It so happened that on the date of the battle a letter was received from Captain Brown remonstrating against Ali Morad's violent proceedings and, in the reply thereto written on the same day, the nature of the cession was correctly specified. A correct copy of the Treaty was also furnished, by deponent, to a moonshee [i.e., an indigenous secretary]—named Towur Mull—employed by the late Major Clibborn to collect intelligence. Three days after the battle, deponent was sent by Ali Morad with another correct copy and the Koran in which it was written to Captain Brown. A copy was deposited in the records of the Sukkur Agency. Shortly after the promulgation of Sir Charles Napier's Proclamation of the 18th December 1842 confiscating all the territory belonging to the Khyrpore Ameers, with the exception of what belonged to Ali Morad, the latter wrote a letter (to Sir C. Napier) claiming the purgunnah of Mahtela. In order to establish his right thereto, he changed the word deh (village) before

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Mahtela into purgunnah (district).[40] In doing this, the original document was damaged and Ali Morad required Peer Ali Gohur to write a new leaf. His Highness wrote to deponent that the Peer declined to do this without a certificate of indemnity and ordered him to prepare one, which he did. The Peer at this same time wrote to deponent that Ali Morad was frightening and threatening to disgrace him. Deponent advised him to do as he was required after receiving the certificate and he did so. The interpolations and erasures on the extracted leaf were made some months before the extraction and remained in that state until Captain Pope sent for the Koran containing the Treaty, when the leaf was taken out and a new one substituted. His Highness sent the altered Treaty to deponent and he took it to Captain Pope, who examined but not detected the fraud. The extracted leaf, at this time in the Koran, fell out and attracted Captain Pope's notice. But deponent lulled suspicion by equivocating. The ex-Minister enters into minute details regarding the circumstance in which the Treaty of Nownahar arose and deposes that Captain Brown's moonshee, Moiedeen, having—in consideration of a bribe of 10,000 Rupees—abstracted from the records of the Sinde Government the correct copy of the Treaty furnished in September 1842 by His Highness Ali Morad. The statement of this witness is fully confirmed by Peer Ali Gohur, the next witness in importance. This person was an influential Syed in Upper Sinde. He appears to have been employed as the writer of state papers in the archives of the Khyrpore family. He was first examined by Lieutenant Younghusband (Lieutenant of Police in Sinde), again by Mr. Pringle on the 29th December 1849 and finally by the Commission.[41] Like the ex-Minister, he is said to have quarreled with Ali Morad and to have fled from his service. But nothing very precise is stated as to the nature of the quarrel. He was present at the Battle of Nownahar—he was sent by Meer Roostum to sue for terms but failed. He then describes how Meer Roostum himself purchased peace by a cession of certain

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villages under a Treaty which deponent himself wrote in the Koran. This account of the circumstances under which the leaf was extracted and a new leaf in his handwriting was substituted exactly tallies into that of the first witness: "The Meer (he deposes) made me enter on the blank page—next to the one which had been injured and taken out—the words that had been written on it." He does not know by whom the erasures and additions in the original Treaty were made (or when) but heard it was done at the time of the Proclamation annexing the country." On being asked why after so long an interval the leaf was extracted and a new one substituted, he replied: "The forgery was apparent and Captain Pope was coming to examine the Koran. On this account, the new leaf was written. Captain Pope saw the Koran and deponent acknowledged to him that the Treaty was in his hand writing." The testimony of these two witnesses is corroborated in some of its most essential details by moonshee Towur Mull, who (at the time of the Battle of Nownahar) was employed by the late Major Clibborn to collect intelligence. Having reported the Battle of Nownahar to his Master, he was sent to enquire about it. Meeting with the first witness, he took out a Koran and showed him the Treaty with three seals affixed to it. In this it was written that a dispute had occurred about Soonderbula and Roostum Khan had made peace by giving seven villages on his own part and two villages (Dadaloo and Mahtela) on that of Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Mahomed Ali Khan.[42] Having read it, he begged a copy. Having obtained one in the handwriting of Bushurut Ali, he returned to Sukkur. Having made a copy of this copy himself, he gave it to Major Clibborn (who sent it to Captain Brown). Deponent identified the Koran containing the Treaty by the seals and by the "title page being ornamented in a particular way." Having perused the Treaty, he pointed out the forgery that had been committed. "At the time deh Mahtela, or the village of Mahtela, was only written in it. But now there is purgunnah Mahtela, Meerpore, Mehurkee or the districts of

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those names." Besides these witnesses we have the evidence of Meer Mahomed Hussein, the eldest son of the late Roostum, who—although proscribed from remaining in Sinde—of his own accord (and uninvited) boldly appeared before the Commission. Besides producing three original letters to be hereafter alluded to (which appear to me to be conclusive of Ali Morad's guilt and of the real nature of the cession made at Nownahar), deposed that it consisted of seven villages of Meer Roostum's, one of Meer Nusseer Khan's and one of Meer Mahomed Ali's. He added that Ali Morad did not obtain possession of the village until after the disturbances in Sinde commenced. On being asked to enumerate the villages, he did so with perfect accuracy and explained that although the dispute was between Ali Morad and Meer Nusseer Khan—and not with Meer Roostum—the latter ceded his villages to terminate the disturbance because Nusseer Khan would not consent to give up his county. When we come to the documentary evidence, it will be seen that Meer Roostum (at the time of the cession) wrote a very particular account of the transaction to his son, a very natural proceeding when we consider that he had just alienated forever a portion of the inheritance that would on his death have devolved on his son. There is also the evidence of a person named Jokeeram (formerly in the Political Agent's office at Shikarpore and afterwards head moonshee in the Collector's office) and supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with the transactions of the period (although he does not appear to have been an eyewitness of the fraud, the evidence he gave is recorded on the preliminary inquiry and confirms the testimony of the other witnesses in many particulars). I shall not further notice it, not only because Jokeeram was not reexamined by the Commission but also because it is stated that, "He was tried and imprisoned for bribery and embezzlement (and well known as a very talented although unworthy person)."[43] Finally, the abstraction of confidential papers from the late Captain Brown's office is confirmed by Mr. Maher (a

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clerk in his office), who remembers the theft of a box of papers containing a book which related to the transactions about the time of the Treaty of Nownahar (although he cannot positively assert that the translation of the Treaty was in it) and that suspicion fell on the moonshee Moiedeen—who was placed in confinement on that account.

12. In regard to the conclusion to be drawn from the oral evidence, of which I have now given a summary, I cannot more clearly express my opinion than by citing the following extract from a very able paper drawn up by Mr. Pringle for the information of the Most Noble the Governor General of India: "The evidence in support of the allegation seems nearly as conclusive as it is possible for any evidence regarding such a transaction to be. The witnesses are persons who, at the time, stood high in the confidence of Ali Morad and occupied the most influential status about his person. They profess to have been eyewitnesses of the fact and one of them, Peer Ali Gohur, to have been the agent in its commission (against the consequences of which to himself he produces a certificate of indemnity from Ali Morad purporting to bear his seal and autograph authentication). The other witness, Sheikh Ali Hussein, has produced the extracted leaf of the Koran on which the interpolations are alleged to have been, at first, unsuccessfully attempted and which it appears had fallen into his possession and been carefully preserved by him. The evidence of the two witnesses was given on different occasions (remote from and—apparently—quite independent of each other). It agrees in every particular and is borne out by the proofs to which it refers. The Koran from which the leaf is said to have been extracted has been obtained from Ali Morad for inspection. The only point in which its appearance, at first sight, raised a doubt is that the matter of the Treaty being written on four pages. The first three of which are on one sheet so that the extracted leaf could not easily have been bound in between the first and second pages, unless it had also been

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part of a whole leaf instead of a single leaf as it now appears. But the other leaf may have been blank and become separated in the process of extraction and its preservation may not have been cared for."[44] Peer Ali Gohur's evidence on this point—before the Koran and the extracted leaf were shown to him—did not quite agree with their actual appearance but is a point on which a trifling discrepancy (at so long an interval of time) does not appear to affect his general credibility. The evidence of these two witnesses is further confirmed by that given independently by one Jokeeram (now a prisoner in the Shikarpore jail for embezzlement but formerly a moonshee in the British Agency in Upper Sinde and supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with transactions of the period). He does not, however, appear to have been a eyewitness. Finally, the allusions to the events in the correspondence of the British Agency—at the time when they occurred—with the Ameers of Khyrpore (including Ali Morad himself) tend to the inference that the cessions, in respect to which the fraud is alleged to have been subsequently committed, were of inconsiderable value and not of the large amount which, under its operation, now appear.[45] It is true the witnesses are reputed to be notorious and unscrupulous intriguers. They are, by their own showing, accessories in the alleged fraud and they are now at bitter enmity with Ali Morad. It is therefore just possible that they may have conspired to get up this charge against him. But the particularity and consistency of their statements and the concurrence of the collateral circumstances are so strong as hardly to be overborne by these considerations. While, on the other hand, there is little, unfortunately, in the personal character of Ali Morad to oppose any great obstacle to the credibility of their allegations.

13. I now proceed to explain the nature of the documentary evidence in support of the charge. First, there is an exact copy and translation of the Treaty of Nownahar as it now stands in the Koran.[46] Second, there is the leaf alleged to have been extracted from the

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Koran and corresponding in size with the other leaves now containing the Treaty. The Commission remarks that between the words "Dadaloo" and "Mahtela" the word "deh" appears to have been altered to "purgunnah" and that, in attempting to make "Bur-meerzee" into "Mehurkee," the paper seems to have been spoiled. Third, there is a piece of waste paper on which Peer Ali Gohur states he wrote a few words before writing the fresh pages in the Koran.[47] He did this to try his hand before he committed the forgery. The words written on this paper, here and there, bear out this assertion. They are: "and the village Dadaloo and purgunnah Mahtela," the first four words of the sentence being repeated. Then we have: "Meerpoor, Mehr, Mehr, Meer, Meer, in the name of the most merciful God" and, finally, "Mehurkee." Fourth, there is a copy of the Treaty from the government records and endorsed as having been received the 4th April 1843.[48] The Commission noted that the village "Abraba" is included in the cession by Meer Roostum, whereas in the copy in the Koran the village "Ranna" is written. They regard this is a mere mistake of the copyist. But they remark that, in the extracted leaf, there is a strong appearance of "Abraba" having also been first written without the word "deh" before it and afterwards changed into "deh Rana" (or the village Ranna), as it now stands in the Koran. This apparent alteration of the name of the village, although why it was made does not appear, probably led to the mistake of the copyist in the copy of the Treaty now on the records of government. They further point out that after the words "purgunnah Mahtela Meerpoor, Mehurkee," the word "khood" stands alone in this copy, whereas in that in the Koran "Bu Meerzee Khood" are inserted. This is probably owing to the attempt to alter "Bur Meerzee" in the extracted leaf or, perhaps, "Meerzee" alone into "Mehurkee" when it may have been intended to trust entirely to interpolations for the alterations required. A mistake has also been made in this copy in omitting the word "gahee" (meaning "ever") but this does not affect the sense.

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Fifth, there is the original certificate of indemnity granted by Meer Ali Morad to Peer Ali Gohur absolving him from the consequences of having perpetrated the forgery and having His Highness' seal and sign manual.[49] Sixth, there is a copy of the Treaty of Nownahar, which was given by Ali Morad's Minister Sheikh Ali Hussein to the moonshee Towur Mull (a copy of which copy is stated to have been given to Major Clibborn for the late Captain Brown).[50] The Commission noticed several clerical errors and variations in this copy when compared with the Treaty in the Koran and with the extracted leaf. On the whole, however, I am of opinion that these rather tell in favour, than otherwise, of the genuineness of the document for if it had been made for an object—that is to support the charge—it would have been made perfect.

14. The above may be considered the first portion of the documentary evidence, which may be conveniently classified together. The first document needs no remark as it was produced by His Highness Ali Morad as the genuine and original Treaty of Nownahar. The Koran in which it is written was identified as the one from which the leaf was extracted by the three principal witnesses—Sheikh Ali Hussein, Peer Ali Gohur and Towur Mull. The second was given by the first of these witnesses to Sir Charles Napier, through his moonshee Ali Akbhar, who states: "Ali Morad had given it to him to take care of. It was extracted at Khyrpore in the presence of my Moonshee Bushurut Ali and the Peer. I was not myself present. Having attempted to dissuade Ali Morad from the deed, my moonshee brought the Koran and the loose leaf was in it. The Koran was afterwards taken to Captain Pope, who had heard a rumor of the fraud. He inspected it but did not detect the fraud. The Treaty was written on 4 pages, commencing on the page on the right side of the book and ending with a page on the left side (on which were the seals). The extracted matter was on the first page. The rest remained as it originally was in the Koran—one sheet forming two leaves was

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extracted, of which one leaf was blank. Two blank sheets were then transferred from the beginning of the book in order to rewrite the page extracted. The binding of the book was undone for this purpose. The moonshee told me this. After showing the Koran to Captain Pope, I went to Bubbeelow and returned the Koran to Ali Morad, taking out the two extracted leaves which I kept with me." The Peer then states: "The first page is the one that I rewrote, the remaining three pages—on the last of which are the three seals—are my original writing." Major Clibborn's moonshee states: "This is the very leaf that was in the Treaty originally." I see no reason for doubting the truth of the above evidence. To some it may appear unaccountable how Ali Morad could have allowed such strong proof of his guilt to have passed out of his possession. But Sheikh Ali Hussein was then in his full confidence and he may have forgotten it or success, in a series of unprincipled deeds, may have made him careless. The third document is thus described by the Peer: "It appears to be an attempt to write certain words fair but I do not recollect." Sheikh Ali Hussein says: "It is the blank page on which the Peer tried his hand." In his examination before the Commission, the Peer states: "It is a paper on which I wrote a few of the words required to see if I could insert them properly in the fair copy and that the ink was all right." It appears to me that this document is corroborative of the truth of the story of the witnesses, for it seems extremely unlikely that such a device should have occurred to them as an afterthought in support of a conspiracy. The fourth document is strongly corroborative of Ali Morads' guilt. It is a copy of the Treaty of Nownahar clandestinely entered into the Sinde records in lieu of the genuine copy originally furnished to Captain Brown, subsequently abstracted through the knavery of the moonshee Moiedeen.[51] It is in the handwriting of Bushurut Ali. Sheikh Ali Hussein deposes: "Two or three days after the Treaty, I produced the Koran before Captain Brown, to whom I delivered a letter from Meer Ali Morad enclosing a copy of the Treaty

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written by either Moonshee Bushurut Ali or Kishondass for the records of government." Before Mr. Pringle, he stated: "The rough copy of the Treaty of Nownahar was written by me and the Meer sent a copy to the British authorities." It, of course, became necessary after the Treaty had been altered to destroy the decisive evidence that this copy afforded of the forgery and the manner in which it was effected strongly illustrated Ali Morad's unprincipled conduct. He corrupted the moonshee Moiedeen by promising him a bribe of 10,000 Rupees on producing the copy. The moonshee in the first instance attempted to deceive his employer by stating that the document required had been lost in the attack on the Residency at Hyderabad. He had also the effrontery to claim the promised reward on the plea that, as the document had been lost, all discussion respecting the alteration of the word "deh" into "purgunnah" was at an end. Ali Morad, however, was not to be so deceived. When on a visit at Hyderabad, he repeated his promise to pay the Rupees 10,000 provided that the moonshee "would get for him the book in which translations of this kind were kept." Moiedeen agreed but demanded security for the payment of the bribe when he had performed his part of the contract and, at Ali Morad's request, his Minister, Sheikh Ali Hussein, became security. The moonshee soon after abstracted the book and received the amount promised. Sheikh Ali Hussein states that the copy I am now remarking on—corresponding with the forged Treaty—was introduced by himself into the Sinde records on the 4th April 1843 and this fact is established by an endorsement to the effect that it was received on that date. Hence, it is clear that some reason existed for placing the document on our records and, as the subject of the Treaty of Nownahar was not then under discussion, no other reason can be assigned except that stated in the evidence—namely that it was so placed in lieu of the copy which had been abstracted by Moiedeen. The ex-Minister further states that Ali Morad sent him to a man named Hafiz Noor Mahomed Khan with

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a letter directing him to attend to whatever he might say.[52] "Hafiz was provided with a piece of paper on which was written the words "Purgunnah Mahtela Meerpoor Mehurkee," which he said he had been directed to show and take back and that I was to give a copy of the Treaty written by my own moonshee with these alterations to be placed on the Government records. I did all this." The copy being now produced he recognized it as being the one written by his moonshee, Bushurut Ali, after the forgery had been committed because the purgunnahs of Mahtela and Meerpoor are inserted in it. This evidence is corroborated by that of Major Clibborn's moonshee, Towur Mull, who states that on the 18th September 1842 Ali Morad's Minister brought the Koran to Captain Brown and explained all that had occurred. Moonshee Moiedeen placed a copy of this in the Persian records and had a translation made in English. After the Battle of Meeanee, I heard Moiedeen "had lost the Persian and English copies of the Treaty of Nownahar on the records of Government." Suspicion fell on the Moonshee. Captain Brown was very angry and put Moiedeen under arrest. He was subsequently released, on his stating that the book had been lost in the attack on the Residency. When Ali Morad came to Hyderabad, I heard that the moonshee had given him the book containing the copies. The fact of a book of confidential records having been lost and of suspicion falling on Moiedeen is fully confirmed by the evidence of Mr. Maher, a confidential clerk in Captain Brown's Service (and still in the Commissioner's Office): "I recollect (says Mr. Maher) that about June 1843 a box was stolen from Captain Brown's table containing Major Outram's secret letters and important papers written during his stay at Khyrpore. It also contained some valuable Persian documents. "Captain" Brown told me this. In the box was an English book that was wholly written by myself. It was endorsed "secret." It related to the dispute between the Ameers of Upper Sinde and commenced about September 1842. Some of the papers related to

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the Treaty of Nownahar but I do not recollect whether a copy or translation was among them. Every inquiry was made and suspicion fell on Moonshee Moiedeen "who was currently believed to have taken it." He was suspended but, as nothing could be proved against him, he was again employed for a short time and then dismissed altogether. The box, with its content, was never afterward heard of." The fifth document (or the certificate of indemnity), is identified by Sheikh Ali Hussein as written by himself with Ali Morad's seal affixed to it. The Peer also identified it and states it was written immediately before he wrote the new leaf—pointing out Ali Morad's seal and the word "buhal" (or confirmed) as His Highness's autograph authentication. This also is strong corroborative evidence of His Highness' guilt. The sixth, and last document, is very important. It purports to be the identical copy of the Treaty of Nownahar furnished by Sheikh Ali Hussein to Major Clibborn's moonshee Towur Mull, who was employed by that officer to collect intelligence of passing events. In this, of course, only the nine villages actually ceded to Ali Morad are enumerated. It is identified by the ex-Minister as a true copy of the original taken before the forgery was committed and, as he believes, in the handwriting of his moonshee Bushurut Ali, who is now at Saharanpore. In his examination by Mr. Pringle, he states "Moonshee Towur Mull was sent to me formerly by Major Clibborn to get a copy of the Treaty of Nownahar. I gave him a copy of it as it was, originally, without any allusion to purgunnahs." Towur Mull himself states: "For several years after, I had shown it to Captain Brown. I kept the copy of the Treaty made for me by Bushurut Ali until the Commission arrived at Sukkur, when I gave it to Mr. Younghusband. I did not show it to anyone but mentioned it to Captain Malet and Major Goldney." On Exhibit F (No. 6) being shown to him, he identifies it and—after reading it over—observes: "This is the same and no alteration has been made in it."[53] The Commission points out that the word "deh Mahtela" appear to them

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to have been partly erased and altered and he replies: "The copy is just as it was when Bushurut Ali gave it to me when I was speaking to Sheikh Ali Hussein. "There is no difference in it." On being asked, the witness states that what is now written is "wa deh Mahtela."

15. The second portion of the documentary evidence consists of extracts from the correspondence of the British Agency (at the time of the Battle and Treaty of Nownahar) with the Ameers of Khyrpore (including Ali Morad himself) and which contain allusions establishing that the cession, in respect to which the committed fraud, was of trifling value and not of the large amount which, in consequence of the alleged fraud, it now appears. In other words, the cession consisted of villages only and not of districts. This will be found in Exhibit D (No. 1 to No. 20) of the appendix to the Commission's proceedings.[54] I shall now briefly notice the principal documents of the series. The first of the series is a letter from Ali Morad to Captain Brown complaining of the conduct of Meer Nusseer Khan and of the sons of Meer Roostum, stating they intended to wage war against him.[55] It is dated 1st Shaban (7th September 1842). From another letter, it appears that Captain Brown reported the arrival of a mission on the 10th September from Meer Roostum making counter complaints that Ali Morad had advanced with his forces to Khyrpore.[56] Upon this, Captain Brown addressed a letter of remonstrance to Ali Morad requiring him to dispense his troops.[57] About the same time Meer Nusseer Khan also complained against Ali Morad, stating that—if violence was resorted to—he had no alternative but to fight.[58] This reached Captain Brown on the 15th September 1842—the very day on which the Battle of Nownahar was fought and which was reported to Major Outram on the 16th September. After this, Meer Nusseer Khan wrote another letter complaining bitterly against Ali Morad's violence and stating: "Meer Roostum Khan managed to settle matters and put an end to the

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strife. I was obliged to satisfy the hungry beggar with a morsel and so put him off for the time."[59] Ali Morad also wrote an apologetic letter throwing the blame on the opposite party.[60] This contains the following important admission: "Meer Roostum Khan then came forward as arbitrator and gave up some of his own villages and also of Meer Nusseer Khan as compensation for the injury I had sustained and the expense of collecting troops amounting to some lacs of Rupees." He adds that this did not satisfy him but that the receipt of Captain Brown's letter of remonstrance had induced him to accept the terms. In a postscript, he adds: "My faithful servant Sheikh Ali Hussein will shortly wait upon you with the Koran, containing the agreement, showing the seals of Meer Roostum and Meer Nusseer Khan and relate all particulars." A letter from Meer Roostum was also received, giving his account of the battle and strongly inveighing against Ali Morad's perfidy, disrespect and dissimulation towards him "who am the Rais or head of the tribe."[61] Passing over the other letters, which do not require to be noticed, we come to Captain Brown's Digests of Intelligence from the 13th to the 19th and from the 20th to the 27th September 1842.[62] The former contains an account of the battle and under the date the 20th there is the following conclusive entry in Captain Brown's own handwriting. (There can be no mistake, for from another letter we learn that on the morning of the 20th Ali Morad's Minister had waited upon Captain Brown and had—no doubt—shown him the Koran containing the agreement.) The entry is: "Meer Roostum and Meer Nusseer Khan have satisfied the claims of Meer Ali Morad by transferring to him nine villages and hostilities have been for the present suspended. But from Meer Roostum continuing to collect troops and repair his guns, it is generally believed that he is temporizing and intends—when in sufficient strength—to meet Meer Ali Morad in the field again." In addition to these proofs—collected by the Commission—that the cession consisted of villages and not of purgunnahs, I find that in a

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postscript to a letter addressed by this Government to the Honourable the Secret Committee (dated the 1st October 1842) it is reported as follows: "Letters have this morning been received from Sukkur dated the 17th ultimo (September) from one of which is the following extract. 'Hostilities between the Ameers of Upper Sinde have for the present ceased. Meer Nusseer Khan having transferred to Meer Ali Morad certain villages.'"

16. The third portion of the documentary evidence is the most important and conclusive of the whole. It consists of three original letters in the possession of the eldest son of Meer Roostum who (as already stated was proscribed from entering Sinde), when he heard of the inquiry, voluntarily appeared before the Commission. The first of these letters purports to have been addressed to him by his father Meer Roostum on the 16th of September 1842, the day after the Battle of Nownahar.[63] It must therefore be viewed as a confidential communication in which the father described to his son what had occurred on the previous day. The whole letter is worth of attentive perusal. After stating that the conflict with Ali Morad had been brought on by Meer Mahomed Khan through the pride of his youth, he informs his son: "Being helpless by the fear of the strong English army (which is close at hand) and under the pressure of circumstances, I gave several places of jagheer of my own—such as the villages of Kahn Buhan, Ubyanee, Bacha, Dherre, Ghurruckna, Rayina and Pulleja (the last two of which are Meer Ali Akbar Khan's), the villages of Dadaloo from Meer Nusseer Khan and that of Mahtela, from Meer Mahomed Ali Khan—and the disturbance removed." The Ameer then pathetically entreats his son to come quickly with his troops and munitions of war "in order that we may retaliate and have our own revenge, as he (Ali Morad) had been so insolent to me who am the Chief of this tribe." The second letter from Nusseer Khan is dated the 17th September 1842, two days after the battle (and is also addressed to Meer Roostum's son).[64] After detailing the particulars of

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the battle, he informs him: "When the principle Ameer (i.e., Roostum), being helpless, gave to Meer Ali Morad seven villages of his own and my village of Dadaloo and that of Mahtela belonging to Meer Mahomed Ali Khan, who was then absent, I refused to put my seal to the agreement to this effect in the Koran. But the principle Ameer took my seal by force—from my tasheebejee—and applied it." In conclusion, he calls upon him to come quickly "with a large force and artillery in order to take our revenge of Ali Morad." The third letter purports to be from Meer Ali Morad, himself, to Meer Roostum's son and written from Dejee Ke Kote and dated the 24th September, nine days after the Battle of Nownahar.[65] After alluding to this battle, Ali Morad informs Meer Mahomed Hussein as follows: "The actions took place and afterwards Meer Roostum interfered to make peace. On account of any expense, he gave me seven villages of his own Khan-un-Khan, Ubyanee, Bacha, Dhuree, Renya, Pulleeja and Ghurruckna; also two villages, those of Dadaloo and Mahtela on the part of Meer Nusseer Khan. He wrote all this in the Koran and gave it to me." Ali Morad then expresses alarm at the preparations in progress by his opponents to attack him (and we know from the Sinde Digest of Intelligence that this is true) and informs Meer Roostum's son that if he will observe a neutrality and aid neither party he (Ali Morad) will restore to him the seven villages given to him by Meer Roostum—keeping the villages of Mahtela, Dadaloo and Soonderbeila himself. But if he will render assistance against Meer Nusseer Khan, then whatever country they might take belonging to him, or his relations, shall be divided between us." Meer Mahomed Hussein deposed before the Commission that he received two letters from Ali Morad—one before and the other after the Battle of Nownahar. The first related to his disputes with Nusseer Khan and was delivered to him by Hafiz, to whom he was referred for further particulars.[66] The second is a letter above alluded to, in respect to which he states: "I received this letter after the Battle of

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Nownahar when I was collecting troops. I was at Abad when Hafiz Hukoomut brought it to me." He identifies the letter, as well as Exhibit F (No. 9 and 10).[67] On Ali Morad's letter being shown to his late Minister, Sheikh Ali Hussein, he also identifies it and declared it to be in his handwriting—stating that it was written about the time of the battle with the view of effecting a reconciliation with Meer Mahomed Hussein. Thus it will be seen that in all of these three letters the cession made after the Battle of Nownahar is alluded to in terms altogether irreconcilable with its extent as it now appears on the Koran and as now claimed by Ali Morad.

17. There are two other documents requiring a passing remark. In a letter addressed to Sir Charles Napier on the 24th January 1843, Ali Morad had merely claimed "the purgunnah of Mahtela and three villages named Dadaloo, Kundpara and Sooderbeila," making not mention of the purgunnahs Meerpoor, Mehurkee as entered in the forged Treaty of Nownahar. His Highness endeavored to surmount this difficulty by stating that the last two districts are included in and subordinate to that of Mahtela. But, if so, the question naturally arises why they are separately entered in the Koran? Again, although the Treaty of Nownahar is dated the 15th September 1842 the districts in dispute are included among those entered in the subsequent Treaty dated the 20th December 1842, by which Meer Roostum is alleged to have ceded to Ali Morad the Turban or badge of sovereignty in Upper Sinde.[68] This seems inconsistent with the fact that they had already been ceded under the first of these Treaties.

18. I shall now briefly review the counter evidence that His Highness Ali Morad had been able to adduce in refutation of the formidable array of testimony addressed on behalf of the prosecution. His Highness' defence is long and rambling. He refers to the enmity that existed between his brothers and himself (in consequence of his allying himself with the British Government) and gives an account of

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the Battle of Nownahar.[69] He charges his ex-Minister Sheikh Ali Hussein and Peer Ali Gohur with enmity towards him and, the former, with having leagued with Sir Charles Napier's moonshee—who advised the Minister to demand half the country which the British Government had given to him. To this His Highness would not consent, though he promised a jagheer. In consequence of this refusal, he threatened to accomplish His Highness' ruin. Ali Morad further asserts that his Minister was incensed because he had applied for a Resident to be stationed in his country and Captain Malet being in consequence appointed. At last, His Highness resumed his Minister's jagheer and called upon both him and Peer Ali Gohur to render their accounts as they had embezzled from him several lacs of Rupees. They transacted all his business for him, had the custody of his seals (which they applied to any writing or agreement they chose) and they had also in their possession blank papers with his autograph authentication "Buhal ust" (it is confirmed) written upon them. The three principal witnesses for the prosecution were very strictly cross-examined by Ali Morad.[70] It is worthy of remark that His Highness does not impute to moonshee Towur Mull any motive of animosity likely to induce him to depose falsely, though he designates him as a criminal and a prisoner whose period of imprisonment had not expired. Finally, he indignantly denies the charge altogether and boldly asserts that, "The Treaty is as it stood on the day of the fight and no alteration has been made in it."[71]

19. His Highness only produced seven witnesses in his defence: 1st his own uncle, 2nd a dependent of his own (formerly in the service of Meer Roostum), 3rd another servant of Meer Roostum (now out of employ), 4th a servant formerly of Meer Nusseer Khan (but now in Ali Morad's service), 5th a discarded servant of Peer Ali Gohur, 6th the Kazee of Shikarpore and 7th a zamindar (i.e., landlord) of Khyrpore (who denies the ex-Minister's statement that he [deponent] was sent by Ali Morad to order him to write out the certificate of indemnity).

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Ali Morad's uncle states that the cession included the purgunnahs of Mahtela, Meerpoor, Mehurkee—as well as the villages—but in many particulars he otherwise corroborates the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution. No one, however, can fail on comparing the evidence of the first three witnesses to detect great similitude, as if they had been previously tutored. The Commission, in fact, noticed that these persons gave their evidence in a manner that conveyed the impression that it was entitled to little confidence and had been prepared for the occasion, and was given like the repetition of a task which had been committed to memory and, occasionally, the witnesses were prompted by the Meer's vakeels. The 4th witness was produced to establish that a seal belonging to Ali Morad was lost and that he saw it in the Peer's possession, who offered to forge a document for him to enable him to adjust his account (but he admits no such document was forged). This occurred three years ago. The Peer denies having possessed such a seal. The 5th witness, a discarded servant of the Peer, states he saw the seal in his Master's possession and that the seal on the certificate of indemnity is of that which was lost. The 6th witness deposes that he had seen many blank papers with impressions of seals and the words "Buhal ust" upon them in the possession of Peer Ali Gohur. Such may, I think, be considered the sum and substance of the oral evidence addressed by Ali Morad in his defence.

20. With respect to the mass of documentary evidence adduced in support of the prosecution, his defence may be said to consist of a general disavowal by Ali Morad of the documents produced bearing his seal and signature. When required by the Commission to explain the letter he wrote to Captain Brown (and received by that officer on the 18th September 1842) describing the cession to consist of villages and how it could be reconciled with its initial extent (as specified in the Treaty of Nownahar in the Koran—namely "purgunnas" Meerpoor, Mahtela and Mehrkee), Ali Morad merely replies that no

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such letter was found on his records.[72] His Highness does not, however, question the authenticity of the letter but states it "must, he imagined, have been written by Sheikh Ali Hussein." This is the case and we must recollect that, at this time, no quarrel existed between Ali Morad and his Minister to induce the latter to misrepresent the real facts of the case. But the letter distinctly states: "In the mean time Meer Roostum became mediator and gave over to me several villages to cover the expense of my army and the loss I had sustained amounting to lacs of Rupees. I, however, was not content with the few places they made over to me and would have demanded reparations for the whole of my loss had not your letter at that moment arrived. I then agreed to accept the villages that Meer Roostum offered to me." With respect to the three important letters produced by Meer Roostum's eldest son, Ali Morad could only assert that they are forgeries and that the letter from himself to Meer Mahomed Hussein must have been written by Sheikh Ali Hussein (as he had the custody of his seal and had blank papers with his seal affixed).[73] The letters from Meer Roostum and Meer Nusseer Khan he declares must have been forged by their families. In order to support this declaration, Ali Morad produced a letter—purporting to be from Meer Mahomed Hussein to Meer Mahomed Ali Khan and Meer Ali Morad Khan—which, if genuine, would establish that Peer Ali Gohur forged documents and that an intrigue was on foot against Ali Morad so that he might lose the friendship of the British Government.[74] This is dated the 29th December 1849 but it does not appear how Ali Morad obtained possession of it, which is a suspicious circumstance. On this letter being shown to Meer Mahomed Hussein, he at once admitted that his seal is affixed to it but denied that he ever wrote such a letter and of which he has no knowledge. He added that when he sent a Quazee [i.e., sharia judge] named Kadir Buksh—who was afterwards employed by Ali Morad as his vakeel—to the gentlemen, he furnished him with four blank papers

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bearing his seal. One of them he afterwards recovered but the other three remained with the Quazee and he therefore supposes that the letter now produced must have been written on one of these.

21. Having now remarked perhaps at greater length than was requisite upon the evidence addressed—both for the prosecution and defence—I shall conclude this part of my minute by the following extract from the Commission's report containing a very clear and impartial summary of the case against Ali Morad and pronouncing His Highness guilty of the gross act of fraud and forgery charged against him.

"The strength of the defence, therefore, must rest on the badness of the character and the motives of the witnesses for the prosecution. The Commission is of the opinion that—apart from Ali Morad's allegations and under ordinary circumstances—there might be enough in their own position and showing to render their evidence, if uncorroborated by collateral proof, insufficient. But these men were undoubtedly, at the time they state the circumstances in question to have occurred, the trusted and confidential servants of His Highness. His Highness appears only to have discovered their worthlessness when Sheikh Ali applied to him for half the country as a reward for his services. Moreover, in a case like this, direct evidence is not to be expected from witnesses of unexceptional character and motives. Hence it becomes necessary to take such as is procurable and endeavor to test its value by its internal remarks of probability and by collateral proof. It is, therefore, on the force of these that—in the opinion of the Commission—the issue of the present investigation must depend and they are as follows:

1st The narrative is more lengthy, complicated (and circumstantial) than would have been necessary for the purpose of a conspiracy and

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therefore presents more points exposing it to detection than it is probable conspirators would have hazarded.

2nd The appearance of the extracted leaf exactly corresponds with that of the Koran (from which it is said to have been taken) and the letter still retains the marks of the stitching by which it appears to have been fixed in it.

3rd The bad execution of the alterations in the extracted leaf as it now stands is apparent enough and the attempt made in it to substitute the word "Mehurkee" for "bu Murrzee" (whereas the rewritten leaf contains both words) agrees with the statement of the witnesses as to the successive stages by which the forgery was brought into its present form.

4th The only copy of the Treaty now on the records of the British Government (and which there is no reason to doubt was placed at the date of the receipt entry endorsed 4th April 1843 and had remained there ever since) corroborates Sheikh Ali's statements as to it having been then delivered for record by him in consequence of the loss of the first copy. It corroborates it also in a remarkable point, which Sheikh Ali did not himself notice (nor at first perceive the force of) when questioned upon it, which is that it bears the word "Mehurkee" followed by "khood" but without the intermediate "bu murrzee" and, in this respect, appears to warrant the inference that it was (at that time) intended to support the claim. By interpolating the additional matter without resorting to the substitution of a fresh writing (for, although the word Meerpoor does not appear in the extracted leaf, it is evident that an attempt was made to alter "bu murrzee" into Mehurkee) and had this succeeded Meerpoor might have been inserted before it and the word "khood" must then of course have remained alone without "bu murrzee" proceeding it as it

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now appears in the Koran. Either reading would have made sense, but a slightly different sense.

5th The copy of the Treaty produced by Towur Mull—as having been taken by Sheikh Ali's moonshee Bushurut Ali from the original in the Koran as it stood at the time of the Battle of Nownahar and of which a copy was then given to Major Clibborn—bears the word village not purgunnah Mahtela and makes no mention of Meerpoor Mehurkee. It also contains "bu murrzee," which was transformed into Mehurkee in the extracted leaf and omitted in the copy now on the records but again inserted in the rewritten leaf. This document would give strong confirmation of the truth of the narrative if it could be relied on as genuine. The Commission, however, is not disposed to found much upon it because there is some appearance of erasure in the word signifying village preceding Mahtela, which brings it into doubt. Also because it has been intermediately in the custody of the person whose statements it is brought to corroborate and therefore open to the same objections from their character and motives as their statement itself. Could any dependence indeed be placed upon it, it might perhaps warrant an inference that the tampering with this Treaty had been commenced at an earlier period after the Battle of Nownahar than the date of the Proclamation annexing the districts north of Roree to the Khan of Bhawulpore.

6th The circumstances of the Persian records of the late Upper Sinde Agency not being forthcoming between March and December 1842 (in September of which year the Treaty was made), the loss of the copies of the Treaty which were then obtained and the abstraction of the box of English records relating to the same period (as proved by Mr. Maher and by a letter from Captain Brown in which it is assigned as the reason for the copy of the document supposed to have been contained in it)—these circumstances strongly corroborate Sheikh Ali's statement in a point which, had they not really occurred, it was

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unnecessary to introduce into the narrative and the introduction of which could only have increased the risk of detection.[75] While if the abstraction of the papers was not effected with the cognizance of Meer Ali Morad and for the object alleged—as no other reason has ever been heard of for abstracting them—it could only have been for the object of a conspiracy upon which it has been brought to bear after a lapse of seven years, a supposition too improbable to be for a moment entertained.

7th On the mention of the purgunnah only of Mahtela in the letter from Ali Morad to Sir Charles Napier claiming it in January 1843, this the Commission is disposed to consider—in conjunction with other circumstances—confirmatory of Sheikh Ali's statement as that purgunnah only having been included in the forgery and Meerpoor and Mehurkee having been subsequently added (although, had it stood alone, the Meer's explanation as to Mahtela being the more general term and including within it Meerpoor and Mehurkee might have been admitted).

8th Regarding the inclusion of the purgunnahs of Mahtela and Meerpoor in the later Treaty of December 1842 (in the Koran by which the Turban was ceded by Meer Roostum to Ali Morad), this is against the supposition of those districts having been ceded in the Treaty of Nownahar in the September preceding. Adverting—indeed—to the circumstances under which the former document was framed, the Commission would not lay much stress on this point did it stand alone (and might be disposed to admit the Meer's explanation that it was intended to make assurances doubly sure) but, taken in conjunction with the other circumstance, it is entitled to some weight.

9th On the certificate of indemnity from the Meer to Peer Ali Gohur, this would, of course, afford conclusive evidence in corroboration of

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the Peer's statement (and that of Sheikh Ali) if its genuineness could be relied on. But being in the Sheikh's handwriting and having intermediately remained in the Peer's custody, it is inadmissible in support of the credibility of those persons further than it contains undoubted proof of authenticity. The Commission is not disposed to consider the Meer's seal with advertence to the incautious use that appears to have been made of seals by the Meers. Perhaps the same objections may apply to the autograph authentication "Buhal ust" though this does not appear to the Commission so clearly established. It may be here observed that the rejections of the evidence of seals merely renders it unnecessary to consider the Meer's allegation as to the theft of his seal by the Peer, the evidence of the 3 witnesses which have been brought in support of it, nor that of Futteh Mahomed Toshajee, regarding his not having brought any message to Sheikh Ali on the subject.

10th On the letter produced and identified by Meer Mahomed Hussein as having been received by him from his father Meer Roostum, his cousin Meer Nusseer and his uncle Meer Ali Morad immediately after the Battle of Nownahar, all of them describe the cession as consisting of the villages of Mahtela and not of the purgunnah of Mahtela, Meerpoor, Mehurkee and are conclusive evidence in corroboration of Sheikh Ali's statement as to the original extent of the cession. The Meer, indeed, objects to Meer Mahomed Hussein's evidence on the ground of their notorious and long existing dissension. But the Commission cannot help attaching great weight to it from the clear straightforward manner in which it was given and which rendered it impossible to doubt its truthfulness on this point.

11th The entry in the diary of Captain Brown (then Assistant Political Agent in Upper Sinde), dated the 20th September 1842, in which alluding to the report of the arrangement effected between the Meers after the Battle of Nownahar which had just reached him, describes

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the cession as consisting of nine villages. The entry is in Captain Brown's own handwriting (the genuineness of which is beyond the possibility of a doubt). The Commission considers it a very strong incidental confirmation of the truth of Sheikh Ali's statements as to the original extent of the cession.

12th Regarding the letters from Meer Roostum, Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Ali Morad himself written to Captain Brown about the time of the Battle of Nownahar, these all alluded to the cession in terms quite irreconcilable with its extent as now shown in the Koran. There can be no doubt as to the genuineness of these letters, which bear the initials of Captain Brown (affixed at the time of receipt) and have, ever since, remained in the Government records and probably escaped abstraction with the other Persian records of the period only from having been filed with their English translation (which are in the handwriting of Captain Kennedy, then an assistant in the Agency). The inferential support given by these letters to the Sheikh's statement—from the terms in which they allude to the cession—is perhaps stronger than if it had been direct from being less open to the suspicion of having been fabricated (with the view in which case it would probably have been more precise though it could hardly have been more significant). The Commission is disposed to place very great weight on this branch of the evidence, from its freedom from possibility of having been fabricated with and it is clear that its weight is fully appreciated by Meer Ali Morad himself, by having met it by throwing out all the doubt he could on his own letter written on the day of the battle and his production in its stead of the draft of one received by Captain Brown twelve days later. This draft bears the date of the day of the battle but it is clear to the Commission that this date has been inserted for the present occasion as the original in Captain Brown's records bears no date at all and it, moreover, makes allusion to an intermediate letter from Captain Brown in reply it would seem to the one written on the day of the battle. This

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is further borne out by the tenor of Captain Brown's allusions to both letters in his correspondence at the time with Major Outram. The obvious attempt at deception on this point affords, in the opinion of the Commission, the strongest proof of the strength of the inference furnished by these letters in Ali Morad's own estimations against the genuineness of the Treaty as it now stands in the Koran from the disingenuous course resorted to for getting rid of it—which in itself it may be observed affords fair inference that there would be little scruple in tampering with the Treaty when a sufficient object was to be gained by it.

Finally, the Commission observes: "Many of the above circumstances taken singly and, still more, all of them together afford so strong a corroboration of the truth of the main facts of the charge as stated by Sheikh Ali Hussein as in the opinion of the Commission to be quite irresistible. It has, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the fraud was effected by His Highness Meer Ali Morad and, most probably, at the same time and in the manner set forth by that witness."

22. Such are the strong and convincing grounds upon which the Commission has unanimously found His Highness Meer Ali Morad guilty. Further comment on the subject is altogether superfluous. I now proceed to the 4th head of my minute, namely to record my opinion as to how the case should be disposed of. In other words, what notice should be taken of Ali Morad's flagrant misconduct and what measures should be adopted for the resumption of the rights of which the British Government had been defrauded.

23. There can be no doubt that Sir Charles Napier viewed Ali Morad's conduct with the indignation it deserves. He informed Mr. Pringle on one occasion: "Ali Morad was anxious to get the district of Meerpoor Mahtela acknowledged, as he knew I suspected his honesty

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in that foul transaction of which I had then no proof."[76] In the memorandum bringing the fraud to the notice of his successor, he stated that he was clearly of opinion that if the charge were proved the district should be resumed. Although he did not anticipate that Ali Morad would resist, Sir C. Napier recommended that the Commissioner and the officer commanding the forces should be in Upper Sinde with a sufficient military force to support whatever measures might be required. The present Commissioner in Sinde, in addition to the resumption of the districts, would compel Ali Morad to make a suitable provision for the junior Ameers of Khyrpore: "I presume (observes Mr. Pringle) that even if the fraud were openly brought home to the Ameer, whatever may be the opinion as to its moral turpitude (yet adverting to his position as an independent sovereign), it would not be thought to call for stronger measures than the resumption of the districts which have been obtained by means of it. And that, if this can be effected without his open conviction, it would hardly be thought expedient to expose to his own subjects and to the world in general as guilty of so base an act a Prince with whom we are to continue terms of amity and alliance."[77] Mr. Pringle further contemplated demanding from Ali Morad the revenue of the districts, in arrears, from the date on which Ali Morad fraudulently possessed for himself of them. Our late Governor, Sir George Clerk, has recorded an opinion in favour of more extreme measures: "Should it be fully established that Meer Ali Morad did perpetrate this fraud, his turpitude deserves not only that he should lose the district so usurped but that he should be deprived of all his possessions."[78]

24. It is not from my sympathy toward Ali Morad that I dissent from this opinion. On the contrary, it appears to me that—were we merely to consider his personal deserts—no punishment we could inflict would be too severe for one who by the late inquiry had been proved so worthless and unprincipled. I feel an indignation scarcely to be described that our general character for honour, honesty, justice

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and good faith should be so seriously compromised by the base and selfish intrigues of a person who has been well described as a "man of unbound ambition and great tact and consistent and unswerving in his purpose of aggrandizement."[79] It is true that Sir G. Clerk has given such a picture of Ali Morad's government that there can be no doubt his removal from power would be a blessing to all now subject to his heartless and despotic rule. Our ally Meer Ali Morad bears an indifferent character. He seems to be addicted to field sports to a degree that precludes his devoting any time to the affairs of his country or his subjects. In short, from all I can learn about him I see no reason to think that the accounts given in Lieutenant Forbes' report are in any way erroneous.[80] In my opinion all we should do is "to give him an impressive and leave him to himself." For this Chief we have sacrificed so much (and so many) that if, after the warning, he is not reclaimed to a course more creditable to our adoption I would not hesitate to wrest his territory from him.[81]

25. It is only, therefore, because I fear the adoption of the extreme measure apparently contemplated by Sir George Clerk in the event of Ali Morad's guilt being as it has been fully established would be prejudicial to our character, that I am an advocate for the adoption of a more lenient course. This is also recommended by the circumstance that a period of seven years had elapsed since the commission of the crime for which he is now arraigned. Ali Morad is the creature of our own raising—used for the objects and purposes of the day. Were we now to dethrone him, we could not escape from (however little we might deserve the imputation of) doing so merely because we had no further need of his services. I would not incur the risk of this reproach and the measures that have occurred to me, as combining moderation and a suitable punishment, are the following.

26. In the first place, I would no longer recognize Meer Ali Morad as Rais (or Chief) of the Talpoors of Upper Sinde. With the exception

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of the sons of the late Meers Roostum and Mobarick (who for reasons to be hereafter stated should be removed from His Highness' control), there are—in fact—no Ameers remaining in Upper Sinde over whom he can exercise the authority of and enact the rights and services due to the Rais. The conquest of Sinde has removed them all. Ali Morad would of course feel our declining to consider him as Rais as detracting from his rank and dignity. With this expectation, I would leave him in the independent enjoyment of his own paternal inheritance and the lands he acquired by the cession of the Turban in December 1842, with the exception noticed hereafter.

27. In the second place, I would declare that Ali Morad has, in consequence of the imposition he has practiced on the British Government, forfeited all the advantages he acquired under the Treaty of Nownahar. In other words, I would altogether cancel that engagement and demand payment from His Highness of all that he has received from the districts (from the period they first came into his possession up to the present date). No one will of course question the propriety of our resuming the districts that, under cover of that Treaty, fraudulently came into Ali Morad's possession. This will be merely taking back our own and what never rightly belonged to His Highness. The resumption, in addition of the nine villages which were really ceded by the Treaty of Nownahar, appears to me to be very moderate penalty for the acts of fraud and deceit towards the Government by whose power he was raised and by whose power, I may add, he is retained in authority. Although—but for the detection of this fraud—it would be too late to notice finally his violent proceedings at Nownahar. They were most unjustifiable and would no doubt have entailed upon him the serious displeasure of the British Government but for the transfer that about that time occurred of the administration of Sinde from the charge of Major Outram to that of Sir C. Napier and the important events that followed in rapid success. For Ali Morad was bound to refer to his disputes with his

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brothers to the British authority in Sinde and which, in fact, they were under reference to Major Outram when he thought proper to bring the matter at issue to be determined by the sword.[82] No one of the Ameers had less excuse than himself for not submitting his disputes to Major Outram's arbitration. For our records prove that, in September 1840, when he was threatened by a large force collected by Meer Nusseer Khan the latter was required to disperse his troops under a threat that if—in 48 hours he failed to do so—a British force would be sent against him. A force for this purpose actually crossed the River to Roree on the 23rd September 1840 but (Nusseer Khan then yielding) it was recalled to Sukkur. Under these circumstances, the penalty I have suggested, seems to me peculiarly suitable and appropriate.

28. Respecting the value of the districts proposed to be resumed, we have the following information: Sheikh Ali Hussein states that Meer Mobarick Khan divided Mahtela, Meerpoor and Mehurkee into three separate tuppas (e.g., sub-districts) and gave the first and third to Meer Mahomed Ali and the second to Meer Nusseer Khan.[83] The Treaty of Meer Mobarick Khan will show the division of these places amongst his sons. The three tuppas formerly yielded two lacs annually (latterly only about one lac). Mahtela, alone, probably yields Rupees 10,000. The Minister ought to know because he states he formerly held all these places in jagheer from Ali Morad. Before the division into tuppas, it was usually to write Meerpoor Mahtela, but whether this included Mehurkee he does not know. After the division, he believed they were called tuppas not purgunnahs. Ali Morad must know why purgunnah was inserted.[84] In Sinde it is not usual to designate a purgunnah a tuppa or a tuppa a purgunnah. It is, of course, the interest of His Highness Ali Morad to represent the revenue of the three districts at a low figure. He, therefore, denies the ex-Minister's evaluation and asserts that he can show that the net revenue realized from nine harvests amounted only to Rupees

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134,000. At this rate, the average annual produce he states would be only Rs. 29,055.14.[85] Fortunately, however, we possess authentic information on the subject. During the Fuslee year 1255 (corresponding with A.D. 1844-45), the actual revenue realized—exclusive of arrears—from these districts was as follows:

		Rs.	a.	p.
Total collection from the village of Dadloo - - -		2,520	–	–
Ditto, ditto, from the districts of Meerpoor Mehrkee -		1,61,106	5	11
Ditto, ditto, from the town or village of Mehtela - -		2,066	13	1
Grand Total - - -	Rs.	1,65,683	3	–

Under the Ameers, the purgunnahs of Meerpoor and Mehurkee were distinct portions of the large purgunnah of Mahtela, which—at one time—comprised the whole of the tuppa divisions now forming the purgunnah of Gotkee and others. There is a village called Meerpoor but none called Mehurkee. There is a village called Mahtela and, likewise, a purgunnah of the same name.[86] Some confusion has arisen from the circumstance that whereas Meerpoor was at one time a tuppa of Mahtela and subsequently created by the British Government into a purgunnah (of which Mahtela formed a tuppa). On the other hand, Mahtela was formerly a purgunnah of which Meerpoor formed a tuppa. But it (Mahtela) under us was reduced to a tuppa in the purgunnah of Meerpoor.

		Rs.	a.	p.
Town of Meerpoor in A.D. 1844-45 was - - -		6,657	–	–
Ditto, ditto, of the pergunna (now tuppa) of Mahtela in ditto, was - - - - - - - -		23,856	–	–
Add, ditto, ditto, of the town of Mahtela, in ditto, was -		2,066	13	1
Total - - -	Rs.	32,579	13	1

From the above information, it seems very probably that Mr. Pringle's opinion is correct that the result (of the resumption)—as regards our interests—would be to retain for us an annual revenue upwards of a lac and a half of Rupees (with arrears) from the time when the

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districts were made over to the Ameer in anticipation of Sir Charles Napier's arrangements.[87]

29. In the third place, I would propose that all the junior Ameers, for whom Mr. Pringle most properly suggests that a provision should be made, should be withdrawn from Ali Morad's control and be placed under the protection of the British Government. Their jagheers—of which I shall presently show they have been wrongfully deprived—being restored to them under such terms and conditions as may be deemed expedient. We have, for some time past, had the appeals of these unfortunate Princes under our consideration and the time appears to have arrived when we can—with safety—render them partial justice. A stronger case for the compassionate consideration of Government can scarcely be imagined. I advocate their claims for such consideration not only with reference to the peculiar circumstances of our connection with Sinde—from its commencement up to its final conquest—but also on the grounds of equity and justice, a regard for our own reputation, for compassion to a line of fallen Princes; the victims of circumstances who were—from no fault of their own—suddenly reduced from a high position, rank and affluence to poverty and exile. I further advocate their cause because no one can deny that the posterity of the late Meer Roostum Khan have peculiar claims on the generosity of the British Government, not only in return for the numerous acts of friendship that unfortunate Chief evinced toward us in times of difficulty but, likewise, on account of their own personal conduct at the time and subsequent to the conquest of Sinde. Lastly, I shall adduce proof—which in my judgement amounts to a certainty—that these jagheers are now held by Meer Ali Morad by as base an act of fraud and deception as that practiced on the British Government. In regard to the districts of Meerpoor, Mahtela and Mehurkee, I am happy to add that—fortunately for the ends of justice—his right to retain them has never been acknowledged but, on the contrary, has been

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challenged by two successive Governors General (Lord Ellenborough and Lord Hardinge).

30. In illustration of this part of the subject and for the sake of reference, I annex a genealogical table of the Ameers of Upper Sinde.[88] I would, likewise, refer to Major Outram's letter to Sir Charles Napier (dated the 24th January 1843) showing that on that date there were 18 Chiefs possessing estates with 30 sons (besides daughters) to provide for—all of whom were, afterwards, involved in Meer Roostum's ruin and (with two exceptions) were not even charged with any act of hostility against the British Government.[89]

31. The following summary—condensed from the correspondence which has taken place between this Government and Mr. Pringle on the subject of the sons and families of the late Meers Roostum and Mobarick Khan—will forcibly illustrate the deplorable state of poverty to which they are reduced, their claims to consideration and the strong reasons which exist for immediate measures being adopted for ameliorating their condition.[90] In August 1848, this Government received a petition from Meer Mahomed Ali Khan and Meer Ali Mahomed Khan (sons of Mobarick Khan) praying that a provision might be assigned to them, similar to those that had been granted to other Chiefs in Sinde subsequent to the conquest. They represented that, previous to the conquest, they were chiefs of their own illaqua yielding revenue of about three lacs per annum. In order to propitiate Meer Ali Morad, they had transferred to him villages of the annual value of Rupees 20,000: "We have claims (they observed) on both sides. At present we have no means to maintain ourselves and to preserve our character. Our families are in great distress. The Company's Government has made suitable provision for the support of the Chiefs of the countries it has conquered, for instance the Chiefs of Bengal, Gujerat and Madras have been duly provided for. The said Ameer will make no provision for us. As our lands and

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property are in the possession of Government and as our other things are in the hands of Ali Morad, we request that—according to the principles of justice and equity—provisions similar to those made for other chiefs may be made for our support." This was forwarded to Mr. Pringle, who in reply merely submitted copies of two petitions that these Ameers had "in common with other relations of the ex-Ameers on the 2nd April 1847 presented to Sir C. Napier with a memorandum which His Excellency had recorded thereon on the 10th idem."[91]

32. The first petition was from five of the sons of the late Meer Roostum Khan and stated: "It is the custom of the great and brave to think and feel for those who have fallen from high estate and upon whom there is oppression. The Almighty approved of this. In sympathy for us, your Excellency enquires of Meer Ali Morad as to our state and condition. May God reward you for this but our circumstances are in this wise: Meer Ali Morad is fully aware of our numbers, of the members of our families, of our people and of our necessary expenses. Yet, notwithstanding this, he has stated that we receive yearly Rupees 21,000, which would not be more than sufficient for one of us. Yet we take our oaths to God that for no one year have we received much more than ¼ of that sum, as will be seen from the annexed memorandum. Moreover, from the time of our coming under Ali Morad a period of three years (during the whole time), we have not—up to the present time—recovered so much (Rupees 21,000) from him. Neither do we hope or expect to receive at that rate for the future."[92] In conclusion, they solicit that the British Government will annually receive from Ali Morad the sum he mentions (Rupees 21,000) and pay it to them when they will reside in such part of the British territory as may be pointed out: "Thus shall we be relieved from the oppression now upon us by night and day to such an extent that we cannot write it and we will pray for the British. If the Government wishes to take our securities,

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notwithstanding, we are so weak that we could not turn an insect. Yet, we would give as our securities men in whom confidence can be placed."

33. The second petition was from three sons of the late Mobarick Khan, two sons of Meer Nusseer Khan and two sons of the late Fuzzlee Mahomed Khan and states as follows: "Permit us to represent to you that when our uncle Meer Roostum Khan fled at the instigation of Meer Ali Morad our brother Meer Nusseer Khan accompanied him. With great fear and trembling, leaving all our property in our houses, we ran away to the desert, where we received messages from Ali Morad telling us to fly further or we should be made prisoners. On what he said we went to Mooltan. There we wished to make our salaam [i.e., oath of allegiance] to the British through the medium of Bhawul Khan but a constant succession of messages came to us from Ali Morad frightening us and saying that we should by no means approach the British through Bhawul Khan and not to make friendship with him—as if we did—we should be made prisoners. To give our hearts confidence, he (Ali Morad) sent his word saying he was our near relative and that he gave us advice by which we should be benefited. Unacquainted with the way of the British and ignorant of the artifices in the heart of Meer Ali Morad, we did not come into the sircar [i.e., British Government]. After this, Ali Morad sent us word desiring us to keep up our spirits, to come to him and that he would make arrangements for us with Government. On hearing this, we made certain that the portions of territory which had not been taken possession of (nor given in exchange by the Government)—but which were held by Ali Morad—would either be restored to us by him willingly or that he would be made to do so by the British and we, with all our families, came to him. We expected to make our salaam to the Government through him hoping that some arrangement would be made for us. But Meer Ali Morad told us to be quiet—asking what arrangements we expected to make with

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the British and that we should be sent to Calcutta as prisoners. On hearing this, we became sorrowful. Saying in our hearts 'Oh God' what fault have we committed that we are amenable to such punishment? In short, being helpless we are passing our days in great distress. So much so, that the sun is the place of our bread and, in lieu of meat, there is blood. The lancet of oppression falls daily from Ali Morad upon the veins of our lives, to such an extent that we cannot keep body and soul together. It has been the practice of the British Government to look with the eye of kindness upon the poor and humble and it is the wish of the same to protect the well born. The Government does not punish those who are guiltless of crime. Indeed, it protects and preserves the honour of families of those who come under its displeasure. It does not allow them to lose their honour (for instance, there are the families of the Meers of Hyderabad). But perhaps Government is not aware of the cruelty we are suffering and if our state is known it is our misfortune. Had we committed any fault against the Government, of course, for every shame we should have been hopeless of receiving kindness but we are guiltless of any fault and we cannot understand why we should not be looked kindly upon by Government."[93] They then truly observe: "We have heard from some that lands which were formerly our father's and which have neither been taken by Government nor given in exchange for other lands (to Ali Morad) that these were intended for the subsistence of the family of Meer Mobarick but Meer Ali Morad has not given us the tenth part of these conserving the whole himself. Possibly, this is not known to the Government. If it was, we should not remain in this distress. We hold in our possession the papers of our fathers' share of territory bearing the seals of Meers Sohrab Khan and Roostum Khan. Among these are: Meerpoor, Mehurkee (in the purgunnah of Mahtela), Kundia in the purgunnah of Khyrpore, Koteera (in the purgunnah of Koteera and Nankalse). These are in the hands of Ali Morad. The following are in the hands

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of the British: Gotekee Adhilpoor, the villages of Jettooree, those of Syedpoor (of which Syuds are the zamindars) and some lands which we bought off Affghans in the Shikarpoor country are also held by the British because it is known to them that these were purchased by us. In short, there is no land in the hands of the family of the late Meer Mobarick by which they can subsist themselves and other purchased land has been restored by the Government to its owners. A few villages which Meer Nusseer Khan gave to his family have not as yet been received in exchange by the British as they are ignorant on the subject and Ali Morad enjoys them. He, constantly seeing our wretched state, never gives us anything from them. We pass our time with much difficulty. Meer Ali Morad never gives us a thought: When we fled to the desert, we left in Khyrpore much property, weapons and cloth—all of which were plundered by Ali Morad.[94] Up to this time we have been in expectation that when Government enquired about us this would be restored to us and we have still that hope. We also hope that Government will seize our lands now in the ocean of oppression and drag us out on the bank of justice. That it will look upon our condition and that of our families and children with the eye of kindness, for sympathy first falls on women and children. Also, that Government will give a thought for our subsistence and that such country as may be bestowed upon us be given with the British seal. For, if the Government gives us nothing, we shall certainly perish when the women of the families of Meer Roostum and Mobarick will be ruined. Thus shame will come upon the Government. We number 30 souls in the family of Meer Mobarick and with followers and all we are 1000. We do not receive from Ali Morad food sufficient for one of us. Oppression, of various kinds, at his hands is always upon us beyond what we can describe. If any of our people go into the jungle to gather firewood they are seized, put in the stocks and fined by his servants. He constantly makes us target for the arrows of his indignity, saying we are like the

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bungys [i.e., Hindu untouchables] who carry dead hog and that, if he were not security for us, we should go to our brothers. By the oath of God, to hear such language from him it would be preferable to be in British jail." The petition concludes by requesting that they may be allowed to reside with their families in British territory on their furnishing the security of men of weight.

34. Annexed to this petition is a memorandum of the family of Meer Roostum Khan and their dependants showing that during the Fuslee 1257 (1846-47) all they received from Ali Morad amounted to Rs. 5,963-13-6. Then follows a statement furnished by Meer Ali Morad, showing in detail that he gave to the family of Meer Roostum—alone—jagheers in the aggregate of the value of 21,000 Rupees per annum, which is—at all counts—an admission on his part that they are at least entitled to that amount.[95]

35. The pathetic appeals of the sons of Meer Roostum and Mobarick found no response in the breast of the conqueror of Sinde [i.e., Charles Napier]. Forgetting the admissions he had repeatedly made that Ali Morad was only entitled to the lands appertaining to the Turban, that he was not entitled to the private lands which belonged to Meer Roostum and Mubarak and overlooking the fact that the Governor General (Lord Ellenborough) had challenged his right to the latter, he sternly rejected the petitions on the following grounds: 1st That Ali Morad had been the faithful ally of the British when the whole of his family by their misconduct subjected themselves to the punishment which befell them, 2nd that petitioners fled from their country when their army was defeated and Sinde conquered by the British, 3rd that they returned under the protection and guarantee of His Highness and at their own request.[96] Sir C. Napier then observes: "If they are not content with the way in which His Highness behaves to them, I am sorry for it. But I neither can nor will interfere. They may leave his territory if they please. The

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petitioners of the family of Meer Roostum were the men who produced the war by their misconduct and hostility to the British. They were more guilty than any others and have no claims upon the British. They are the subjects of His Highness while they choose to dwell under his protection and the British Government has no right to interfere between His Highness (the Rais) and his subjects, especially those of his own family and for whose conduct he is responsible. If the members of Meer Roostum's family choose to memorialize the Supreme Government in Calcutta, I will forward their memorial to that effect—the same being sent through His Highness." The memorandum concludes by declining to receive any communications from the Ameers in question except through Ali Morad and stating that, "The petition of the family of Meer Roostum is in most of its assertions wrong. It is not in common sense to assert that the petitioners had committed no offence against the British Government, for their offences reduced them to their present state of dependence on their relation and Chief the Rais."

36. It would be very easy to show that these remarks are chiefly founded on assumptions. These unfortunate Chiefs, certainly as it was their duty to do, accompanied their parent (the then Rais) when he was first scared away by his fears from Khyrpore and, afterward, from Dejee. But much as I have studied the Sinde question I have not been able to discover that they were personally engaged in any act of hostility against the British Government. For the first act of hostility was the aggression on our part against the Fort of Emanghur, which no one resisted. One thing is quite certain, when Sir C. Napier directed Meer Roostum to proceed to Hyderabad to meet Major Outram, not one of the petitioners accompanied him and, consequently, they could not have participated in the next hostilities—namely the attack on the Residency on the 14th and the Battle of Meeanee (on the 17th February 1843). Surely fleeing for

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refuge into the desert and afterward to Mooltan was no offence again Government. But I am anticipating.

37. In September 1848 another representation was forwarded to Mr. Pringle from three of the sons of Meer Roostum complaining of the tyranny and oppression of Ali Morad.[97] In his reply (after referring to a separate correspondence relating to the first of the petitioners), the Commissioner reported that—when at Khyrpore in February last—he had made full enquires into the case of the other two Ameers and "was led to believe that they had substantial grounds of complaint against H.H. Ali Morad," but that he had delayed reporting on the subject until he could obtain "certain information relative to the appropriation of the territories of the late Meer Roostum Khan and Mobarick to enable him to point out the manner in which a future provision might be made for their sons and was awaiting the reply to a reference he had made to Sir C. Napier respecting them.[98] The Commissioner was, in reply, informed that he should not delay his report on the case of these two Meers—the object of the Government being to "recue them from present oppression and the attainment of that is inconsistent with (and ought not to be delayed by) considerations as to the revenue they should in future enjoy or the sources from whence it shall be derived."[99]

38. In answer to this requisition Mr. Pringle submitted to Government a correspondence between Captain Forbes (the Resident at Khyrpore) and himself on the condition of the descendants of Meers Roostum and Mobarick and of the junior Ameers, generally, at Khyrpore under the guarantee of His Highness Ali Morad.[100] That having endeavored—by inquiry on the spot and in personal communications with the Resident—to ascertain the real character of the treatment of these Ameers, the "result was compensatory of the opinions expressed by Captain Forbes and led to the conclusion that the treatment which the members of the families of his

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brothers—the late Meers Roostum and Mobarick—received from Ali Morad was far from kind and liberal and that the only means of effectively ameliorating their condition would be to remove them from under his protection altogether." He did not enquire immediately into their grievances (as this could not been done without further embroiling them with His Highness) but "the general impression from all he heard and saw to the above effect." The Commissioner added that Captain Forbes bears testimony to "the peaceable conduct of these Ameers since they have been residing under the guarantee of Ali Morad and, with advertence to the opinion formed by him after good opportunities for observation, I see no reason to apprehend any risk to the peace of the country from their now being withdrawn from His Highness' guarantee and settled in British Sinde under surveillance of the local authorities; while the general character of the treatment they experience from His Highness and the uncertainty of the provision for their maintenance under him would seem to justify the adoption of this course." The provision recommended by Captain Forbes (either in jagheer or money) for each of the families of Meers Roostum and Mobarick is Rs. 20,000 per annum, which—with reference to their numbers and position and the assignments which have already been, proposedly, made to them (as also to the allowance made to the Hyderabad Ameers)—Mr. Pringle considers suitable. If granted, he recommends that the recipients should reside in the vicinity of Hyderabad under the surveillance of the Collector and that the allowance, if in jagheer, should be in British territory or, if in money (which he is disposed to prefer), should be paid through the British Government. The charge for the provision for Meer Roostum's family—both Captain Forbes and the Commissioner suggest—should be borne by Ali Morad because he is now in possession of Meer Roostum's territories and also because the cession of the Turban and his patrimonial lands by Meer Roostum (in virtue of which Ali Morad's title to their possession

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was recognized by us) appears to have been made under a reciprocal obligation on the part of Meer Ali Morad to provide for the maintenance of Meer Roostum."[101] On the other hand, both officers concur in opinion that the provision for Meer Mobarick's family should be at the cost of the British Government because we hold the territories of that Meer by conquest. But adds Mr. Pringle: "If the confirmation of the territory north of Roree has not been promised unconditionally by Sir C. Napier to Ali Morad, I am of opinion that—as any cession in that quarter would be matter of favour and not right—it may not unreasonably be charged with the condition of providing for the family of his brother Meer Mobarick, the uncertainty of whose maintenance and illiberality of whose treatment under him forces us to interfere on their behalf."

39. On referring to Captain Forbes' report, it appears that in December 1848 the petition from two of the sons of Meer Mobarick to this Government was forwarded for his report.[102] With reference to this and similar petitions from others of the ex-Ameers and their relatives at Calcutta, Bombay and Sinde, the Resident (after full inquiry and mature consideration) was required to report:

1st Who of the minor or ex-Ameers and their relatives are now living under the protection and guarantee of His Highness Meer Ali Morad?

2nd What is the position of these individuals as respects their original relations and conduct towards the British Government and how far does it give or deprive them of claims to our favourable consideration?

3rd How far would it now be advantageous to the interests or character of the British Government to extend to all, or any, of these individuals favourable consideration without reference to their original relation and conduct towards it?

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4th What is the nature and the character of the treatment they receive from His Highness Meer Ali Morad?

5th If that treatment is harsh (and if the original claims of the individuals—or the modification which time and circumstances may have effected in their position—would make it advantageous to the interests and character of the British Government to ameliorate their conditions), is the time now arrived when they might be withdrawn from His Highness' guarantee and provided with a settlement in British Sinde?

6th If this be the case, in which locality and under what surveillance or restrictions would it be advisable to place them? What assignments in land or money would be suitable for their maintenance? What would be the annual aggregate charge on this account and to what party should it be debited, to the British Government or to His Highness Meer Ali Morad?

In prosecuting these inquiries, secrecy and caution were enjoined on the Resident and a careful avoidance of anything which might tend to excite Ali Morad's distrust or unreasonable expectations on the part of his relations. Finally, Captain Forbes was desired to include in his report the case of any other of the ex-Ameer's relatives who, although not at present living under the protection and guarantee of Ali Morad, may have similar claims to our consideration with those who are so situated.

40. With his reply, Captain Forbes furnished the following list of the minor Ameers of Khyrpore, with—as far as he could ascertain—the amount of revenue they derive from the jagheer assigned for their support by Meer Ali Morad:[103]

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
Sons of Meer Roostum age yearly Income Remarks
1 Meer Ali Akbar 45
2 " Ali Meerdan 33
3 " Meer Mahomed 28 one daughter
4 " Ghoolam Hiader 23
Sons of Meer Ali Akbar
1 Meer Ghoolam Sha 20
2 " Ali Gohar 15
3 " Nadjif Ali 11 one wife
4 " Sobrad Ali 10
5 " Soontaf Ali 7
6 " Gorham Ali 6
7 " Abdool Kader. " By a concubine
8 " Allah Dattah " By a concubine
Son of Meer Ali Meerdan
1 Meer Muzzuffir Ali 13
Sons & grand sons of Meer
Mobarick Khan deceased.
1 Meer Mahomed Ali 37 Three wives one daughter and child of a third wife & some grandchildren
2 " Ali Mahomed 25 Two wives
3 " Wullee Mahomed 26 Two wives
Sons of Meer Nusser Khan at Bo
1 Meer Ali Muddut
2 " Ahmed Ali 8
Son of Meer Ali Mahomed
1 Meer Ali Hyder 9
Son of Meer Wullee Mahd
1 Meer Mobarick Khan 7

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Grand Sons of Mobarech Khan

Sons of Meer Fuzzle Khan deceased.

1	Meer Ale Buttah	20	one wife
2	Ameen Buttah	15	From 3 to 400 Rs. at which Sardars are paid out of the one wife

Sons of Meer Sobinain Khan..

1	Meer Mahamed Khan	43	one wife one daughter betrothed to Meer Tajomal 3 sons of the same..
2	Moreed Hyder	33	one wife
3 — "	Goolam Shah	28	one wife

Son of Meer Mahn Khan

1	Meer Allee Dattah	20	

1	Meer Kabangheer Khan	64	Two wives, one daughter married.
2 — "	Chatter Khan	70	one wife

Sons of Chatter Khan —

1	Meer Nubbee Bux	29	one wife
2 — "	Ghoolam Mourtaza	22	one wife
3 — "	Ahmed Ali	13	

Son of Meer Ghoolam Mourtaza.

1	Meer ali Bux	3	

1	Meer Mahamed	46	Three wives

— Sons of Do —

1	Meer Ghoolam Hyder	27	one wife
2 — "	Ghoolam Nubbee	20	one wife
3 — "	Abbas Ali	15	
4 — "	Nawazsin ali	13	
5 — "	Fuzzle ali	9	
6 — "	Buckal Khan	10	
7 — "	Ali Bux	2	By a Biranbine

1	Meer Ahmed Khan	43	one wife a quiet respectable man.

— Sons of Ditto —

1	Meer ali Datto	20	one wife
2 — "	Alah Muddee	19	
3 — "	Goolam Nawazsin	17	
4 — "	Futteh Khan	15	
5 — "	Buttah ali	13	
6 — "	Sultan Ali	11	
7 — "	Loofs ali	9	
8 — "	Lodi ali	8	
9 — "	Ghoolam ali	5	

Comp[a] Fuzzle

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
1 Meer Ghoolam Murtazza. His son — 10 One daughter, a very quiet respectable man

1 Meer Ghoolam Ali — 6

1 Meer Kurrum Khan — 25
son of Meer Khoodadad Dec deceased.

1 Meer Khan Mendah — 21 One wife - two sisters the eldest betrothed to Meer Sh Neeaz H.H. Ali Moorad's eldest son, and is to be married in February.

41. With reference to the four sons and nine grandsons (with which the above list commences), Captain Forbes—with much force and truth—observes: "The family of the late ex-Ameer Roostum I have ever considered deserving from the British Government of far more consideration than it appears, hitherto, to have met with. Whether in regard to the long standing friendship which existed between it and the late head of that family, or to the extent of blame which ought to be attached to their individual share in the events of 1842-43 (which ended in the exile of that Ameer and in their present state of dependence and want), their case should receive such consideration (I am the more anxious) as I feel that the decision Government must come to on it, namely to ameliorate their condition, must be highly advantageous to its character."[104] In these sentiments, I most cordially concur, they do great honour to the Resident.

42. From the same report, we obtain the following melancholy history of the hardships which these most unfortunate Princes have endured from the date of the Battle of Meeanee up to the present

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time: "Meer Ali Akbar (Meer Roostum's second son) was the only one present in the Battle of Meeanee. From that field, he joined his three brothers—Ali Murdhan, Shere Mohamed and Dost Mohamed (deceased)—at Kochra in the Khyrpore territory. In July of the same year (1843)—having during the interval never left the Khyrpore State—they (with the permission of His Highness Meer Ali Morad) settled at Meerawah, where they continued quietly to reside until the 14th May 1844 (when they were, by order of His Excellency the Governor of Sinde, removed prisoners to Khyrpore). This order originated in the petition which the four Ameers sent to Sir Charles Napier and by which petition His Excellency appears to have first learned that petitioners were residing in the Khyrpore territory. That petitioners were not made prisoners for any attempt at disturbing the peace of the country appears from an extract from a letter dated 29th June 1844 from His Highness Ali Morad. But, solely because His Highness' protection of them was not authorized." In this letter, His Highness Ali Morad writes: "Meer Ali Akbar, Meer Ali Murdhan and the other two sons of Meer Roostum (with the exception of Meer Mohamed Hussein)—since the Battle of Meeanee—have behaved obediently to the British Government and to me. Seeing this, I permitted them to remain at Meerawah and I gave them encouragement. Now your Excellency's order has reached Captain Malet and this officer directed me to seize Meer Ali Akbar, etc., and, according to this, I sent some horsemen for the purpose. There were many Beloochees about them but they showed no sign of opposition or resistance and the Meers were brought safely to Khyrpore. I am certain these four Ameers will never cause disturbance or be unfriendly towards your Government." It is pleasing to observe the better feelings of Ali Morad obtaining the mastery, and inducing him to intercede with the Governor of Sinde on behalf of his unfortunate nephews and, in the end, he succeeded in obtaining their release from imprisonment.

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43. Their conduct (reports Captain Forbes) subsequent to "their release in September or October 1844 has been exemplary, as it was previous to their imprisonment. Such behavior on their part as subjects for a period of nearly six years, alone gives them in my opinion no slight claim to the favourable consideration of their case by the British Government (even had their acts as Princes been far more hostile than they were). I have not the least doubt that they might (with perfect safety and, certainly, with great advantage to themselves) be withdrawn from His Highness' guarantee and be provided with a settlement in British Sinde as their peaceable behavior, hitherto, is not in any way to be attributed to that guarantee but their own conviction of the utter hopelessness of any attempt to recover their lost position in opposition to the British Government. For to our Government do they consider His Highness of Khyrpore solely indebted for the Chiefdom (as also that we are prepared to maintain him in it)." In conclusion, the late Resident suggests that Roostum's sons and grandsons may be located in any part of the Hyderabad Collectorate not contiguous to the Khyrpore State, in order to avoid the constant bickering that would arise between them and Ali Morad. Rs. 20,000 would—in his opinion—be a sufficient provision and should be decidedly paid by the Khyrpore State: 1st because the whole of the land they themselves received in jagheer from the late Meer Roostum is now in the possession of Ali Morad and 2nd because there is little doubt that His Highness assured Sir Charles Napier, in an interview he had with him at Hyderabad, that he allowed this family the above sum and would continue to do so. No further surveillance over them will be necessary beyond what all other jagheerdars in British Sinde are subjected to.

44. The petition from the sons of the late Meer Roostum, alluded to in the above extract, merely set forth that, "Since Meer Roostum went away with the other Ameers to Bombay we have only had a small place at Meerawah for our support. This is not sufficient for us

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and we trust you will restore us to the jagheers we had in the time of Meer Roostum." The only notice taken of it was forwarded to Captain Malet (the then Resident of Khyrpore) with directions to keep the subject secret until he arrived at that place "when he was to take steps to make them prisoners with certainty."[105] This was accordingly done and, in September following, the Resident was furnished with an extract from a letter from the Government of India directing that a distinct communication should be made to Ali Morad, informing him that his protection of the four Ameers was not—as His Highness alleges—authorized by Sir Charles Napier.[106] That we hold him responsible for any misconduct of which they may be guilty or for any interference, correspondences or intrigues into which they may enter and that in forbearing to exact from him, as our ally, the painful duty of surrendering these members of his family who have been engaged in military operations against us.[107] The Governor General in Council cautions His Highness not to misunderstand this forbearance on our part. That, if his relatives—who are on his custody and charge—abuse our lenity by the slightest act of interference, we shall consider His Highness to be the responsible person and not hesitate to have recourse to such coercive measures as may prevent the tranquility of Sinde being disturbed in the future.

45. Such are the circumstances under which these Princes were originally entrusted to Ali Morad's custody. Their complaints of ill treatment and of their not receiving a sufficient subsistence have been unceasing. On one occasion, Captain Malet forwarded to the Government of Sinde a petition from the family which they request might be kept secret because—on a former petition being sent to His Highness—Meer Ali Murdhan was kept by Ali Morad in confinement for six months.[108] Captain Malet also enclosed a petition from the son and family of the late Meer Mobarick and observed: "From what I can learn, the whole of the above parties, the relatives of His Highness Ali Morad are in very great distress and they are all in such dread of

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him that they can only come to me secretly at night." With this letter Captain Malet furnishes a memorandum that it appears Ali Morad gave in February 1847 to Sir Charles Napier of the allowances he had granted to these families:


Meerahbpor between all the sons of Meer Roostum annual produce Rs 8000
Meerapore to Meer ali Akbar alone ——— do ——— Rs 3000
Chulla ——— to ——— do ——— do ——— do ——— Rs 500
Shamerdekhan to Meer Ali Mirzahan ——— do ——— Rs 6000
Lunkahar Rs 1300 } between Meer Shere Mahomed
Kahar Rs 600 } & Meer Ghulam Mahomed } do ——— Rs 1900
Hussun Rs 1000 }
Gouhar Rungur Rs 600 } to Meer Dost Mahomed ——— do ——— Rs 1600
Total Rs 21000.

I have already stated that these representations produced no effect on Sir Charles Napier.[109] He declined to interfere on behalf of these children of affliction which is the more surprising with reference to the comparative liberality with which the Lower Sinde Ameers and their families have been treated pecuniarily, although the guilt and folly charged against them far exceed what was ever been imputed to the Khyrpore branch of the Talpoors.

46. Captain Forbes remarks: "Even if the value of the jagheers is, as stated by His Highness Ali Morad, 21,000 Khyrpore Rupees (equal to 19,000 Company Rupees)—which I do not believe they are—still from that amount has to be deducted ½ nominally but more frequently ½ in reality as taken by His Highness. They are also subject to all seasons (in common with the less favoured of His Highness' jagheerdars, to the oppression and detrimental demands of His Highness' shikarees [i.e., hunting trips])—for men to beat up the shikargarhs [i.e., hunting grounds], to repair their enclosures and also to furnish as labourers for other work whenever called upon to do so."[110]

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47. With reference to the three sons and ten grandsons of the late Mobarick and their families, Captain Forbes remarks: "They are equally badly off and the amelioration of their condition would be equally advantageous to the character of the British Government."[111] The same amount should be assigned to them as the family of Roostum but "as the whole of Meer Mobarick's possessions (as well as all jagheers held from that Meer by his sons) now form a portion of British Sinde, it would not be fair to call on the Khyrpore state to bear their entire charge." He, therefore, suggests that Ali Morad should be called upon to state in writing what provision he is willing to make for the family and on the supposition that he will permit them to enjoy free of all deductions or interference the lands they now hold of the estimated value of Rupees 7,000. He suggests that the British Government should add cultivated lands of the value of Rs. 13,000 per annum and permit them to reside on the same with all the rights of British subjects.

48. On Mr. Pringle being required by this Government to furnish further particulars of the treatment of the families of Meer Roostum Khan and Mobarick, which he considered far from kind and liberal, he stated that, "The deficiency in kindness and liberality in their general treatment by Ali Morad consisted in his assigning to them a maintenance insufficient for their comfort and responsibility; the distress this subjected them to, the resort to personal restraint and other objectionable measures for preventing them from representing their grievances to the Government, petty acts of annoyance and oppression towards their followers, the absence of that countenance, consideration at durbars [i.e., royal court] and on other public occasions which is due to their position and near relationship to His Highness and necessary for them to obtain the respect of his subjects."[112] Besides this he was given to understand that there were other circumstances (of daily occurrence) tending to humiliate and depress them but difficult of formal enumeration. Captain Forbes,

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who from his residence on the spot had ample opportunity of judging, was fully impressed with his view of their case and represented it to me frequently and strongly in conversation. That his predecessor Captain Malet entertained similar opinions may be gathered from his letter of the 4th April 1847. Finally, he referred to the fact of Meer Ali Murdhan having been kept under restraints for six months for petitioning and to the members of Meer Roostum's family being in such distress and in such dread of Ali Morad that "they could only venture to visit the British resident at night."

49. The Commissioner was informed, in reply, that it appeared that the descendants of the late Meer Roostum (now at Khyrpore) were in number 14 persons. From age of 43 to 6 years, with their families, to whom Ali Morad has assigned a provision not exceeding at the utmost Rs. 9,500 per annum. On the other hand, the descendants of the late Meer Mobarick are nine of number from 37 to 7 years of ages, with their families receiving at the highest estimate Rs. 4,000 per annum. That Ali Morad in his memorandum asserts that the allowances to Meer Roostum's family amount to Rs. 21,000 per annum and that if they amount only to Rs. 9,000 the interference of the Government is called for. But unless these families are permitted to reside in British Sinde (although Government may insist on an increased allowance), they will suffer from Ali Morad in many ways (in which it would not be in the power of Government to prevent). Mr. Pringle was, therefore, directed on his then approaching tour to take every opportunity to speak to His Highness on the subject of these Ameers and their families (without giving His Highness reason to suppose they had complained) and to induce him to make up their means to what he formerly reported to be its amount. Should the Commissioner, however, fail in securing better treatment and more liberal allowances for their families, he was instructed forthwith to report the same to Government in view to the consideration of the expediency of removing them from under

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His Highness' control—requiring him to grant them such allowances as may be deemed necessary.

50. With respect to Meer Mobarick's descendants and their families, the Commissioner was informed that further information was required to enable Government to decide on the amount that would be proper for their support before it acceded to Captain Forbes's suggestion that it should be increased five-fold. It did not also exactly appear to Government why it should burden itself with the provision to this family hitherto defrayed by Ali Morad. Information was therefore required as to the mode in which it was first fixed and made payable by His Highness. It was further observed that, in the case of Meer Roostum's family, it was probable that the obligation mentioned by Mr. Pringle may be the only, as it is a very sufficient reason why Ali Morad should pay it, but that this does not apply to Meer Mobarick's descendants, concerning whom it must be supposed that some express directions were issued by the Government of Sinde.[113] I have been unable to discover any reply to this reference and, if none has been received, the Commissioner should be requested to furnish the information called for to enable the Government to decide on the claims of the late Meer Mobarick's family.

51. Captain Forbes' list of the members of the late Meer Roostums family does not include his eldest son (Meer Mahomed Hussein) and his youngest son (Meer Ali Buksh). Neither of these persons personally engaged in hostilities against the British Government, either at Meeanee or Dubha. The former joined his father with his followers soon after the Battle of Nownahar but, on the ruin of his family consequently on the conquest of Sinde, he quitted that province and has ever since been a fugitive—first at Mooltan and, lately, at Bhawulpore.[114] The youngest son accompanies his father in his captivity to Poona, where he now resides. He has lately petitioned to be permitted to return to Sinde. His conduct has been unexceptional.

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52. The case of Meer Mahomed Hussein was first brought to our notice by Mr. Pringle in 1848 as one deserving consideration.[115] In a petition to the Governor General, the ex-Ameer states: "I never before petitioned your Lordship and now do so because I am in extreme distress. His Excellency the Governor of Sinde knows that I took no part in the disturbance of Sinde when my late father Meer Roostum was sovereign.[116] All his children had jagheers separately and had possession of them. If my father gave all his country to Meer Ali Morad, certainly he must have made some provision for himself, his children and his family because he could not have known that he would be sent to India and get a provision from the Government when he left Khyrpore. All that he had was plundered by Meer Ali Morad." After alluding to his flight with his family (after the Battle of Meeanee), he continues: "The few ornaments which the women saved on their persons are all sold and expended and nothing is now left for us. I do not speak whether my father was guilty or not (that the Government knows) but I do say that his family were guiltless and deserve the sympathy of Government. I never meddled in any quarrel, therefore, I deserve—in justice—the mercy of Government. When Government thought it right to give Meer Roostum's country to Meer Ali Morad they may think it just to give his family a piece of bread. Meer Roostum and I served the Government. I beg that my jagheer, or any portion of it, may be given to me or that Government may give something from its own country sufficient for the subsistence of my father's family (or from Meer Ali Morad's country). I shall give in writing on the Koran—or in any manner that Government may wish—that I will never do any thing to offend the British Government. I hope that Government will no longer wish me to remain in a wild and strange country with all the family. To go to India there is not objection in distress but the name of being a prisoner we cannot bear."

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53. Sir Charles Napier was requested to report whether a pension should be granted to Meer Mahomed Hussein.[117] In reply, he stated: "He could only recommend that he should be sent to live at Calcutta with the other ex-Ameers," and accordingly the Government of India assigned him a pension of 500 Rupees per mensem [i.e., monthly] with orders that he should reside at Dum Dum.[118] It was to avoid this hard condition that the ex-Ameer had become a refugee from Sinde and he evaded acceptance of the provision offered to him. In July 1849, however, he again petitions—representing that, in consequence of Dewan Moolraj having been against the British Government, he had left Mooltan and had sought asylum in the territory of the Newab of Bhawulpore.[119] In reply, he was merely referred to the order of the Government of India assigning him a pension of Rs. 500 per mensem on condition of his residing at Calcutta. In November of the same year, he visited Lieutenant James (Deputy Collector) in Sinde and presented 3 more petitions. In one of which he observed: "My late father befriended the British and made over to them Fort Bukkur at a time when all the other Chiefs of Sinde were averse to the connection, and so on until his death. The rest of my brothers are sitting in Sinde under His Highness Ali Morad. I alone for six years have been in exile."[120] On these appeals being forwarded with the recommendation of this Government that the ex-Ameer should be permitted to reside and receive his pension under the protection and surveillance of the Chief of Bhawulpore, the Governor General was pleased to sanction the arrangement.[121] On his being informed, the ex-Ameer again petitioned for permission to return to his native land and that a separate provision might be granted to other members of Meer Roostum's family: "I am now an old man (he observed) and desire that I may be permitted to return to Sinde and that a place of residence be appointed for me there. There need be no fear of my entering upon traitorous schemes for no one has power to resist the British. I am satisfied with the amount of pension allowed me but I

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have a large family (five sons, the widows of Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan and the family of the late Meer Moreed Hyder Khan, son of Meer Roostum Khan) and my expenses average four times the amount of pension allowed me."[122] On reference, both the ex-Ameers' requests were negatived.[123]

54. There is another appeal from the ex-Ameers now before the Government which, at my suggestion, has not been disposed of in expectation that the report of the Sukkur Commission would throw some light on the conduct of Meer Ali Morad towards the unfortunate Meer Roostum and his family and that it may also appear that the value of his eldest son's evidence before the Commission may entitle him to favour and indulgence.[124] Both these expectations have been realized. I shall presently show that Ali Morad has fraudulently appropriated land of large value that either belongs to the British Government or Meer Roostum's family. Of the value of Meer Mohamed Hussein's evidence before the Commission, there can be no question. For although I will not go so far as to assert that Ali Morad's guilt could not have been established without his assistance, the documents he produced are—of themselves—sufficient to satisfy the most skeptical and the straightforward manner in which the Chief (of his own accord) came forward. This greatly strengthens the claims which, in my opinion, he previously possessed for a just and compassionate consideration of his case.[125] I rejoice to observe that Mr. Pringle advocates this, for in reporting his unexpected appearance before the Commission, he observes: "Meer Mohamed Hussein is now advanced in years. His appearance and address are prepossessing. He was accompanied by his three eldest sons (fine looking young men). He has never, I believe, in any way conducted himself inimically to our Government since the conquest of Sinde. If he were allowed to return to reside in this Province, I should not myself have any apprehensions of his abusing the indulgence. I should also be glad to see the pension of Rs. 500 per mensem—which was proposed

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to him—doubled. For I believe it would be very scanty for the maintenance in a manner suitable even to his present fallen position of representative of the eldest branch of the Khyrpore family with his children and followers. In his petition—which should now be forwarded for the consideration of the Most Noble the Governor General of India—the ex-Ameer reiterates the appeals he has so frequently made and, very naturally, taken credit for himself for the services he has performed to the British Government in producing evidence which has established the right of the British Government to Meerpoor Mahtela and refuted the false witness produced by His Highness Ali Morad."[126]

55. I now proceed to establish that Ali Morad has obtained possession of the jagheers—which formerly belonged to Meer Roostum and his sons—by an act of fraud or deception (as flagrant as that practiced on us) in respect to the districts of Meerpoor Mahtela and Mehurkee. The act I allude to is intimately mixed-up with another transaction, namely the cession of the Turban or badge of sovereignty in Upper Sinde by Meer Roostum to Ali Morad. I shall first endeavor to give a correct statement of how this most extraordinary event was brought about. This is not irrelevant to the case now before the Board, for the alleged cession of the Turban is repeatedly alluded to in the Commission's proceedings and Ali Morad, himself, recorded thereon the Treaty under which he asserts it was ceded.

56. The principle facts connected with the cession of the Turban is that Sir Charles Napier received a message from Meer Roostum complaining of being opposed and coerced by his family. That, in reply, Sir Charles Napier—avowedly for a political object—wrote a letter to Meer Roostum advising him to go to his brother Ali Morad (then residing in his stronghold at Dejee Ke Kote) and to be guided by his advice. That Meer Roostum afterward denied having sent the

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message but, nevertheless, followed Sir Napier's advice and went to Dejee, where—according to Ali Morad voluntarily but according to his own accord by force—he ceded the Turban and the whole of his country to Ali Morad under a Treaty written in a Koran. That Meer Roostum immediately escaped from Dejee and fled into the desert, from whence he promptly renounced the act of cession as having been extorted by force. In the first instance, Sir Charles Napier believed his statement and advised Ali Morad not to assume the Turban. But during the discussions that subsequently occurred respecting the transaction he changed his opinion and came to the conclusion that the cession was voluntary. Meer Roostum, unfortunately, avoided a personal meeting with Sir Charles Napier. His brother Ali Morad having craftily (and in order to avoid the exposure which a personal interview would lead to) impressed him with the conviction that Sir Charles Napier intended to imprison him. Finally, that the wrongs thus inflicted on Meer Roostum were emphatically remonstrated against by Meer Roostum and the other Ameers of Sinde and that Sir Charles Napier determined to recognize and uphold the cession and to refuse inquiry and redress. Afterwards, when by order of Sir Charles Napier, Meer Roostum proceeded to Hyderabad to meet Major Outram, his wrongs became the war cry of the Beloochees and were the cause of war and conquest of Sinde. In the first instance, it was understood that the cession only included the lands that appertained to the Turban, which according to Meer Sohrab's will was only one fourth of the lands of Upper Sinde.[127] But Ali Morad, afterwards, claimed under the same Treaty another fourth (or the portion assigned under the same will to Meer Roostum and his family as their patrimonial inheritance). In other words, he asserted that the cession of the Turban included that of the private estate and that Meer Roostum had voluntarily reduced himself and his family to beggary. It is with the last part of the transaction that I have chiefly to deal for it must be obvious that if—as will soon

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appear—Meer Roostum's private estate was not ceded and it cannot possibly of right belong to Ali Morad (though he has contrived to obtain possession of it). It must either belong to his unfortunate family or it must have devolved to the British Government in virtue of the conquest of Sinde.

57. In the document alluded to in the margin, it is stated: "Meer Roostum Khan, an old and imbecile man, alarmed at the intrigues and machinations of his family sent a secret message to Sir Charles Napier that he was anxious to place himself under his protection."[128] Sir Charles Napier sent him the following reply through Ali Morad: "I send this by your brother, His Highness Meer Ali Morad. Listen to his advice. Trust yourself to his care. You are too old for war and, if battle begins, how can I protect you? If you go with your brother, you may either remain with him or I will send an escort for you to bring you to my camp, where you will be safe. Follow my advice. It is that of a friend. Why should I be your enemy? If I was, why should I take this trouble to save you? I think you will believe me but do as you please."[129] Meer Roostum, in great trepidation, took Sir Charles Napier's advice: he made over all his possessions to his sons and proceeded to Dejee Ke Kote, where his brother Ali Morad (a man of unbounded ambition, great tact and consistent and unswerving in his purpose of aggrandizement) lived in baronial state. Meer Roostum, afterwards, declared that although he had received the letter quoted above and had followed the advice contained therein he had never written to Sir Charles that he wished to leave his family and place himself under his Excellency's protection. He felt convinced, however, that such a message had been sent by someone. Be that as it may, he had not remained many days at Dejee Ke Kote, where (by a formal piece of writing in the Koran) he reduced himself to beggary by resigning the Turban and transferring every acre of land he possessed to his brother. In this deed of transfer, several of the confiscated districts named above were improperly entered. This transaction was

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the origin of a controversy between Sir Charles Napier and Major Outram. It was also the principal cause of the war with the Ameers. The Beloochees swore that they would not sheath their swords unless Meer Roostum was reinstated as Rais. Sir Charles Napier considered that he was not in a position either to scrutinize the intrigues of Ali Morad (supposing him to have been guilty of any) or to attach any weight to the excuse that Meer Roostum's actions were the emanations of imbecility: "Imbecility is not a legitimate excuse for rulers! I have only to deal with Meer Roostum's acts," wrote Sir Charles Napier. He found that Ameer's abdication in favour of Ali Morad to be regular and formal and he felt himself bound to recognize the latter as Rais. At the same, time he wrote: "I think your Highness will do well not to assume the Turban. People will say that the English put it onto your head against the will of Meer Roostum. But do as you please."[130] Sir Charles Napier also sent word to Meer Roostum that he would like to have an interview with him in order to hear from him personally all he had done. This message apparently possessed such terror for Meer Roostum that he immediately fled from Dejee Ke Kote into the desert. He, afterwards, declared that he had been frightened away by his brother. Meer Roostum, shortly after, went to Hyderabad when all the Ameers had assembled for the purpose of discussing the propriety of signing the draft Treaty which Sir Charles Napier had sent them. Here at a conference between Major Outram and the Ameers (on the 8th February 1840) Meer Roostum complained of the treatment he had received from his brother Ali Morad and retracted his resignation of the Turban: "Would I resign my birthright of my own freewill?" After some hesitation, the Ameers agreed to the Treaty but they, at the same time, stated that, "Unless Major Outram would give a promise that the Government of India would permit them to unite their forces against Ali Morad—for the purpose of compelling that Ameer to yield the Turban to Meer Roostum—it would be out of their power to restrain their Beloochee retainers from

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proceeding to acts of violence. Major Outram did not feel himself competent to give such a promise and his house was attacked by an infuriated multitude. His gallant defence is well known. Sir Charles Napier rapidly came up with his 2,500 troops and overthrew the hosts opposed to him at Meeanee on the 17th February 1843. The Battle of Dubba was fought on the 24th March 1843 and the conquest of Sinde was complete."

58. I have given this extract because it contains in a clear and condensed form a statement of the circumstances under which Ali Morad obtained the Turban (and of the conquest of Sinde which followed) framed from the most authentic data in existence, namely the records of Government of India. I have, however, observed that Sir Charles Napier had a political object in view when he advised Meer Roostum to go to his brother. This fact is proved by the following extract from a letter which he addressed on the 20th December 1842 to the Governor General: "I had a secret message from Meer Roostum. The bearer had an open letter in the usual unmeaning style of the Durbar but the messenger privately informed Lieutenant Brown that Roostum could do nothing and would escape to my camp. I did not like this—as it would have embarrassed me very much how to act—but the idea struck me at once that he might go to Ali Morad, who might induce him (as a family arrangement) to resign the Turban to him (Ali Morad); especially as Roostum has long been desirous of getting rid of this charge of the Talpoors. I, thereafter, secretly wrote Roostum and Ali Morad at about one o'clock this morning. I had an express from Ali Morad to say that his brother is safe with him, etc. Ali Morad is now virtually chief for—if Meer Roostum does not bestow the Turban upon him—he will at all events be guided by Ali, into whose hands he has voluntarily thrown himself."[131] On the 29th December, Sir Charles Napier informed the Governor General: "Meer Roostum had resigned the Turban to his brother Ali in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the

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Koran before all the religious men collected to witness the resignation at Dejee. Ali sent me the Koran to see it. I said that these family arrangements were their own but that your Lordship would support the head of their family, whoever it might be, according to the spirit of the Treaty. I personally thought it better for Roostum to keep the Turban and let Ali Morad act for him but that he was free to do as he pleased. It was a family arrangement with which your Lordship would not interfere."[132]

59. There is abundant evidence that, at this time, Sir Charles Napier suspected that foul play had been practiced against Meer Roostum, for—in the same letter—he informed Lord Ellenborough: "Now it strikes me that Ali Morad may have frightened the old man into the foolish step he has taken, on purpose, to make his possession of the Turban more decisive and, that to do this, he told him I intended to make him (Roostum) a prisoner; Ali pretending to be his friend and only waiting for his opportunity to betray us. Such are my conjectures, etc."[133] On the 7th January 1843, Sir Charles Napier repeated that both Major Outram and himself "were convinced that Ali Morad had frightened him and that the old man had been persuaded by Ali Morad that I mean to imprison him for life and who was perfectly exhausted by his flight."[134] Nevertheless, on the 1st of this month, Sir Charles Napier issued a Proclamation to the Ameers and people of Sinde—which Ali Morad had caused to be recorded on the Commission's proceedings. In this, the transfer of the Turban to Ali Morad is proclaimed and the General's intention announced "to protect, according to the Treaty, the chief Ameer Ali Morad in his rights as the justly constituted Chieftain of the Talpoor family. God willing, I mean to march into the desert. I will dispose the armed bands that have stopped our mails. I will place the killadars [i.e., underlings] of the chief Ali Morad in command of every fort and I will act towards the Ameers of Hyderabad as I shall find their conduct deserve."[135]

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60. The Treaty under which the Turban was ceded is dated the 20th December 1842 and will be found in the compilation printed by order of Parliament No. 12.[136]

61. Immediately on the receipt of Sir Charles Napier's Proclamation of the 1st January 1843 (noticed in paragraph 59), Meer Roostum denied that he had ever sent the message and desired to know who had delivered it.[137] At the same time, stating that he had no doubt it was delivered but that he was prepared to prove that he never sent such a message. He added that—the night before he left Dejee—Noor Ahmed Hafiz (a confidential servant of Ali Morad) brought a message at midnight from Ali Morad to the effect that it was Sir Charles Napier's purpose to come to Dejee and that there he would meet Roostum (from whom he intended to extract three lacs of Rupees and that, if the money was not paid, the jewels and property of the zenanna [i.e., women's quarters] were to be seized). Therefore, Ali Morad had advised him to go off to the desert at once. He (Roostum), accordingly, did so early in the morning. It is, however, clear from a letter (dated 2nd January 1843) that the moment Meer Roostum was out of Ali Morad's power he appealed to Sir Charles Napier and repudiated the act of ceding the Turban. For in this he observes: "The gist of your letter amounts to this—that I advised you to be guided by His Highness Ali Morad and that he advised you to fly from a meeting with me as a conspirator who wished to make you a captive."[138] Forgetting his previous admission (see paragraph 59) that he thought this very likely, Sir Charles Napier—without enquiring—treats this as a subterfuge and untruth and informs Meer Roostum that he will no longer treat with him as Rais or consider him as Chief of the Talpoors and take for granted that he (Roostum) has "solemnly resigned the Turban." On the 11 February, Sir Charles Napier says:[139] "Roostum's plea of being sent to Ali Morad by me is a shallow affair because, in the first place, he sent a secret message (by Moyadeen, I believe, Brown told me) to say that he was by all intents

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a prisoner at Khyrpore. I replied to him: "Take your brother's advice. Go to him and either stay with him or I will escort you to my camp."[140] To which—on the 13th when reporting that all the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde had accepted the new treaties in public Durbar and applied the seals to the draft—Major Outram informed his superior: "The old story—justice to Roostum—was the reiterated cry, notwithstanding my constant replies that the abdication was his own act. This they all higgled at more than signing away their own property that is confiscated by the new Treaty. He, Roostum, has always been consistent in his story and brings forward strong proofs. Indeed, it appears notorious that he was in the first place actually surrounded by Ali Morad's sentries (his own people removed from him) and that Ali Morad afterward caused him to fly (to avoid) as he (Ali Morad) led him to believe a worse evil. He not perceiving Ali Morad's object to prevent the interview which you proposed having with Meer Roostum until he saw your Proclamation here the day before yesterday, his observation on which I send you."[141] Unfortunately, Major Outram's remarks produced no effect. The Battle of Meeanee was fought four days afterwards. Meer Roostum gave himself up to Sir Charles Napier and was sent with the other Ameers—a prisoner—to Bombay. In one of his appeals that he addressed from hence to Government, he thus describes the mode in which the cession of the Turban was extorted from him: "I and my family went to the Fort of Dejee in conformity with Sir Charles Napier's advice. As soon as we arrived there, Meer Ali Morad placed guards over us and, having seized all my confidential and respectable servants, imprisoned them. He forcibly made me execute a writing making over to him the right of inheritance to the country and affixed to certain forged papers our seals, which he took from our imprisoned servants. Afterwards, he went to Khyrpore and sent a message through his servant that we were at liberty to go out of the Fort of Dejee and that, if we did not leave the fort, the army of General Napier Sahib

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Bahadoor would march there and imprison us. On the receipt of this message we did not know what to do and—having no remedy left to us—we went out of the fort (exposing ourselves to cold and rain) and arrived at Saeeda."[142] In allusion to Major Outram informing him that he must relinquish the government of the county which belonged to Ali Morad, he pathetically observes: "I could not hear this conversation (as I had governed the country 85 years) as I was put to the necessity of living at the mercy of a younger brother whom I had brought up from infancy. I went to Kohera in exile and remained there. I trust that—in conformity with the laws of Jesus Christ and of the justice and equity of the British Government—my affairs will be settled." He requests that his appeal be forwarded to the Governor General and the authorities in England "in order that they may be merciful to me who am oppressed at the age of eighty five years and grant me redress."

62. I have already shown that, before the conquest of Sinde, Sir Charles Napier was under the impression that Meer Roostum had been frightened into the cession of the Turban and that he avoided a meeting with the General: "The old man having been persuaded by Ali Morad that I intended to imprison him for life."[143] After the conquest when the justice of the measure became matter of discussion, Sir Charles Napier abandoned this impression and made the following observation: "Soon after a message arriving from Meer Roostum claiming my protection against the intrigues of his own family offered an opportunity of having one man to deal with (instead of a faction with whom it was impossible for a civilized government to deal and into whose intrigues I considered it undignified for a powerful government to enter and, from the first, I determined not to enter into them). I was determined that when there was a breach of Treaty—whether great or small—I would hold all the Ameers responsible and would not be played off like a shuttlecock (and told this was done by one Ameer and that by

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another) and have a week's inquiry to find out whom I was to hold responsible for the aggression. For I, at once, saw on arriving in Sinde that this hide and seek shifting responsibility was the game that the Ameers had been playing. The proposal of Meer Roostum to come into my camp offered me an easy remedy for this evil and, having adopted the high opinion which Major Outram entertained of Ali Morad, I had no hesitation in recommending his brother to seek his protection and be advised by him. Yet having suspicions (in despite of the high character given to me by Major Outram of that brother) that some intrigue must be going on, I gave Meer Roostum the option and invitation of coming to my camp and putting himself under my protection. But my advice to Meer Roostum, which let the reader observe, was not given until it was asked. I secured to Meer Roostum the honourable and powerful protection of the British Government. This he did not choose to accept. He went to his brother and then fled from that brother with his usual vacillating imbecility (an imbecility which I believe to have been produced, by his long habits of drunkenness, for he is said to never be sober after mid-day).[144] That this flight was caused by Ali Morad, as Major Outram affirms, I do not now believe, though I did at the time. I have neither seen nor heard anything to make me believe it. When I heard that he had resigned the Turban, I disapproved of it. Mr. Brown will recollect my sending Ali Morad's vakeel back to him with this message. I even recommended to him to return the Turban and merely act as his brother's lieutenant. His answer was that the deed had been executed, in due form, before all the Mullahs (or priests) and that it was impossible to alter it. I—of course—had nothing to say. I had no business to interfere with the private engagements of the Ameers. I was authorized to give advice when asked. I was obliged by existing Treaty to give protections to any Ameer whose rights were invaded by another but I was not called upon to originate a complaint when none was made to me. Especially in a case which—whether originating or not in family intrigues—had a result so favourable to

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my own Government and useful to the Ameers. I did not, therefore, interfere between Ali Morad and his brother. The proofs that he was voluntarily elected by his brother were laid before me. I sought to have the acknowledgement that it was a voluntary act from that brother's own lips but he pertinaciously avoided meeting me. Nor was Major Outram able to bring about a meeting. Afterwards, I believe that it was his own family that prevented this meeting me—they were afraid that he had voluntarily given up his Turban."[145] Further on, Sir Charles Napier observes: "We will even suppose, which I do not admit (though I suspected it at the time), that Ali Morad bullied his brother into making over the Turban and his estates. He, Ali Morad, guaranteeing a due and dignified maintenance to Roostum and then—arguing on false premises—asserts that: What the law of England would have done for him, Ali Morad did for himself—by his own power. That is, not only possessed himself of the Turban (the badge of sovereignty) and the rights belonging to it but, likewise, Meer Roostum's private estates—thereby making the unfortunate Ameer disinherit his own sons and nephews."

63. I have made this long extract in order to give both sides of the question. But I may be asked, "Why do I now reopen a question which, had I the power, I would bury in oblivion?" Especially since Meer Roostum has found that peace in the grave which was denied to him in this world. To this, I reply, that I plead the wrongs he suffered as the most powerful argument that can be adduced in favor of our now affording redress to the utmost extent of our ability to his descendants. Sir Charles Napier admits he was bound by existing Treaty to interfere when an Ameer's rights were invaded by another. But it is difficult to reconcile this admission with his refusal to listen to Meer Roostum's complaint against his brother's perfidy An "old Indian" like myself—the merest tyro of a "political" (those classes of whom he professes such profound contempt)—would have informed Sir C. Napier that a message conveyed to Meer Roostum from a

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General at the head of an army was likely to be viewed as a command and that (when a British officer has been instrumental in placing one man into another's power) he is responsible for the consequences (at all events) to such an extent as to satisfy himself that no foul play had been practiced. Sir Charles Napier had thought fit to assure Meer Roostum that he might trust Ali Morad and that Ali Morad would not deceive him. I will venture to assert that there is not a political officer—of any note in India—who will dissent from my opinion that he was bound (in honour and good faith) to have investigated Meer Roostum's complaints against Ali Morad. Had he professed his readiness to do this, he would have found no difficulty in obtaining an interview with the Ameer—for the old man was scared away by the menacing letter he received and by being informed by Sir Charles Napier's orders that "no concession or submission could reinstate him in the Turban which he has resigned."[146] Had this course been adopted, the brilliant victories of Meeanee and Dubba would not have been added to the military fame of England and the large public and private treasures of the unfortunate Ameers would not have been divided among our noble and gallant army.[147] But the materials would not have been created for writing what, I venture to say, will constitute one of the most melancholy chapters of the history of British India.

64. It has been seen that Sir Charles Napier's advice to Meer Roostum to be guided by Ali Morad's advice was founded on a secret message from Meer Roostum and that the latter denied having sent such a message. Who will, henceforward, discredit the denial—now that it has been established by the Commission's inquiry—that the man who is stated to have brought the message was the corrupt agent of Ali Morad (namely the moonshee Moiedeen, who for a bribe of 10,000 Rs. abstracted the box containing the original Treaty of Nownahar and other confidential records from Lieutenant Brown's office).[148] A man, moreover, who was proved to be a double traitor

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and was actually made a prisoner in consequence of having been detected in corresponding with the enemy: "Major Clibborn having intercepted letters from the hostile chiefs thanking him for his information." The information we derive from the Digests of Intelligence from Sinde between September and December 1843 render it highly improbable that any such message was sent and prove that Ali Morad was the very last person to whom Meer Roostum would cede the Turban voluntarily.[149] The Upper Sinde Ameers were, at this time, divided into two parties: Meer Roostum, his sons and nephews (the sons of the late Mobarick) on the one hand and Meer Ali Morad on the other. For several years, a bitter fraternal feud, inamedicable vulnus (i.e., mayhem), had prevailed between them. Meer Roostum had only a very short time previously been humbled to the dust and (although Rais or sovereign of the country) had been compelled to purchase peace by a cession of territory. Can it, for one moment, be supposed that on the 21 December 1843 he would voluntarily have ceded not only the Turban but (as it now appears) his private estates (the inheritance of his sons after his own demise) to one of whom on the 16th September 1843—in the confidence which exist between father and son—wrote as follows: "Although I entreated Ali Morad, it was of no avail. He became very infuriated and disobedient. Being helpless—by reason of the strong English army which is close at hand and under the pressure of circumstances—I gave several pieces of jagheer of my own etc., etc. Oh, my son, this is the way of the world. A strong English army is close at hand and we must, therefore, be cautious—although, on this account we must be patient. Yet, as regards Ali Morad, there must be no delay as he has been so insolent to me, who am the Chief of the tribe. What have the gentlemen said to him that they should say anything to me. We must have our revenge. You must therefore come quickly with your troops and munitions of war that we may retaliate." The writer of this letter never dreamt that it

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would be exhibited as evidence in a British court of justice.[150] We may, therefore, rely that it faithfully portrays the feelings which he then entertained towards Ali Morad and to imagine that—in the short space of two months—Meer Roostum would, of his own free will, make over all that he possessed in the world is to pronounce that he was either insane or imbecile. But he was neither.[151] Ali Morad, the most designing of the Upper Sinde Ameers, completely hoodwinks Sir Charles Napier and succeeds in effecting the ruin of his elder brother Meer Roostum. That old and venerable chieftain, bewildered with the menacing and insulting letters of the British representative and by the artful insinuations of his brother, expresses his wish to throw himself into the hands of Sir Charles Napier. Does this look like a desire to resort to force? Is this a proof of his contumacy and hostile feeling to the British Government? What is the answer of Sir Charles Napier? He recommends Meer Roostum to seek refuge with his worst enemy: Ali Morad. A recommendation under such circumstances was of course a command. What is the result? The slightest knowledge of Native Princes might have foretold. Ali Morad takes advantage of the opportunity to practice on the fears of the helpless old man, who—by force or fraud—is induced to resign the Turban and is then persuaded to fly. The most remarkable feature of the case is the connection of Sir Charles Napier that, while trampling on all the dearest rights of these wild Beloochees and transferring the power of the state from an aged and justly beloved chieftain to one who was an object of detestation, he had hit on the only expedient for ensuring a permanently peaceful state of affairs in Sinde.

65. Shortly after the conquest of Sinde, a correspondence occurred between Sir Charles Napier and the Governor General (Lord Ellenborough) repeating the arguments to be adopted for the occupation of the conquered territory and for determining what portion should be retained by Ali Morad and what portion devolved to the British Government. A reference to this correspondence is

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now necessary because it involved the question of what rights Ali Morad had required under the Treaty ceding the Turban. It still further illustrates the real character of that transaction and, at the same time, affords additional evidence of Ali Morad's duplicity and of the manner in which he had swindled Meer Roostum's sons and nephews of their birthright. Strange to say—at the same commencement and throughout this correspondence—Sir Charles Napier contended that Ali Morad was entitled to retain not only all the lands in his own rightful possession at the outbreak of the war and all lands which Meer Roostum possessed in right of the Turban but, likewise, his personal patrimony (under the will of their father Meer Sohrab), as far as they were in Meer Roostum's rightful possession at the same period. The rest he proposed should devolve to the British Government, either in right of conquest or of forfeiture imposed on the Khyrpore Ameers, generally, for breach of engagement preceding to the war. I say it is strange that Sir Charles Napier should have so argued because it must be familiar to those who are conversant with the Sinde question that in the controversy between that officer and Major Outram (when the latter asserted that Meer Roostum had been deprived of all his lands which appertained to the Turban and those which constituted his private estate), Sir Charles Napier emphatically declared that such was not the fact. Nay, I shall presently show that on the 14th January 1843 Sir Charles Napier addressed a letter to Ali Morad explicitly informing him, in order to obviate any mistake, that he would be only entitled to the lands and privileges which belongs to the Turban and not to those which appertained to Meer Roostum as an individual.[152]

66. On the conquest of Sinde, Captain Pope was appointed Collector and Magistrate at Sukkur and was instructed by Sir Charles Napier to take charge of the conquered territory in the North.[153] Almost immediately after assuming charge, this officer wrote to Sir C. Napier as follows: "I perfectly understand your instructions as to

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the territories which His Highness Ali Morad is to be acknowledged as possessor of (i.e., whatever belonged to him before the war broke out and whatever was by right attached to the Turban)."[154] The then Governor General (Lord Ellenborough) entertained exactly the same view and it did not escape his Lordship's penetration that Ali Morad was endeavoring to grasp more than he was entitled to, for on the receipt of Captain Pope's report he observes to Sir Charles Napier: "I am afraid there will be some inconvenient differences with respect to lands attached to the Turban. I have never seen any account of them. Your Excellency has justly decided that Meer Ali Morad is to retain possession of all the lands that he before held in his own right and to have all those attached to the Turban. More than this he is not entitled to. I should judge, however, from Captain Pope's report that he is endeavouring to possess himself of all the lands in Upper Sinde which belonged to any of the Ameers who acted hostilely to the British Government. This must not be permitted."[155]

67. There can be not doubt that the Governor General's views were conformable to justice and reason. Sir C. Napier, however, changed his original views and advocated Ali Morad's claim to much more than the Governor General conceded. He observed: "1st we recognized the assumption of the Turban and lands appertaining thereof by His Highness Ali Morad on the free resignation of his brother.[156] We were bound to do so by Treaty, for such was the law of Sinde and we were bound to abide by that law. 2nd with the Turban, according to the will of Sohrab, went certain lands amounting to one fourth of the territory bequeathed by the Ameer to his heirs. 3rd when Meer Roostum resigned the 'Turban,' which he did with all legal forms, he did at the same time and with the same forms resign to his brother the whole of his (Meer Roostum's) territories and in return his brother engaged to provide for his own due maintenance. This resignation of his territories was written in the same Koran at the same time and was one act with the resignation of the Turban. The

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whole was confirmed by the signature and seal of His Highness Meer Roostum Khan. 4th as we were obliged by Treaty to recognize and did accordingly recognize the formal transfer of the Turban, it appears to me conclusive that we must recognize every part of the transaction that is in accordance with the laws of Sinde and of Mahomed [PBUH]. By this law, every chief is master of his property, none of which can be entailed. The will of the possessor decides who is to have the land, such—at least—I am given to understand is the Mahomedan law. If this be so, we are bound to concede to His Highness Ali Morad those lands which Meer Roostum had the right of making over to him by the Mahomedan law. 5th but we are not bound to concede to His Highness those lands to which his brother Meer Roostum had no legal right viz. those which belonged to their nephews the sons of Mobarick."[157] Sir C. Napier, therefore, informed the Governor General that he had directed Captain Pope to abstain from stationing kardars [i.e., district officers]: 1st at all those territories possessed by Ali Morad as his inheritance, 2nd all which belonged to the Turban by the will of this father "Meer Sohrab," 3rd all that are written in the Koran as made over to him by Meer Roostum under the hand and seal of that Ameer and making one act and deed with the transfer of the Turban, save and except those lands which were the property of his nephews' the sons of "Mobarick." Sir Charles Napier then discusses the question whether Meer Roostum could recall the gift (as he terms it) of the Turban and decides that—by the Mahomedan law and by the law of Sinde—he could not. But he observes: "Meer Roostum recalled his gift of the Turban and its lands and all he did in that act. Question: Was this lawful? Ali Morad answers: "No. By the law of Mahomed [PBUH] every chief is master of this own property. If he gives it to his children, he may (in virtue of his paternal power revoke that gift) but, if he gives it to a chief who is his equal and over whom he has not patrimonial power, the deed is final. He cannot revoke the gift. Therefore Meer Roostum cannot undo that

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which he has done. The Turban and the lands of Meer Roostum are mine by right in virtue of the Mahomedan law and by that of Sinde." Now continues Sir C. Napier: "As I am given to understand this is really the Mahomedan law, I have acted thereupon but I have ordered Captain Pope to occupy the lands of Mobarick's sons. They made war on the English, were conquered and their territory becomes ours. Such, my Lord, is the view I have taken of the subject and I have ordered Captain Pope to act upon it. Until I received your Lordship's commands, it was necessary for me to act immediately as the ryots were left in a state of alarm and uncertainty. One party industriously spreading the report that all the country was to be given up to His Highness Ali Morad. The other—with equal zeal—asserting that he was to be deprived of all but his patrimonial inheritance."

68. The above letter evidently took Lord Ellenborough by surprise, and well might it do so. I have already shown that it would be a violent supposition to imagine that Meer Roostum would voluntarily have resigned to this most bitter enemy even the Turban and lands appertaining to it.[158] How then can we, for a moment, suppose that in addition thereto he would make a free gift to that same enemy of his private estate (in fact, of every acre he possessed) and forever afterwards become (with his family) pensioners on Ali Morad's bounty. The Governor General does not appear to have recollected that Sir C. Napier had himself expressly informed Ali Morad (before Sinde was conquered) that the Turban lands alone were all he would receive. Without this aid, however, Lord Ellenborough—in a very able letter—refuted Sir C. Napier's arguments and directed further inquiries to be instituted.[159] In this, after concurring in the order to Captain Pope to occupy the lands which belonged to Meer Mobarick's sons as now belonging to the British Government by right of conquest, His Lordship observed:[160] "Your Excellency has directed that the lands to belong rightfully to

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Ali Morad, to whom the Turban was, as your Excellency states, freely resigned by Meer Roostum. Your Excellency rejects as invalid the subsequent retraction by Meer Roostum of the Turban. It appears from your Excellency's letter of the 20th December (1842) that Meer Roostum had long been desirous of getting rid of the charge of the Turban and from your letter of the 29th December that the Turban was resigned in the most formal manner: His resignation being written in the Koran before all the religious men collected to witness the act at Dejee and the Koran was sent to your Excellency that you might see it. It appears also (from Major Outram's notes of conference with the Ameers on the 8th February [1843]) that Meer Roostum addressed a letter to your Excellency requesting that the Turban might not be made over to Meer Ali Morad.[161] Finally, it is consistent with probability that—under the circumstances then existing—an old and infirm man, as Meer Roostum is, may have been really desirous of relieving himself from the Chiefship of his family and may have freely resigned the Turban to his brother Ali Morad the next legal heir." His Lordship, therefore, concurred with Sir C. Napier in rejecting Meer Roostum's subsequent retraction of the cession of the Turban and in recognizing Ali Morad's right in virtue of such cession to the lands which appertained thereto.

69. We here see that the Governor General proceeds on the supposition that the resignation of the Turban was the free and voluntary act of Meer Roostum and from this it is to be inferred that, had His Lordship thought the contrary, he would not have confirmed the transaction. At the same time, it is clear that the Governor General had some misgiving on the subject. At the conclusion of his letter he observes: "Your Excellency may possibly be able to obtain from some of the religious men present at Dejee—when the Turban was resigned by Meer Roostum—some detailed account of what took place on that occasion."[162]

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70. Having disposed of this part of this question, the Governor General proceeds to remark on Sir C. Napier's proposals that Ali Morad shall be deemed the rightful possessor of all the lands which belonged to Meer Roostum, not in right of the Turban but as a single Ameer now stated to have been made over to Meer Ali Morad at the same time and with the same forms with which the Turban was transferred. This transfer, of what may be considered his private property, having been made by Meer Roostum in consideration of an engagement by Meer Ali Morad for his due maintenance. To this proposal Lord Ellenborough replies that Sir C. Napier's letter of the 28th June is the first information he had received of this transfer of lands not held in right to the Turban and of its being one act with the resignation of the Turban and points out that "when your Excellency met the son of Meer Roostum on the 6th of January (1843) you told him that his father would hold his lands according to the draft Treaty but must loose what was attached to the Turban—thus drawing a clear distinction between the lands held by Meer Roostum in his private capacity as a simple Ameer and those he possesses in his public capacity as the Chief of the Talpoor family invested with the Turban. And, therefore, your Excellency cannot have been aware on that day that his private as well as public lands had at the same time and in one transaction been ceded by Meer Roostum to Meer Ali Morad. The Koran in which the cession of the Turban was written and which must have been seen by your Excellency on, or before, the 26th December (1842) cannot then have contained the cession of the private lands or the writing therein must have been incorrectly translated to you."

71. The following remarks clearly indicate that the manner in which the cession of the Turban was extorted: "On the 27th December your Excellency wrote to me that, "There is one point I cannot yet understand. Some trick, probably, but I cannot yet clearly see it. There is an evident objection to my seeing Meer Roostum. Why I do

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not know but I told Ali Morad I must and will see His Highness." On the 29th your Excellency wrote: "I have to tell you that Meer Roostum decamped yesterday morning. I met Ali Morad the night before and desired him to say that I would pay my respects to His Highness." Your Excellency then gave your two conjectures as to the cause of Meer Roostum's flight and seemed inclined to the opinion that Meer Ali Morad had frightened him into this step in order to make his possession of the Turban more decisive. My conjecture (adds the Governor General) is that the resignation of the Turban and the resignation of the private lands by Meer Roostum were two separate transactions, if—indeed—the private lands were ever ceded by Meer Roostum and the cession thereof be not altogether a forgery subsequent to the first transaction, which was of public character, that of the resignation of the Turban."

72. His Lordship then observes: "Whether by the Mahomedan law Meer Roostum, being a free agent, could alienate his hereditary lands is a question upon which inquiry shall be immediately made from persons acquainted with that law. The result shall be communicated to your Excellency. But the indispensible condition of the legality of the grant is that it should be made by a free agent. Even if it should appear that Meer Roostum had the power to alienate these private lands, it must be clear that he did so not under restraint and not under delusion as to his true position before I could justly recognize Meer Ali Morad as the proprietor of such lands by virtue of the resignation Meer Roostum is now stated to have made to him. That such resignation can have been altogether voluntary it is difficult to believe. Meer Roostum may have readily divested himself of the Turban (which made him the centre of the intrigues and machinations of his family), but he can hardly have been the willing instrument of the disinherison of his sons or have freely reduced himself to dependence upon his brother for his own maintenance." The words I have underlined in the above extract deserve to be

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moiety of the lands specifically bequeathed to Meer Roostum besides having the fines, ferries, tolls, etc. mentioned. But, until it be decided whether Meer Roostum ceded his personal moiety attached to the Turban, it would be impossible to proceed further than to ascertain what lands never belonged either to Meer Roostum or to Meer Ali Morad and to take possession—for the British Government—of all lands which (never having belonged to either of these chiefs) were the property of chiefs who have been in arms against us and have not since been forgiven by your Excellency."[166] In conclusion, his Lordship reiterated the doubts entertained with "respect to the validity of the cession of Meer Roostum's private interests in the lands he held. If, indeed, any cession of that interest was intended to be made by him, doubts may be removed by the inspection of the original writing in the Koran and by further information which may be afforded by Sir Charles Napier."

77. A copy of Meer Sohrab's will showing how, in the first instance, the lands of Upper Sinde were divided between Meer Roostum Khan and his two brothers was forwarded to Captain Pope with instructions to ascertain and report what lands really belonged to the Turban.[167] In reply, he reported—on the information of Ali Morad's Minister Sheikh Ali Hussein—that, "No lands in any part of Sinde belong to the Turban. The claim of the wearer of it being solely for the half of the revenue of the country lately possessed by Meer Roostum with the addition of the whole amount of the taxes of the country."[168] In a subsequent letter, he repeats this opinion and enclosed a report from Mr. Wingfield on the subject. He submits that the result of the inquiry—so far as oral evidence is concerned—had confirmed the "fact admitted by Sheikh Ali that no lands in Upper Sinde belonged to the Turban." With regard to the authenticity of Meer Sohrab's will, Captain Pope left this point to be determined by Sir Charles Napier and observed: "There can be no reasonable hope of the voluntary production of any document which should

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damage His Highness Ali Morad's claims from the records in his possession."

78. Pursuant to the Governor General's instructions, Captain Pope was—now at the eleventh hour (six months after the Battle of Meeanee)—directed to obtain a copy from the Koran (ceding the private estate of Meer Roostum) and to "make the necessary inquiries from such religious parties who may have been present when the Turban was resigned by Meer Roostum at Dejee."[169] For the performance of this duty, Captain Pope proceeded to Khyrpore and obtained "an attested copy of the deed of cession of the Turban and the whole of the lands of the ex-Ameer Roostum to His Highness Ali Morad." In his report, he explains the precautions he adopted to ensure accuracy and these were unexceptional.[170] The writer of the deed of cession was the Syed Peer Ali Gohur (the same person who was, afterwards, employed by Ali Morad to commit the forging in the Treaty of Nownahar discussed in the commencement of the minute). At the time of Captain Pope's inquiry he was on friendly terms and in the service of Ali Morad. That he really wrote the deed of cession was never disputed. He admitted the fact and states that—after the deed had been sealed—he saw Meer Roostum write the words "Buhal ust" upon it. He, at first, denies to verify his statement on oath but was finally persuaded by Captain Pope to do so. The only other evidence obtained by Captain Pope was a joint statement, made by the persons named in the margin, to the effect that the "sealing and signing of the deed of cession was witnessed by several individuals (servants of Meer Roostum and of Meer Ali Morad) and all declared publically that—neither by work or deed—did he (Meer Roostum) show that his action was otherwise than of his own free will. The Persian language being the language of business in this country, I caused my moonshee to write, before all the people assembled, an abstract of the proceeding which was read over to them in my presence and assented to by all as correct."[171] In this, Peer

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Ali Gohur states: "I with my own hands placed and bound round the Turban on His Highness Meer Ali Morad's head, excepting that His Highness Meer Roostum Khan gave three turns with his own hands. The compact that Meer Roostum made with Ali Morad I wrote myself in the Koran and Meer Roostum Khan wrote the words "Buhal ust" signifying it is the truth. The sixth on the list, a darogah [i.e., official] late in charge of Meer Roostum's seal, states he affixed the seal to the agreement by Meer Roostum's orders. Numbers 4, 8 and 9 state they were present when the negotiation was going on and corroborate Ali Gohur's statement. It does not appear that numbers 5 and 7 gave any specific evidence (though they signed the statements), and as for Ali Morad's uncle and brother (numbers 2 and 3), they were absent when the Turban was ceded but heard: "All that Peer Ali Gohur has said."

79. For the sake of reference I will now transcribe the translation of the deed of cession made in the Office of the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta:[172]

Treaty written in the Koran by Meer Roostum: Praise be to God and blessings on the Prophet and his family.

Meer Roostum Khan Talpoor has made a compact and formed a Treaty with Meer Ali Morad Khan Talpoor to the following effect. At this time—during the supremacy of the powerful and exulted English Government and from the Autumn of 1253—I Meer Roostum Khan, of my own free will and pleasure according to the rule and custom of the chiefs of Hyderabad, present to Meer Ali Morad Khan (who is worthy of the Chiefship) the Turban of the Chiefship and brotherhood with the control of the whole of my country—with the (sur shemeari) capitation tax, (meer buburee) river dues and (jazeya) tax on others than Mahomedans and farms and tolls and fisheries (as specified below) so that during my lifetime—having occupied the

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seat of the Chiefship—he may take into his entire possession the countries specified below. No one of my sons or nephews has—or shall have—claim or entry on this same Turban and this same country, which I (of my free will and pleasure) bestow in gift. If anyone advances a claim, he is a liar. The administration of affairs, the control of the army and the negotiations with the English, all now depend on the will of Meer Ali Morad Khan. In this compact, the oath of the Koran is used. There shall not be the variation of a hair's breadth. God is a sufficient witness. Written on the 17th Tekiad 1258 A.H. (December 20th 1842): 1st Purgunnahs Khobara, Chehoor, Alleeareea and Kutteera; 2nd Purgunnahs of Noushera, Praze; 3rd Purgunnah Khundbarree (with Cherpore and Lehureed); 4th Lud Kokun; 5th Purgunnahs Meerpore Mahtela and Mehurkee; 6th Sandy territory in Rene and Nara; 7th Forts Shahgurh, Sirdashgurh and other forts; 8th Purgunnahs Obara, Khyrpore, Hurkee; 9th Purgunnah Imanwah; 10th Purgunnahs Buhoonuck and Burah; 11th one-third of Subzut and Purgunnah Moozuka; 12th Purgunnahs Shikarpore, Morali; 13th Purgunnah Rupa; 14th Purgunnah Bulbudka; 15th Purgunnah Chuck Morzargah; 16th Purgunnah Kushmoor.

80. Sir Charles Napier informed the Governor General that Captain Pope "tells me there is not the least doubt of the Treaty ceding the Turban being authentic and voluntary on the part of Roostum. However, Captain Pope shall speak for himself. We are trying to verify the rights and powers of the Turban." In a subsequent letter, he observes: "By the time this reaches its destination, your Lordship will have received all the proofs that Captain Pope has been able to collect relative to the transfer made to Ali Morad by Meer Roostum, both as regards the Turban and his personal property. They seem to me satisfactory and valid. Meer Roostum does not deny the facts. We have his own confessions that he went voluntarily to Ali Morad's fortress of Dejee. For his assertion that he went by my advice, even if true, he admits that he went voluntarily. He also

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admits that he came away voluntarily. He says by Ali Morad's advice, but still he went away voluntarily. I think that, if despotic Princes are to escape the results of their folly by throwing the blame on their advisers, it would be very hard to deal with them if any wrong. I have all along thought—and still think—that Ali Morad has a just claim on the possessions of Meer Roostum. I am sure your Lordship will have the same opinion when you receive Captain Pope's papers. I desired the Captain to be very exact in his inquiries, as the utmost justice was necessary towards a captive Prince. But, assuredly, neither the Ameer nor his family have any claim upon us except to have justice."[173]

81. It is not surprising that Sir Charles Napier should have endeavored to satisfy himself that the result of Captain Pope's inquiry was satisfactory, for—unquestionably—upon the result the justice or injustice of our proceedings in Sinde mainly depended. For this reason, however, Sir C. Napier's opinion cannot be regarded as conclusive. A more extraordinary mode of conducting so important an inquiry never came under my observation. What a contrast does it not afford to the recent inquiry into the charges prepared against Ali Morad. Captain Pope evidently misunderstood the Governor General's instructions, which (I have no doubt) were to elicit the truth—that is, what were the real merits of the "Turban" transaction. Captain Pope, however, confined the inquiry to such persons as Ali Morad (the party complained against) thought fit to produce and does not appear to have felt himself at liberty to search out for independent and disinterested testimony. Instead of examining the witnesses separately and subjecting them to strict cross-examination, they are all lumped together. The character of the first witness, Peer Ali Gohur, is sufficiently developed on in the Commission's proceedings. At the time of the cessions of the Turban and at the time also of his examination, he was in Ali Morad's service ready to do whatever his Master bid him; even to the commission of forgery

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(as in the case of the Treaty of Nownahar). The second witness, an uncle of Ali Morad's, appeared before the Commission to support that forgery. The third, a brother of Ali Morad's and now dependent upon him, admits he was not present when the transaction occurred—his evidence, therefore, being hearsay. The six other witnesses are either retainers of Ali Morad's or (with one exception) persons formerly in the services of Meer Roostum who, after the wreck of their Master's fortunes, attached themselves to Ali Morad. To call this a bona fide inquiry would be a mockery. It was—to all intents and purposes—ex parte. Meer Roostum, the plaintiff, has been exiled to Poona. No one was summoned on his behalf. He was, in fact, altogether unrepresented at the inquiry. One thing, however, is quite certain. By instituting any inquiry, at this late period, Lord Ellenborough (as Governor General) virtually admitted that Meer Roostum's earnest appeals (and the appeals of the Ameers of Lower Sinde on his behalf and the wild cry of remonstrance of the Beloochees generally) ought to have been attended to. That they were listened to, augments (in my humble judgement) the claims of Meer Roostum's posterity upon the justice and mercy of the British Government because it has now become matter of history that the refusal to investigate and redress his grievances became the war cry of the incensed Beloochees and was the ultimate cause of the war and conquest of Sinde.[174]

82. But it appeared to me very desirable that the real nature of Captain Pope's inquiry should not be involved in doubt and the following extracts (from a letter I have received from that officer), which I give with his permission, will explain its character and show how ill adopted it was to elicit the truth: "I do not remember the date on or about which I was sent to Khyrpore. Most probably it was in August 1843 but I was not, I regret to say, sent to inquiry into the circumstances of the cession of the 'Turban' of Upper Sinde to Ali Morad by the late Meer Roostum but to 'hear' what Ali Morad might

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have to adduce in proof that the cession was voluntary. He was himself, for sometime, in the room at Khyrpore when the statements I had to hear were made. His Minister Sheikh Ali remained there to conduct the proceedings. I had only to hear and record what was said. The witnesses produced were all either persons residing at Khyrpore or within Ali Morad's territories. Having their families so residing, they were consequently completely under his power. It could never have been intended that there should be any investigation or else Ali Morad would naturally have been directed to send the parties to be examined in Sukkur. The idea of any of those produced at Khyrpore saying one word likely to displease Ali Morad would have been absurd and in no case could an ex parte statement of one side of the question be viewed as an inquiry into the whole. It may be as well further to note that Sir Charles Napier had virtually decided the question by putting Ali Morad in possession of the lands referred to in the alleged list of cession long before that inquiry (if inquiry it can be called) took place. The servants of Meer Roostum had passed into Ali Morad's service. Only one of the parties whose depositions you will probably find on record, Shere Singh (formerly Meer Roostum's Dewan or finance minister), was at the time in British employ (under me as Collector) but his family and property remained at Khyrpore. So that even had a bone fide inquiry been ordered, no fair search could have been entered into. In the absence of anyone representing Meer Roostum, it would probably have been vain to expect that the witnesses to be examined should speak out while themselves, their families and properties were in Ali Morad's power and the question at issue had been already practically decided in his favour by the British Government. In obedience to my orders I went to Khrypore, heard and recorded what the parties produced by Ali Morad had to say (as to the circumstances attending the alleged cession of the 'Turban' to himself by Meer Roostum) and transmitted the record to Sir Charles Napier with a remark, to the

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best of my recollection, that—so far as I saw—the parties deposing did not do so under compulsion. I have no copies either of my order or report but they are in the Sukkur records I presume or in those of Kurrachee. I must, in justice to myself, state that long previously I had expressed to Sir Charles Napier my own conviction (founded on statements made to me and the concurrent belief of all natives in Upper Sinde who ever mentioned the circumstance) that the cession was not voluntary. I know that Sir Charles Napier, himself, did not believe it to have been so. Ali Morad, as well as his Minister Ali Hussein, severally confessed to me that the cession was not voluntary. Ali Hussein saying (when pressed on the subject): "Who gives lands and sovereignty away voluntarily?" And Ali Morad saying to this effect: "Everything is allowable in political matters." These circumstances I mentioned to Sir Charles Napier, also to Sir George Arthur. Indeed, I have never concealed my opinion on the subject at any time or place when it happened to be discussed, in Sinde or out of it. I have not the slightest wish to do so now. I have little fear of any man being ultimately injured by talking the truth but, even were it otherwise, I should not hesitate when the remotest chance existed of my being—even indirectly—of the slightest service to these unhappy exiles of Khyrpore."

83. I have not been able to discover any reply from Lord Ellenborough to Sir Charles Napier's letter commenting on Captain Pope's report and stating it to be his opinion that the proof obtained by that officer—both as regards the Turban and Meer Roostum's personal territory—were "satisfactory and authentic." No trace of such a document is to be found either in the voluminous correspondence on the subject received with the Commission's proceedings or in the correspondence lately furnished by the Government of India relating to Sir Charles Napier's administration of Sinde. In fact, there appears to have been a cessation of the correspondence on the subject between these two high functionaries

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from September 1843 to May 1845 and I infer that his Lordship never expressed his concurrence in Sir C. Napier's opinion. Be this as it may, it is quite clear that the Government of India never did so. For, when Sir C. Napier forwarded a draft Treaty of 12 articles which he proposed to enter into with Ali Morad for the confirmation of the Government of India, he was called upon to report what arrangement he proposed for definitively settling the question as to the extent of territorial right acquired by Meer Ali Morad in virtue of the deed whereby the Turban was transferred to him by Meer Roostum dated the 20th December 1842.[175] It is clear that Lord Hardinge (who had intermediately become Governor General) did not consider this point had been cleared up.[176] For, in the same letter, his Lordship observes: "The late Governor General (Lord Ellenborough) was decidedly of the opinion that the deed lands alone which were held by Meer Roostum in right of the Turban were thus transferred and that the deed in question conveyed to Meer Ali Morad no rights in any other than the Turban lands. This also (the letter continues) appears to have been Sir C. Napier's opinion but it seems Meer Ali Morad has never ceased to urge his claim to the whole of Meer Roostum's possessions. But there is no information before Government which of the districts enumerated in Meer Sohrab's will were to be considered as Turban lands and which as personal and hereditary. If any distinction was made, it is not stated in any document but from the correspondence that it is supposed some such distinction existed. The Government of India then, justly, observe the hypothetical question (put by the desire of Lord Ellenborough to the Mohammedan law officers and professors of Arabic Law at Calcutta in 1843) as to the validity of a deed executed by a sovereign Prince—similar to that said to have been written in the Koran by Meer Roostum—with a view to elicit the opinions of the Mohammedan doctors as to the legal validity of the deed and rights it conveyed are of little value, the replies being so full of

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technicalities and conditional contingencies.[177] It appeared, however, to be the opinion of the law officers that the Mohammedan law does not recognize any separate or individual rights in a sovereign Prince. This question should be distinctly met and decided upon before the Treaty is concluded. To this I would remark that admitting the Mohammedan law to be as stated, Meer Sohrab (the father of Meer Roostum), by his will, distinctly recognizes as Meer Roostum's private property ¼ of the lands of Upper Sinde, another fourth being assigned to the "Turban."[178]

84. In reply to this communication, Sir C. Napier referred to his letters to Lord Ellenborough (dated the 28th June and 21st September 1843) and stated that the views, therein expressed, remained unchanged.[179] "The case (he observed) seems to stand thus: On the 28th June, I made a clear statement of His Highness' claim. On the 17th August, His Lordship the Governor General expressed doubts whether the Ameer Roostum Khan made over his personal lands (as well as those belonging to the Turban) to his brother Meer Ali Morad. His Lordship directed me, pending the decision in this question, to take possession of all the lands which never belonged to either of these chiefs; which order I obeyed. On the 30th August 1834, it appeared from Mr. Secretary Thomason's letter of that date that the view taken by me on the 28th June 1843 was correct.[180] Thus the doubts which had been entertained by Lord Ellenborough—pending the decision of the ten doctors of the Mohammedan College at Calcutta—fell to the ground and, further orders having been issued on the subject by the Supreme Government, I considered that the claims of His Highness to be the whole of the lands held by the Meer Roostum were just. He, at that time, had possession of them and I left matters as they stood pending further instructions, which (as I before observed) were never received. If any fraud can be proved against His Highness in the transaction which gave him the Turban and the remaining lands of Meer Roostum, I have nothing more to

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say but, otherwise, I consider that the question was settled by the letter of Mr. Secretary Thomason and the opinion of the College. I have no proof of fraud having been committed by His Highness and, without that, I think it would be impossible to deprive His Highness of the lands made over to him in the Koran. I should consider it to be a breach of faith. I am not aware that there are any geographical distinctions between the Turban lands and the other lands of the late Meer Roostum. However, this does not appear to be a matter of any importance because the Mohammedan law allows of no distinction or separate rights in a sovereign Prince." Finally, Sir C. Napier observed: "Nothing has been formally given by me. All remains in abeyance subject to the decision of your Lordship. To sum up the whole, I consider all the lands held by His Highness Ali Morad to the north of Roree as his by gift. All south of Roree as His Highness' by right. To take from him the first would, I think, be illiberal towards a faithful ally. To take away the last would be a breach of faith." In a subsequent letter Sir C Napier submitted a sketch prepared by Lieutenant Fitzgerald "showing the exact portion of the Khrypore territory, in reference to the British possession, with the names of those districts enumerated in the proposed Treaty" and, with it, a memorandum prepared by the Collector of Shikarpore on the districts included in Article II of the Treaty.[181] There are also statements showing the respective values of certain lands to be exchanged under the Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Ali Morad, but which are of little value since they include the districts that His Highness fraudulently appropriated to himself under the Treaty of Nownahar.[182] With this letter, correspondence between Sir C. Napier and the Government of India terminated and in the following month His Excellency was succeeded in the Government of Sinde by Mr. Pringle.

85. I have observed (paragraph 63) that in the controversy between himself and Major Outram, Sir Charles Napier distinctly

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denied that Ali Morad had obtained under the Treaty with Meer Roostum any lands expect those which appertained to the "Turban." One of the chief points of that controversy related to the extent of possessions that Ali Morad had acquired under the Treaty. Major Outram contended that Meer Roostum Khan had been deprived of almost all he possessed, Sir C. Napier that he had only recognized Ali Morad's right to the Turban lands. It is now clearly proved that Major Outram was right and Sir C. Napier wrong on this most important point. On this subject, I beg to refer to Major Outram's letter to Sir C. Napier dated the 24th January 1843 explaining his views in regard to the financial results which would follow the arrangements then in progress in Sinde and giving "a list of Ameers and their sons who are now rendered disparate" together with the Beloochee and native chieftains and feudatories dependant on them.[183] To this is appended the following note by Sir C. Napier: "I was pledged to nothing except to support Ali Morad in his rights as Rais," and "I was pledged to nothing except to the rights of the Turban, whatever those rights may be."[184] On the 13th February, Major Outram wrote: "I believe it is merely a last attempt to get their brethren of Upper Sinde restored to their lands given—or about to be given—to Ali Morad. They have never murmured at what has been taken by the Treaty poor devils."[185] On which Sir C. Napier writes: "Given? Who gave him any thing? I certainly did not." Again, on the 14th February, Major Outram informed Sir C. Napier: "It has been intimated to me that, if the lands assigned to Ali Morad were restored, his retaining the Rais would not be disputed."[186]

86. I really cannot reconcile Sir C. Napier's statements—in 1843—that Ali Morad was merely entitled to the lands of the Turban with his statement (in his correspondence with Lord Ellenborough) that, in addition thereto, he was entitled to Meer Roostum's personal estate or inheritance. But how, may I ask, are the latter statements to be reconciled with the following letter that Sir Charles Napier

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addressed to Ali Morad on the 14th February 1843: "The Governor General has ordered me to support your Highness as the lawful possessor of the Turban as Rais. Your Highness has certain privileges and certain lands which appertain not to the individual but to the Turban. These must be given to you with the Turban, but the rights and possessions of the other Ameers must be maintained as prescribed in the draft of the new Treaty and I endeavored to explain that no portion of their states can be transferred to you. If they resist the arms of the Company in war and if a shot is fired at the troops under my command, then I have orders to take all their estates in the name of the Company and they would not be made over to your Highness (at least such, in belief, is the intention of the Governor General)." And on the 23rd January, Sir C. Napier wrote to Major Outram: "The intrigues of these people are very silly and like a tangled web. We can cut the Gordian Knot, as Alexander did. We are too strong to take the trouble to untie it. I hear this minute that Roostum has gone the wrong way. After all you said to him, why did he doubt you? However, his movements signify nothing. We walk all over his folly and Ali Morad's intrigues—and all the others—going our own road. I have clearly told Ali Morad, in my letter, that if any of the Ameers fight or refuse to join you personally (or by vakeels) that their lands shall be forfeited to the Government."[187]

87. The motive that induced Sir C. Napier to address the above letter to Ali Morad gives it greater force. Major Outram, when on friendly terms with Sir C. Napier, repeatedly warned him against the crafty and subtlety of Ali Morad: "It is (he observed as early as the 30th October 1842) the interest of Ali Morad to place the other Ameers of Khyrpore at enmity with the British Government (as well as to gratify revengeful feelings) as to secure our support to his claims to the principal chieftainship of Upper Sinde on the demise of Meer Roostum Khan." When he had obtained the latter object, in the manner described in my minute, Sir C. Napier endeavored to set

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bounds to his further ambition—informing (in the above letter) that, if war ensued, the rights and lands belonging to the Turban (all in excess of that including, of course, Meer Roostum's private estate) would devolve to the British Government as conquerors of Sinde. Lord Ellenborough, in what may be regarded as vindication of his Sinde policy and of Sir C. Napier's proceedings, adopts the same view: "The charge against Ali Morad would seem to be that he had forced Meer Roostum to cede land not attached (i.e., to the Turban) or that he had—without any such cession—taken possession of the lands of the other Chiefs, whose interest in such land was not dependant on the Turban, were matters to be enquired into by the British Government, upon which—after full inquiry—decision would have been given. Sir C. Napier sanctioned the cession by Meer Roostum of the Turban with its accustomed rights but his sanction went no further. With whatever passed between Morad and Meer Roostum on the occasion of the cession Turban, Sir C. Napier had nothing to do.[188]

88. I rejoice to state that—in consequence of Lord Ellenborough and Lord Hardinge not concurring in Sir C. Napier's views—the question of what rights Ali Morad acquired under the Treaty ceding the Turban is still an open one. For, as I shall now proceed to show, there are the strongest grounds for believing that Meer Roostum was not so insane as to disinherit his sons and reduce his family, as well as himself, to beggary by ceding every acre he possessed to Ali Morad. But, when the alleged cession of the Turban occurred, he reserved (by separate agreement) his own personal estate as well as those of the sons of the late Mobarick Khan—which agreement has been fraudulently withheld by Ali Morad.

89. It will be in the recollection of the Board that the Commission referred to Government for instructions whether their inquiries should be confined "to the charge of the fraud in the Treaty of

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Nownahar or be extended to other matters of bad faith on the part of His Highness, as—for instance—the alleged suppression of the private agreement between Meer Roostum and himself and the interception of the letter from Meer Roostum transmitting it to Sir C. Napier."[189] In reply, they were—as I now think unfortunately—informed that they shall not investigate "any acts of the Ameer which do not directly bear on the fraud in regard to the Treaty of Nownahar."[190] I say that this is unfortunate because, I think, had we been aware of the connection which exists between several frauds committed by Ali Morad we should have requested the sanction of the Most Honourable the Governor General to have the inquiry extended.

90. I think, however, that the evidence obtained by Mr. Pringle (in his capacity of Commissioner) obviates the necessity of a new inquiry. For it is corroborated by a very remarkable fact: Although all—including Sir C. Napier—admit that when Meer Roostum ceded all his lands (Turban as well as personal) to Ali Morad, he stipulated for a liberal maintenance for himself, family and dependants. Nevertheless, on reference to the Treaty between Meers Roostum and Ali Morad (produced by the latter in support of his claims to retain <u>all</u> Meer Roostum's land), it will be seen that it contains no stipulation for maintenance.[191] Now, it may be surely asked, was it likely that any man in his senses would have allowed so important a part of the arrangement to be unrecorded? Certainly not and the absence, therefore, of any stipulation in favour of Meer Roostum and his family strongly corroborates the fact. Now, I believe for the first time brought to the notice of Government, there are two agreements that were entered into: on the 20th December 1842 the one ceding the Turban to Ali Morad and the other reserving certain lands and possessions to Meer Roostum, to his sons and to his nephews. The former, however, has alone been produced and the latter suppressed by Ali Morad.

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91. On the 28th January last, Mr. Pringle (with reference to his letter of the 15th of that month on the affairs of His Highness Ali Morad) submitted two memorandums. The first of these stated that Sheikh Ali Hussein (Ali Morad's Minister)—having arrived at Mooltan—had been examined by the Lieutenant of Police in the Commissioner's presence "relative to the fraud in the Treaty of Nownahar and the private agreement between Meer Roostum and Ali Morad." The second states that (on the night of the 8th January 1850) an emissary of Ali Morad's came to the Lieutenant of Police (Lieutenant Younghusband) with a present of gold to the value of Rupees 14,000, which he had placed under seal in the Government treasury. Further, that Lieutenant Farrington (the officiating Collector of Shikarpore) reported that (on the 7th January) Mr. Teasdale—a European in the service of His Highness Ali Morad—came with the offer of a present of jewels to a very large amount, which was declined. "I note these circumstances (observed the Commissioner) as indicative of the efforts His Highness appears to be making to influence the proceedings now in progress." The man sent with the gold to bribe Lieutenant Younghusband was apprehended. His examination before the magistrate acknowledged that the object of the bribe was to secure the Lieutenant of Police's services throughout the accusation that Peer Ali Gohur and others were bringing against His Highness.[192] When he was seized, his brother was arrested by Ali Morad—with the view of intimidating him into a denial of having been sent by His Highness and of inducing him falsely to state that Meer Mohamed Khan had sent the bribe.

92. I must now refer to the Board to the documents noticed in the margin.[193] The first of these is a letter from Sheikh Ali Hussein to Sir Charles Napier's moonshee Ali Akbar dated 25th Zelead 1263 (4th November 1847). In this letter, the writer informs the moonshee that he had arrived at Shikarpore on the 29th October 1847 but that—before he left Khurachee—he had written to his

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son (then at Mooltan) directing him to take from his box of papers Meer Roostum's letter to Sir Charles Napier and the Treaty given by Meer Ali Morad to Meer Roostum. That his son, not liking to trust the papers to the post, sent them by a person named Gholam Hyder. This person reached Shikarpore on the 5th November and his arrival was reported to Major Goldney, who forwarded the papers to Captain Brown. Sheikh Ali Hussein then remarks: "Both papers are clear proof because Meer Roostum—previous to granting the Treaty to Meer Ali Morad Khan—made Meer Ali Morad write this Treaty, which is in the hand writing of Peer Ali Gohur. The seal and "Buhal ust" are from Meer Ali Morad's own hand. The letter from Meer Roostum Khan is in the handwriting of Sabr Allee Shah, who was then vakeel to Meer Roostum Khan. That letter Meer Roostum sent to His Excellency the Governor. I am well acquainted with the handwriting of Sabr Allee Shah and as to its identity there is not the slightest doubt. You, yourself, must be well acquainted with his handwriting, as he was frequently in the Shikarpore police stationed at Gotkee. This Treaty was (too written) before me and in the presence of Ali Morad by Peer Ali Gohur. From these two papers, a profit of 5 or 6 lacs of Rupees yearly will accrue to Government—that is to say—that country north of Roree and that belonging to the sons of Meer Roostum Khan."

93. The second document is a letter from Sheikh Ali Hussein to Captain Brown (dated the 7th November 1847). It is, in substance, nearly the same as the one above given to the moonshee and encloses the original letter which Meer Roostum addresses to Sir C. Napier and the Treaty which Meer Ali Morad entered into with Meer Roostum. The letter is as follows:

From His Highness Meer Roostum Khan to His Excellency Sir C. Napier dated 17th Zilcadah 1258.[194]

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After compliments: "I have always been the friend of the British and, never having done evil towards them, trust that they will not do evil to me. I have now—of my own free will and accord owing to old age and weakness—made over, in writing, to Meer Ali Morad Khan the Turban, the whole of my country and fortresses (on condition that he is solely responsibly to the British Government for the new Treaty and in everything). I am old and weak. Without the power of conversing with the British Government, neither am I able to travel far from village to village or from mountain to mountain. I, therefore, hope that whatever the British Government have to say that it will be with Meer Ali Morad, as I have abdicated in his favor the Turban; given over to him all my country and the whole arrangement and responsibility of the Treaty with the British. As a proviso, I have caused Meer Ali Morad to give, in writing, an agreement containing four articles as follows: 1st the country north of Roree, according to Proclamation, I made over to the British. Should I now give that to the Meer, the British Government would without doubt be angry and say: 'You made over that country to us. Why have you given it to Meer Ali Morad?'; 2nd the country belonging to sons of Meer Mobarick Khan (fearing that Meer Ali Morad Khan might deprive them of it on account of a former enmity); 3rd the country belonging to my sons; 4th my expenses, that of my family, khidmutgars [i.e., servants], male and female slaves. I am certain that Meer Ali Morad would not deprive my sons of their country or me of substance since I have done him much kindness. But, for the sake of the future and to ensure my maintenance and the restoration of the three countries, I have caused Meer Ali Morad to give me a written Treaty. Hereafter, should Meer Ali Morad—either before or after my death—make difficulties (as to the restoration of the country of my sons or of the sons of Meer Mobarick Khan), I trust that the British Government will cause Meer Ali Morad to restore to them their country which is their right and to which Meer Ali Morad has no claim. As to the

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country beyond Roree, Government will—of course—act as they please. I have enclosed the Treaty, sealed by Meer Ali Morad and in the handwriting of Peer Ali Gohur. I hope that, after having perused it, you will return it to me."

94. The Treaty, above alluded to, is as follows:

"I Meer Ali Morad Talpoor requested Meer Roostum Khan, on account of his old age and weakly state, to abdicate the Turban in my favour and give over—in writing—all the country that I would be responsible, in every way, to the British Government. The Meer consented to abdicate the Turban and to give, in writing, the whole country and also the fortresses. But he required that I should agree to four articles. After which he would give over to me in writing the whole country. Those articles are as follows:

1st That the country north of Roree, according to the Proclamation, belongs to the British.

2nd The country belonging to the sons of Meer Mobarick Khan.

3rd The country belonging to the sons of Meer Roostum Khan.

4th My (that is Meer Roostum's) expenses.

I consented to the above articles. Taking upon myself the whole responsibility, I do now declare—giving the same in writing—that (if the British Government remonstrate with Meer Roostum Khan and demand why he made over the country north of Roree to Meer Ali Morad) I will be answerable and satisfy the English Government. If they demand the country, I will give it up but I will not allow Meer Roostum Khan to suffer one word of annoyance. To the sons of Meer Roostum Khan, whom I look upon as my own brothers, I will restore their jagheers. I will in no way depart from this. To take one span of

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their land is unlawful. I have no claim, whatsoever, to their jagheers. It is their right and their right they shall receive. The country belonging to the sons of Meer Mobarick Khan (should I not take the British Government will) I will, therefore, now appropriate their country which I will afterwards make over to them. I have no claims whatever on their country. One single span of their country in my possession would be unlawful. The country is their right and their right they shall receive. As for Meer Roostum Khan, his family, servants and male and female slaves, I will provide for all either in land or in money. Nothing shall be deficient. I will serve him as he wishes. These articles I have written out in the form of a Treaty that, hereafter, they may remain as proof and that no difference may occur. God is my witness. Dated the 16th Zilcadah 1258 (A.D. 19th December 1842). Postscript: Meer Roostum Khan is to retain possession of Khyrpore for life. Dated, as above confirmed. Meer Alī Morad's Seal. Translated by Captain Harding 11th November 1847.[195]

95. It will be observed that the above Treaty is dated the 19th December 1842, which establishes the fact that Meer Roostum Khan first took the precaution of securing—as he thought—a provision for himself, his sons and his nephews for the Treaty ceding the Turban is dated the day after, namely the 20th December 1842.[196] The following summary of the evidence obtained by Mr. Pringle establishes, in my opinion, the genuineness of the two documents above recited and—at the same time—the villainy resorted to by Meer Ali Morad to deceive Sir C. Napier and to deprive Meer Roostum's sons and nephews of their birthright.

96. Sobr Ali (soobedar [i.e., the highest military rank for South Asians] of the mounted police of Shikarpore but formerly in the service of Meer Roostum Khan) states that (in December 1842) he was "Meer Roostum's vakeel and was sent to Sukkur with a letter to Sir C. Napier, who informed him that Meer Roostum had fled to

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Dejee Ke Kote. He immediately went to Dejee and was informed by Meer Roostum (who was crying) that he had ceded the Turban to Meer Ali Morad. On the following morning, Meer Roostum sent off the cession—signed by himself—as also the Treaty between him and Ali Morad (signed by the latter) with an accompanying letter to Sir Charles Napier. Deponent heard, afterwards, that Ali Morad dispatched horsemen after the cossid [i.e., mail carrier] carrying the letter and brought him back. Thus, Ali Morad obtained possession of the papers. But Sheikh Ali Hussein has since informed him that he obtained them from Ali Morad. The cession and the Treaty were both written by Peer Ali Gohur. He does not recollect who wrote the forwarding letter but Sheikh Ali Hussein has told him he did so. This may be the case, for deponent was in the habit of writing Meer Roostum's letters to Sir Charles Napier. But there was so much confusion at the time. He does not recollect it. If he saw the letter, he would certainly be able to state whether it is in his handwriting or not."[197] The original letter is now shown to the witness and he is asked whether this is the letter Meer Roostum sent and he replies: "Yes it is this is the letter Meer Roostum sent with the cession and Treaty to Sir Charles Napier."

97. Peer Ali Gohur (the writer of the Treaty ceding the Turban and also of the private Treaty between Meer's Roostum and Ali Morad) gives the following account of a conversation that occurred between the two Ameers at Dejee at the time the two engagements were entered into:[198]

Meer Ali Morad: You are now an old man and had better give over governing the country. Your sons are always in concert with Futteh Mahomed Ghoree making disturbances. The British Government does not approve of this, therefore, they think that you are unfit to govern and you will get into a scrape through this.

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Meer Roostum: I, you, Nusseer Khan and Futteh Mahomed Ghoree will hold a concert together on this matter and settle it.

Meer Ali Morad: There is no occasion for any others to be present. You and I are quite sufficient. Futteh Mahomed Ghoree is a disturber and Nusseer Khan—in this business—is a great loser and, therefore, will not agree.

Meer Roostum: What do you say? The British Government will do nothing to me. I have committed no crime.

Meer Ali Morad: I do not know that you have committed any crime but if you do not know what you have done Futteh Mahomed Ghoree does. But I imagine, if you cede the Chieftainship and the country to me, the Government will still remain in your hands and I will be your child. What you have to answer for to the British Government will easily be settled.

Meer Roostum: I see that for two reasons the country will not remain in my hands: 1st because I am a decrepit old man; 2nd because Futteh Mahomed Ghoree and my sons are continually fighting.

Meer Ali Morad: That is the case.

Meer Roostum: Make out a Treaty and bring it to me. When I have read and agreed to it, I will sign and send it.

Peer Ali Gohur then states that Meer Ali Morad wrote out a Treaty making over to him all the territory belonging to Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Mobarick Khan, the chieftainship and the forts and artillery and brought it to Meer Roostum for signature. Meer Roostum said: "The country from Roree northwards, I have given to the British Government and it has been proclaimed through these

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districts. That country, therefore, belongs to the British. I, therefore, cannot cede that. The lands of Mobarick Khan do not belong to me, so neither can I cede those. Nor can I cede the country belonging to my sons, for they have no other livelihood. But I will cede to you my own territories. You take care of them." Meer Ali Morad: "Meer Sahib, that country north of Roree will never be asked after by the British. If it is, I will be answerable. Whatever arrangements the British Government makes, I will carry it into effect. I will also make arrangements for the continuance in the jagheers of the sons of Meer Mobarick Khan, as also for your own sons and for your private expenses. I am answerable. Be satisfied." Meer Roostum: "Very good. Write the Treaty according to this and I will give you the whole country and Chieftainship." The Peer further states that, "Meer Ali Morad then wrote out the agreement and signed it. Meer Roostum then wrote the Treaty in the Koran ceding his territory to him. After this, Meer Roostum wrote a letter to Major General Sir C. Napier telling him what he had done and enclosing the agreement signed by Meer Ali Morad. This came to the latter's ears and he sent a man after Roostum's servant and took the letter from him. It was given to Sheikh Ali Hussein, who now has it. The copy is in my possession."

98. On the 26th December 1849, the private engagement between Meer Roostum and Meer Ali Morad was exhibited by Mr. Pringle to Peer Ali Gohur and was asked whether he recognized it. He replied: "Yes, it is in my handwriting and was written when Meer Roostum ceded the Turban to Ali Morad."[199] On the 9th January 1850, Sheikh Ali Hussein was—likewise—examined by Mr. Pringle on the same subject and his evidence unveils the real nature of the transaction. I will transcribe it extenso:

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Question by Commissioner	Answer by Deponent
Did you give any statement to Sir C. Napier regarding the transfer of the Turbain by Meer Roostum?	1. Yes I gave a statement at the same Time as I did the one, regarding the Treaty of Naanahar.—
2. Did you give any papers to Sir C. Napier regarding this subject?	2. Not at that time, for they were at Moultan, but I got them down, and sent them to Major Goldney, who forwarded them to Khurachee.
3. Do you recognize the two papers here shewn to you?	3. Yes, I recognize them they are the letters I addressed to Captain Brown and Moonshee Ali Akbar on the subject. N. B. These papers are marked E & F
4. Do you recognize these papers also?	4. Yes one is the letter from Meer Roostum Khan, to Sir C. Napier, and the other the private agreement between Meer Ali Murad and Meer Roostum, regarding the Cession of the Turbain. These are the Original papers referred to above.— N. B. They are marked G & H
5. How did those papers come into your possession?	5. Meer Ali Murad gave them to me to put by, when I was in his full confidence
6. Do you know what Messenger Meer Roostum sent with the letter?	6. No, I do not—
7. Who were present when the agreement between Meer Roostum and Meer Ali Murad was executed?	7. Peer Ali Gohur, Saheb Ali Shah Shree Singh, and several other people.—

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8. Did you ever make these Circumstances known to the British authorities before your communication to Sir C. Napier on the subject?

8. No. I did not, because I was desirous first to ascertain how the districts of Meerpoor and Mahtela would be disposed of. I wrote one petition to Lord Hardinge when I was at Mooltan. After my quarrel with the Meer, subsequent to the Trukee Campaign, I wrote in general terms saying, I would give valuable information to the amount of 10 Lacks of Rupees, but did not particularize until now, that enquiries are being instituted.—

99. From the above, it will be observed that the proof of this atrocious fraud—the interception in the first instance and the suppression afterwards of the private Treaty between Meers Roostum and Ali Morad—chiefly depends on the evidence of the same two persons who proved the Nownahar forgery. But it is supported most materially by the independent testimony of the Soobedar of Police, against whom no charge of enmity against Ali Morad exists. It is further corroborated by the strong presumption that exists in favour of the truth of the story and from the absence of all mention in the Treaty (that Ali Morad has produced) of the maintenance which it is admitted he engaged, when the Turban was ceded, to provide for Ameer Roostum and his family. It may also be observed that—if the present charge originates in a conspiracy against High Highness by his ex-Ministers and the Peer—why should the former have gone through the farce of sending to Mooltan for the papers? Why should they have not fabricated the letter from Meer Roostum and the private Treaty on the spot and supported them by producing (which would have been easy) false evidence to prove that these documents were intercepted by Meer Ali Morad? Although, therefore (as I have

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already stated) I regret that the Commission's inquiry was not extended to his additional charge, I see no reason for discrediting the evidence obtained by Mr. Pringle. Coupled with the facts proved in regard to the Nownahar Treaty and referring to the impudent attempt of Ali Morad to bribe Lieutenants Younghusband and Farrington, I have no hesitation in recording my belief that the documents produced by Sheikh Ali Hussein are genuine and the charge of having fraudulently imposed on Sir C. Napier and depriving Meer Roostum and his sons of their paternal estates is fully proved.

100. It follows, therefore, that Meer Ali Morad has no claim, whatever, either to those estates or to the lands he claims to the north of Roree. They belong to the British Government or, as I hope, will be restored to Meer Roostum's sons. Whether, on the supposition that they are restored, they shall be granted hereditary (or for life only) or whether—when conferred—they shall be subjected to a moderate tribute or quit-rent, I shall leave to the judgement of my superiors. I do not advocate that the Ameers be restored to the sovereign powers. This would be beneficial neither to themselves nor to the people of Sinde. But I would create them jagheerdars of the first class and subject them to the same rules (as far as they can be applied in defining their relations to Government) as the Sirdars in the Deccan and the jagheerdars in the Southern Mahratta country are subjected to.

101. I have asserted that the posterity of Meer Roostum have peculiar claims on the generosity of the British Government, not only in consideration of the many acts of friendship which that ill-used chief evidenced toward us at a period when his friendship was thought worth courting.[200] But, likewise, for their own personal conduct since they were ejected from Sinde. It is not from want of suitable opportunity that they have not gained the enemies of those whom they must regard as the oppressors of their race and family.

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Nevertheless, not one among them has become the avenger of their wrongs—a strong argument in favour of those who maintain that the Ameers of Sinde were coerced into hostility. We have had to undergo the severest trial perhaps to which we have been subjected since we landed in India as commercial adventurers, but in neither of the Punjab Wars did a single Prince of Sinde draw the sword against us. Although he who suffered most was—at the time of the second and greatest struggle—a refugee in Mooltan, the focus of that rebellion which arrayed the Sikh nation against us and which required all our energies to subdue. I say, therefore, that the peaceful and submissive conduct of these Princes in adversity and during a period of turmoil and strife is the best guarantee we can have that they will remain so after their condition has been ameliorated in the manner I suggest.

102. In regard to the claim they possess—in consequence of Meer Roostum's friendly conduct—I must be very brief. When it was resolved to invade Afghanistan for the purpose of replacing Shah Shooja on the throne of Cabool, it became an object of imperial policy to enter into close alliance with the Ameers of Upper Sinde. For this purpose, the late Dr. Burnes was deputed to Khyrpore and, as is well known, obtained from Meer Roostum everything that it was thought expedient to demand (including even permission to occupy, temporarily, the important fortress of Bukkur and the abolition (in the Khyrpore territory) of the levy of all tolls on the Indus. The following extracts, from the correspondence of the day, will show how much importance was attached to these concessions by the Governor General (Lord Auckland) and also the opposition that Meer Roostum experienced from his family when complying with the requisitions of the British Government:

"The Governor General has received, with much pleasure, the account contained in your letter of the professions of friendly feeling

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which have been made to you by the Meer of Khyrpore. His Lordship considers it to be of much importance that the good offices and the cordial good feeling of that chief should be conciliated with a view to the approaching operations of our armies as for the facility that may be, thereby, acquired for the navigation of the Indus. It would be of great and important convenience to the army if the temporary occupation of Bukkur could be obtained for our magazines and hospitals. Captain Burnes has been directed to use his best endeavors to facilitate this object."[201]

"The Governor General, as you are aware, attaches great importance to the possession of Bukkur. You will probably be able to ascertain from Meer Roostum Khan how far he would be willing to permit us to occupy it. Herewith, you will receive a document—under the seal and signature of the Governor General—certifying that our desire is only for the temporary occupation of that fortress, which you are authorized to produce should occasion require it."[202]

"The devotion to British interests expressed by the Ameer of Khyrpore and evidenced by Meer Sobdar Khan are at this juncture important. The important point of obtaining temporary possession of the fortress of Bukkur is, in the dispatch of the Resident in Sinde, merely incidentally alluded to."[203]

The favourable temper of that Chief (Meer Roostum Khan) has been already noted. This feeling Captain Burnes has been instructed to cultivate. For its maintenance—in connection with the great importance of the temporary cession of Bukkur—Lieutenant Colonel (now Sir A. Burnes) arrived at Khyrpore on the 18th October 1838.[204] On the 26th of that month, he reported that Meer Roostum had voluntarily placed in his hand a letter he had received from Meer Noor Mohamed of Hyderabad.[205] Hostile to the British Government and observing: "With such adherence I feel quite at a loss to know

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how we can either ask money or any favour from this family. I have never doubted their sincere disposition to cling to us but in their weak state I did not expect such firmness in the day of trial. As respects Bukkur (observed the Governor General), it would be required by this Government as a depot for treasure and ammunition during the war only. It will be advisable that this fact should be carefully impressed upon the Meers when reference is made to the question of our occupying it."[206]

The accomplishment of the great object of obtaining the fort was thus reported by Sir A. Burnes: "It is with the highest satisfaction that I inform the Governor General of India that the fortress of Bukkur has been ceded to the British Government on the terms proposed and that Meer Roostum Khan has placed himself and his country under its protection. I have had a task of delicacy, difficulty and even danger, but Meer Roostum Khan has shown in the day of trial what he professed all times: that he was the sincere and devoted friend of the British nation."[207] So offensive was this to the aged Ameer's family that, in the Treaty concluded with the Khyrpore state, the cession of the fort was made in a separate article.[208] As the Ameer observed: "It was the heart of his country, his honour was centered in keeping it. His family and children could have no confidence if it were given up," and, again, "the Ameer (Roostum) stated at full-length his declarations of devotion. He said that in giving up Bukkur to the British he had to encounter great disgrace and that his tribe and his family were, alike, opposed to it. But a few years to live and it was to save his children and his tribe from ruin that he had, years ago, resolved on allying himself to us. Other invaders of India might be resisted but if one of our armies were swept away we could send another. Such power induced him alike to fear and rely upon us. He was, henceforward, the submissive and obedient servant of the British and hoped I would avert all injury befalling him and tell him—without hesitation—what he could do to please us." The keys

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of the fortress were delivered to Sir A. Burnes on the 30th January 1839 and possession taken of it on the same day.[209] A few days afterwards, that officer observed: "It is not for the temporary cession of Bukkur that I have ventured to solicit His Lordship's indulgence to the Khyrpore Chief but for his steady and faithful conduct under trying difficulties—the last of which was the granting of a road to Hyderabad. I only echo the voice of all the Indians when I record that to the cession of Bukkur and the demonstration of the army of the Indus we owe the rapid adjustment of affairs at Hyderabad and the happy results of our now being able to carry into effect the highly important operations of the Governor General to the West."[210] For proof that Lord Auckland estimated very highly the value of the concession by Meer Roostum, I get to refer to the documents noted in the margin.[211] His Lordship accepted it, bone fide, as a loan and regarded it as such as long as he governed India. On one occasion observing: "Sir James Carnac [i.e., Governor of the Bombay Presidency] has recommended the permanent retention of Bukkur in our hands. But it will be remembered that we are under special engagement to restore Bukkur to the Khyrpore Ameers and that we have no absolute right under Treaty to station our troops within Khyrpore limits." What must have been the surprise of these Ameers, when under the succeeding administration, the political authorities in Sinde were directed to negotiate for the permanent cession of "the island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur with such an ample arrondissement as may give every facility for the maintenance of a good police within the town and for the formation of commercial establishment therein," with the avowed object of converting the island of Bukkur into a citadel and arsenal of the town of Sukkur and making it easily defensible by a small force.[212] Finally, when we recollect that the cession of the fortress and neighboring islets was ultimately informed by the Treaty imposed upon the Khyrpore state (as a penalty for certain alleged breaches of the former Treaty charged

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against Meer Roostum but which he denied [though he was never allowed the opportunity of proving his innocence]), it must be admitted that here there is much reason for recrimination against the British Government. This constitutes an additional reason why we should look with an eye of compassion on his descendants. But besides the cession of Bukkur, Meer Roostum (about the same time) strengthened his claims to the favour and justice of the British Government by consenting "forever to renounce all right to toll on the Indus throughout his territories."[213] A sacrifice on his part which was (at the time) highly appreciated by Lord Auckland, who informed Sir A. Burnes that, "The result of his well conducted negotiations is, in itself, a matter of much importance to the growing traffic on the Indus and a source of sincere gratification to the Governor General."[214] I am sure that—with all right-minded and honourable men—I have fully justified my opinion that the descendants of the man who, in difficult and troubled times, performed the above important (and many other minor) services for the British Government have a right to expect justice and favour at our hands. But if anyone still entertains a doubt on this point, let him peruse the following letter, which was addressed to Meer Roostum by Lord Auckland—the representative of Her Majesty and the Honourable East India Company. Let him reflect that, in less than four years afterwards, the man so addressed was violently dethroned, exiled and his family utterly ruined. What must be the effects on our own national character if we permit his innocent posterity to pine in want and poverty and to continue dependent on the bounty of the crafty chief who was mainly instrumental in bringing about such a sad reverse of fortune?

The Governor General to Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore:

"The judicious mediation of your friend Sir A. Burnes, the highly esteemed and able agent of my Government now with you, has by

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the blessing of God brought about the establishing of our mutual good understanding by Treaty on a firm and lasting basis.

The support afforded to you by the guarantee of the British Government will, I am assured, prove a source of future strength and—if be God's will—of continued prosperity to your country. I am glad to acknowledge the advantages that I hope to derive from your alliance and support in the warlike operations which I am about to undertake.

Having entered into a Treaty with your Highness, in all honesty and good faith, I should be sorry to find any part of the written agreement between us so worded as to leave either your successors or mine under the supposition that we concluded our compact in a spirit on the one side or the other of anything like jealousy or distrust.

The mention, however, of a previous written agreement in every instance as to the temporary character of the occasional occupation of Sinde by the English is calculated to convey this unpleasant idea.

I have therefore struck it out and, in place of inserting a sentence which casts a doubt on the sincerity of our intentions, I address you this friendly letter as a lasting assurance of the plain meaning and purpose of the words of the separate article. Namely, that the British shall avail themselves of the Fort at Bukkur—the citadel of their ally the Meer of Khyrpore—only during actual war and periods of preparing for war, like the present.

I trust that this mode of re-assuring your Highness will have the double effect of setting your mind at ease and of putting you in possession of a written testimony to my intentions such as may remain among your records in pledge of the sincerity of the British Government."

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Camp Bhagpoorana (January 10th 1839).[215]

103. I have observed also that Meer Roostum's posterity have peculiar claims on the British Government in consequence of the nature of our connection with Sinde, from the commencement up to its final conquest and annexation to the British Empire.[216] It was, at first, my intention to have endeavoured to have given a rapid sketch of the origin and nature of our connection with that province and the transactions in which it has involved us, from the beginning up to the overthrow of the Talpoor Dynasty (so injurious in my opinion to our national reputation for honour and good faith). For such a sketch, the controversy which occurred immediately after the conquest between Sir C. Napier and Major Outram, the debate in Parliament and the Court of Proprietors, the papers relating to Sinde published by order of Parliament and other sources of information open to me afford ample and authentic materials. But I have already trespassed at such length on the Board's attention (and time presses so much) that I find myself obliged to relinquish this design. I do so, however, with much regret because I am satisfied that a summary of this kind would greatly strengthen my argument that it is only consistent with justice and policy that the condition of the surviving Ameers of Sinde (not only of those at liberty) but, likewise, of those in exile at Poona and Calcutta should be ameliorated by every means in our power and compatible with the maintenance of the public peace. In such a sketch, I should have shown: that our earliest treaties with Sinde (those of 1809 and 1820) were merely treaties of friendship stipulating for the exclusion of foreigners;[217] that we next appeared as suppliants for commercial privileges; that the first rulers of Sinde adopted the sagacious policy of repelling our proffered friendship and all our advances for the formation of a closer alliance; that when their successors departed from that policy they did so with melancholy fore-shadings of the results which have actually

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occurred.[218] I should have shown that the "meteor flag" of England—the emblem, generally speaking, of advancing civilization, justice and good faith—was first unfurled on the waters of the Indus by means of a not very dignified ruse. That, from this time forward, we forced on the Ameers of Sinde treaties in rapid succession, each more unpalatable and stringent than its precursor. That—by the Treaties of 1832 with Khyrpore and Hyderabad and the one of 1834—we obtained command of the Indus on condition that no armed vessel or military stores should be conveyed by that river and that the Ameers, moreover, manifesting their distrust of the alliance by introducing the humiliating stipulation that "the two contracting powers mutually bind themselves from generation to generation never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other."[219] That in 1838, our necessities (in consequence of the invasion of Afghanistan) compelled us—at the expense of good faith—contrary to the Treaty of the 20th April 1832 to force a passage and make Sinde the highway for our armies (which, as might have been expected, very nearly anticipated the subsequent war in 1842-43).[220] That, in the following year, we compelled the Ameers to conclude another Treaty imposing a subsidiary force and tribute and abolishing—without compensation—the levy of tolls on the river Indus.[221] During the three years that succeeded the Treaty of 1839, all the authorities unite in praising the conduct of the Sinde Chieftains.[222] Throughout that eventful period, which was characterized by disasters unparalleled in our Indian annals, the Ameers remained faithful to their engagements at a season when—if they had nourished any hostile designs—they might have cut off all support to our troops to the northwest and placed in jeopardy the very existence of the British force in Candahar. I should have also shown that the war in Sinde (and ultimate ruin of the Talpoor Dynasty) was chiefly occasioned by an unwise departure from a fundamental rule of our administration of India—namely, that the

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functions of war and peace should not be vested in the same person.[223] At a period of great difficulty (and on the eve of complicated negotiations) when various charges of a break of Treaty had been preferred against the Ameers (requiring careful, patient and impartial inquiry), the Political Department in Sinde—composed of men well known to the Ameers of Sinde and disposed to treat them with respect and forbearance—was abruptly abolished.[224] The machinery by which the intercourse between the two states had, heretofore, been carried on was suddenly swept away and the conduct of our affairs in Sinde was entrusted—without check or control—to the distinguished military commander. Who—although of eminent (but eccentric) genius, untiring zeal, determined energy, priding himself on never swerving from the right hand or to the left in the accomplishment of any object he had in view—was (from his ignorance of the language, manners, and customs of the people whom he now for the first time came into contact and his inexperience of native character and the intrigues which always more or less prevail at Native Courts) but ill-fitted to exercise the unlimited powers entrusted to him. Who indeed himself proclaimed this fact when, only 12 days after his arrival at Sukkur, he informed the Governor General that, "Only a fair pretext was wanted to coerce the Ameers."[225] And when, shortly afterwards, he observed to Major Outram: "the intrigues of these people are very silly and I think, like a tangled skein of thread, we can cut the Gordian Knot as Alexander did. We are too strong to take the trouble to untie it."[226] I trust I shall not be mistaken in these remarks. I am no advocate for the interference of the civilians with the military commander or for the revival of that absurd system adopted by the Dutch in a bygone age (in sending deputies to the headquarters of Marlborough to contest and thwart the operations of that great commander). All I content for is that not one in a million can, with safety, be entrusted with combined functions of peace and war—with the power to determine when the sword shall be drawn

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and to apply it afterward. The ablest men are often unknown to themselves influenced by ambition, thirst for fame, military honours and distinctions; by the desire to acquire wealth by ignorance, prejudice and contempt of those beneath them and of those the Chinese term "outside barbarians." Or it may be by the desire—laudable by itself—to amend what (according to their ideas) seems amiss in the laws and institutions of foreign governments. It is unwise to emancipate from all control these (some of them the strongest) passions of mankind. The line of demarcation is perfectly clear to anyone of the slightest experience. The man of peace should, in the first instance, have the freest scope in his endeavors to avert the terrible alternative of war and it should be his province to pronounce when those efforts have failed. The military commander's work then commences and he should have equally free scope, without interference to conduct the war to a successful termination. It is to the neglect of these generally recognized principles that I chiefly attribute our misfortunes in Sinde. But I should have also shown that Sir C. Napier was, on his arrival in Sinde, received with every demonstration of attention and respect by the Ameers of Hyderabad and Khyrpore.[227] That an "old Indian" would have considered it his duty to have discussed with the Ameers the various matters of misunderstanding that had arisen between the two governments. To have reasoned with them and, at all event, to have heard what they had to say in self-defence and against the demands made upon them. Instead of this (remaining only two days in Hyderabad), he left with the officer in charge a memorandum to be delivered—after his departure—cutting the Gordian Knot of difficulty by authoritatively deciding, according to his own interpretation, several articles of the Treaty then existing upon which a difference of opinion might well arise.[228] That after his arrival at Sukkur, a series of the most arbitrary measures were adopted by Sir Charles Napier against the Ameers, more especially the summary confiscation—under a Proclamation—

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of territory yielding an annual revenue of six lacs of Rupees.[229] Sir Charles Napier even did not concur in this severe measure and that there is too much reason to fear that Lord Ellenborough himself was not aware of the extent of the penalty imposed by his orders on the Ameers of Khyrpore.[230] For Major Outram pointed out that his Lordship had originally specified that Subzulkote and Bhoongbarra only were to be forfeited and, therefore, that it must be from mistake that the whole country from Subzulkote to Roree was afterwards ordered to be confiscated. Major Outram, therefore, suggested that the point should be referred to the Governor General under the impression that his Lordship had erroneously concluded that Subzulkote and Bhoongbarra extended to Roree, whereas—in fact—they included only about one quarter of the extent.[231] I should further have shown that the Treaty dictated to the Ameers by order of the Governor General was most unjust and arbitrary, and could only be justified by the supposition that the charges against the Ameers had been fully proved.[232] They were denied and no opportunity of rebutting them had been afforded (though there are strong grounds for believing that many of them were fabricated by Ali Morad to effect Meer Roostum's ruin): "A careful and deliberate inquiry ought to have preceded any stringent measures. The various causes of infraction of Treaty ought to have been brought to the notice of the Ameers. If no satisfactory explanation was afforded, the Ameers ought to have been distinctly warned, the innocent separated from the guilty and then—if anyone persisted in breaking his engagements—we should have been justified in exacting the penalty. Charges are not crimes. Proof is requisite. The Ameers ought to have had opportunity of answering these charges." I should also have shown the gross injustice of the attack and destruction—without any previous declaration of war or any overt act of hostility—on the part of the Ameers of the fortress of Emanghur.[233] I have exposed the fallacy of the explanation by which that hostile act, on our part, has

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been defended—namely that all forts in Sinde belonged to the Rais (or sovereign) and, having given his sanction to the measure, the fort was destroyed accordingly. If all forts in Sinde appertained to the Turban, how did it happen that Dejee Ke Kote (the strongest fort in that province) and other fortlets were in the undisturbed and undisputed possession of Ali Morad before he became Rais and as a part of his patrimonial inheritance? This fort, in fact, was the property of Meer Mohamed Khan (the head of a separate branch of the Talpoor family), who never injured us in word or deed. The arch traitor Ali Morad must have laughed in his sleeve when the British General sought his permission to blow up the fort and when he replied: "As far as the value of the property goes, I am quite indifferent and I fully concur with you in the reasons which make it necessary to destroy it. Therefore considering me joyfully willing, by all means blow up the fort and consider me your well wisher."[234] I should have shown that all these arbitrary and unjust measures were adopted without any previous act of decided hostility. That they were carried out with the most harsh and unbending rigour and that the Ameers were addressed in a style of hauteur and menace never before adopted towards sovereign Princes. Take this as a sample: In forwarding the draft of a new Treaty dictated by Lord Ellenborough, Sir C. Napier informed the Ameers that, "In obedience to the commands of the Governor General of India, I shall proceed to occupy Roree and the left bank of the Indus from the latter town up to the Bhawulpore frontier (including the whole of the district of Bhoong Bara and Subzulkote) as set forth in the said Treaty. The minor arrangements will be entered into by my aid-de-camp Captain French (and Lieutenant Stanley) with those whom your Highness may appoint for that purpose to the end that the Treaty may be speedily brought to a conclusion."[235] Or this: "I have sent my Commissioner to wait upon you and to agree upon the day and hour of the ensuing week on which your Highness will receive a new Treaty, which the

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Governor General has ordered me to place in your hands & carry into immediate execution."[236] Or expressions, like these, addressed to Meer Roostum: "Ameer, I have received my orders and will obey them. I laugh at your preparations for war. Eight days have passed and I have not heard that your Highness has nominated a Commissioner to arrange the details of the Treaty. I expect to have in writing your full acceptance of the draft thereof by return of the bearer. Your Highness is collecting troops in all directions. I must therefore have your acceptance of the Treaty immediately, yea or nay. I will not lose the cold weather. Your Highness must be prompt or I shall act without consulting your Highness. My time is measured and I cannot waste it in long negotiations. Your Highness' letter is full of discussion but, as these are two sides of your river, so are there two sides of your Highness' arguments. But I cannot go into the argument. I am not the Governor General. I am only one of his commanders."[237] I might multiply examples but will conclude with the following letter dated the 13th December 1842 (addressed to Meer Roostum) and referring to Sir Charles Napier's Proclamation of the 1st January 1833: "Ameer, my letters have been stopped near Khyrpore. This has been done either by your order or without your consent. If by your order, you are guilty. If without your consent, you cannot command your people. In either case, I order you to disband your armed followers instantly. I will go to Khyrpore to see that this order is obeyed."[238] I should have further have argued that—notwithstanding all this provocation (the summary confiscation of territory yielding six lacs annually, the imposition of a new penal Treaty, the destruction of the fort of Emanghur)—all the measures adopted by the Ameers were purely defensive.[239] That (although untrustworthy spies may have reported to the contrary) they never had the courage or folly, seriously, to think of defying the tremendous power of the British Government (at a point most favorable to us and the reverse to them)—the magnitude of which they had only

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recently witnessed such an ample demonstration in a neighboring country. No! The patriarchal Chief Meer Roostum wrote in terms that ought to have been felt by the stern warrior to whom they were addressed: "God knows we have no intention of opposing the British, nor a thought of war or fighting. We have not the power. Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me and my posterity by the British government—under a formal Treaty—I have considered myself a dependant of theirs and have thought myself secure. I have always attended to the least wish of the British officers and—now that my territory is being taken from me—I am at a loss to find out the reason of so hard a measure. I have committed no fault. If any is alleged against me, let me hear what it is and I shall be prepared with an answer. I feel strong in the possession of that Treaty and I trust to the consideration of the British still. If (without any fault of mine) you choose to seize my territory, I shall not oppose you but I shall consent to and observe the provisions of the new Treaty. However, I am now (and shall continue to be) a suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your hands."[240] Meer Roostum's acts prove his sincerity. At all events up to the period when, in obedience to Sir C. Napier orders, he proceeded to Hyderabad.[241] The catastrophe was finally brought on by the ungovernable fury of the Beloochee tribes exasperated by the sight of their venerable and respected chief who had been cajoled out of the "Turban" by one whom they despised and whose villainy and deceit have now been placed beyond all cavil by the result of the Commission's inquiry. In vain did the assembled Ameers—though giving a forced compliance to all our severe demands—implore a hearing and for redress of Meer Roostum's wrongs. Major Outram was not vested with any plenary powers and could make no promise that those wrongs could be investigated. He was, merely, deputed to demand the acceptance of the Treaty dictated by Lord Ellenborough.[242] By a most unhappy oversight, the notes of his conferences with the unfortunate Ameers (on the 8th, 9th, 12th and

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13th February 1843) were not forwarded until long after that fiat had been pronounced.[243] "These notes (admits Lord Ellenborough) I never read until I saw them today (June 13th 1843). I know absolutely nothing of what may have passed between Major Outram and the Ameers while he was acting as Commissioner under Sir C. Napier for the settlement of the details of the Treaty, to which the Ameers had generally given their assent.[244]" Then followed in rapid succession the attack (and brilliant repulse of the infuriated Beloochees) on the Hyderabad Residency, the glorious (only, however, in a military sense) victories at Meeanee and Dubha, the extirpation (root and branch) of the Talpoor Dynasty, the indiscriminate punishment of sovereign Princes old and young (those who had never in any way severed from their fidelity) equally with those who were charged with specific (though still unproven) acts of bad faith.[245] In a military point of view, probably few achievements in India have been more brilliant. Looking at it morally, a more disgraceful act never stained the history of our country. From the first step to the final scene, the same reckless injustice predominates. No distinction is made between the Ameers who were alleged to be guilty and those who were known to be innocent. Meer Sobdar Khan—whose whole career has been one of scrupulous fidelity and to whom Lord Ellenborough (in the very last Treaty) had assigned territory as a reward for his good conduct shares the hard fate of Meer Nusseer and Meer Roostum—is dethroned, exiled and imprisoned.[246] It must not be forgotten that each Chief was perfectly independent of all the others and responsible for his own acts and guaranteed in his possessions and rights by a separate Treaty.[247] Lastly, I should have shown we have not the consolation, poor and ignoble as it would be, of having obtained—in return for the loss of reputation which such acts must undoubtedly have occasioned—a really valuable possession. I admit that—as we have since been obliged (I rejoice to say in self-defence and to repel aggression) to conquer the Punjaub—the political value of Sinde has

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been enhanced. But the time is still far distant when this province will cease to be a burden on the finances of India but, more especially, on those of this Presidency. Let those who have deceived themselves—and others—into a belief that Sinde already pays its own expenses and, even, possesses a surplus revenue (a result obtained by excluding the heaviest item—viz., the extra military expenditure), consult paragraphs 106-120 of Sir George Clerk's Minute (dated the 24th April 1848).[248] They will, at once, be emancipated from so grievous a delusion. But I have now before me an approximate estimate of the revenues and charges of Sinde—prepared by our own Accountant General (dated the 5th January 1850)—for the years 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847 and 1848. I say approximate for although—no doubt—all receipts are entered, all charges are certainly not so.[249] For, up to this date, we are frequently called upon to admit what are inaptly designated "inefficient balances." That is to sanction expenses actually incurred during Sir C. Napier's administration of Sinde (and this to such an extent that we have been obliged to direct that these items should be entered under a separate head) so that what was, in fact, expenditure made by the late Government of Sinde may not be included in the current expenditure of this Government administering Sinde. The results of the state, however, as it now stands are as follows:

	Rupees.
Total receipts - - - - -	1,25,55,661 8 11
Ditto Charges - - - - -	3,84,56,980 13 7
Balance against Scinde - - -	2,59,01,319 4 2

Or considerably more than two million and a half pounds sterling.

104. The above brief allusion to the principal events connected with the conquest of Sinde, "deeds to make heaven weep all earth amazed," read more like romance than reality.[250] But, nevertheless, they are described without exaggeration from published documents. It may, however, be asked why have I usurped the province of the

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future historian in making these painful reminiscences? To this I reply that I have done so in the hope that consideration of the wrongs suffered by the fathers may benefit their children—Meer Roostum is dead, Meer Nusseer Khan is dead and Meer Sobdar (the faithful ally of the British Government) is also dead. All three died in exile and captivity, severed from their families and kindred. But all three have left children to mourn their loss and fit objects for the compassionate consideration of the British Government. I admit that, from the moment I became aware of the real circumstances which led to the conquest of Sinde, I agreed with those who considered that "the proceedings of the Government of India—which ended in the dethronement, exile and imprisonment of the Ameers and the seizure of their country and private property—were uncalled for impolitic and unjust."[251] For a long time, I cherished the hope that the policy pursued towards them would be denounced as "inconsistent with good faith and subversive of the interests of the British rule in India." But now, by lapse of time, viewing the annexation of Sinde to the Anglo-Indian Empire as un fait accompli (final and irrevocable) our efforts should be directed to the amelioration of the condition of the Princes of Sinde who yet survive and to benefiting—to the utmost of our power—the country which has thus become subjected to our rule so that out of present evil future good may come.

105. I have already shown how the first may easily be accomplished in the case of Meer Roostum's sons and grandsons: by resuming their private engagements (referred to in paragraphs 93 and 94) which have been fraudulently retained by His Highness Meer Ali Morad. In the case of the sons of the late Mobarick Khan, redress cannot be so easily effected for, I believe, that the best portion of their private estates has been bestowed upon our faithful and staunch ally the Nawab of Bhalwulpore. At least, I find it stated (by the late Sir A. Burnes) Meer Mobarick Khan is the second brother of Meer Roostum Khan: "He holds a little less than one third of the Khyrpore territories.

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Is very miserly in his household and, universally, reputed to have wealth in jewels and money. Of the fertile territory lying between Subzulkote and Roree, nearly all belongs to Mobarick Khan and includes the villages and districts of Ghotkee, with Malsoler, Choonga, Dadoota, Uzeezpore. He has also estates in the neighborhood of Khyrpore itself and towards Hyderabad. But, besides this, Sukkur and the country halfway between it and Shikarpore (as well as a share of that town) are his property."[252] Even, however, in the case of this family there appear reasons for believing that a portion of their jagheers are wrongly possessed by Ali Morad. In one of his letters to Sir C. Napier, Captain Pope reports: "I am informed that His Highness Meer Ali Morad has granted to his son (Jan Mahomed) the whole tuppa of Maharee (annual value Rs. 90,000), also—to an aunt of his—the place and district of Adalpore (value of Rs. 22,000); total Rs. 1,12,000 (both being out of the territories of the sons of the late Meer Mobarick). His Highness possesses not the slightest claim to these under your orders. This has been told to me so confidentially that I think there can hardly be any mistake in the matter. I shall soon have an official report on the subject from the kardars."[253] Whether Ali Morad was afterwards required to surrender these districts does not appear. But the matter should be enquired into. If they are still in his possession, they ought be reclaimed and made to constitute a portion of the provision, which—I trust—will be allotted to Meer Mobarick's sons.

106. The Commissioner in Sinde has recommended that a provision should be made "for the junior members of the families of Ali Morad's brothers Meer Roostum and Mobarick" and, when doing so, observed: "None of these took any part in hostilities against us (although they accompanied the head of their families in their flight at the outbreak of the war) and—having lost their possessions by its issue—were subsequently allowed to reside under Ali Morad's guarantee and, entirely, dependant on him for maintenance. The

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insufficiency of the provision assigned to them by him and the illiberality of the treatment generally which they have experienced at his hands, led to the bitter and frequent appeals from them to the Government of India, Sinde and Bombay."[254] In support of his recommendation, Mr. Pringle refers to Meer Roostum's letter, the private Treaty entered into with Ali Morad when he ceded the Turban, remarking that the evidence for the genuineness of these documents is nearly as conclusive as that in support of alleged fraud in the Treaty of Nownahar.[255] "The object of Ali Morad (continues Mr. Pringle), in their suppression, appears to have been to prevent their operating to invalidate his title to the lands north of Roree and to escape from the obligation they contain to provide for the families of Meer Roostum and Mobarick. The first object has failed inasmuch as Sir C. Napier never admitted Ali Morad's claim of right to the territory north of Roree—although disposed to concede to him Meer Roostum's interest in it as a matter of grace. It may, however, be remarked as regards this point that the discovery of these documents affords a strong corroboration of the justice of that view and of any measures which may now be thought expedient to base it upon. The other object had been so far successful that the families of Meers Roostum and Mobarick have, hitherto, been left at the mercy of Meer Ali Morad for a maintenance. That which he has provided for them, has—as there is too much reason to believe—been miserably inadequate to their wants to rescue them from this state of dependency (which considerations of humanity as well as regard for our own character) seem to require. I would recommend etc."

107. We have to also decide the case of Meer Mahomed Khan and Meer Mustapha Khan, also nephews of Meer Ali Morad (being the sons of his deceased brother Meer Ghoolam Hyder).[256] We have here further proofs of Ali Morad's grasping policy and the gross injustice with which he treats his brethren. The case is thus noticed by Mr. Pringle when remarking on an exchange of territory (which had

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been proposed in the 6th article of a draft Treaty with Ali Morad): "It would appear from a comparison of the numeration of villages and districts—therein given—with the details of the memorandum from which the Treaty seems to have been framed, that of those to be ceded to us (with exception of Gotkee, Roree and Kundra) consist entirely of the jagheers of Ali Morad's nephews Meers Mahomed and Goolam Mustapha (value has not been taken for some of those of the former and all of those of the latter). Whether this omission was intentional or not, it is impossible (in the absence of any detailed explanatory information) to discover but it, clearly, cannot now—without such information—be admitted. In place, however, of rectifying the omission, I am of the opinion that all the jagheers should now be retained by us and restored to their original owners (the two Ameers above named). This branch of the family did not, indeed, receive any independent recognition in the will of Meer Sohrab (which forms the basis of our present policy in Upper Sinde) and may, so far, be viewed in the light of subject jagheerdars. But the elder of them (Meer Mahomed) appears to have maintained, practically, a position of considerable independence as regards his own possessions and the younger (Goolam Mustapha) held a somewhat similar position in virtue of his relation to him. A separate Treaty was negotiated with Meer Mahomed by Sir A. Burnes and ratified by Lord Auckland.[257] At the outbreak of the war, he was a considerable loser by the destruction of the Fort of Emanghur, which belonged to him. He then fled (as did his brother Mustapha) but neither of them took any active share in the hostilities against us. Both made their submission soon after to Sir C. Napier, from whom Meer Mahomed received a promise that all the jagheers should be restored to him which he held at the date of the Battle of Meeanee. But he does not appear to have been immediately placed in possession of the whole of them. No similar promise was given to Ghoolam Mustapha but this may be accounted for by his having been afraid at

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the time to urge his claims and having soon after gone on a pilgrimage to Mecca. When his jagheers were taken possession of by Meer Ali Morad (but under the acknowledgement that they were held for us and in view to being accounted for in the ultimate adjustments of mutual claims), Goolam Mustapha, subsequently, petitioned for their restoration. He was referred to Ali Morad—as his Rais or sovereign—apparently under the misapprehension that Ali Morad held them on his own account. Although they were entered as cessions made by us to Ali Morad in the draft of the Treaty of the jagheers of the elder brother of Meer Mahomed, a portion was also proposed to be ceded to Ali Morad by the Treaty. Some of those Ali Morad took immediate possession on the ground, as he afterward alleged of their having been confiscated by Sir Charles Napier and made over to him on account of Meer Mahomed's failure to accompany him on the Hill War. But there is nothing on record to support this beyond the fact of their appearing among our possessed cessions in the draft Treaty and for receiving credit for them (though not to their full value in the estimates from which it appears to have been framed). On the other hand, on Meer Mahomed claiming subsequently to be put in possession of all his jagheers (in virtue of the promise given to him after the conquest), his claim was admitted by Sir C. Napier and he was reinstated in those still in our hands (including some which it was proposed by the Treaty to cede but which Ali Morad had not taken possession of). While as respects those which Ali Morad held, he was (as in the case of his brother Goolam Mustapha) referred to Ali Morad as his Rais or sovereign, although they were held by him only provisionally and to be accounted for to us. It seems, therefore, doubtful if Sir Charles Napier ever did authorize the confiscation of these jagheers for the cause alleged by Ali Morad. In any case, it may be inferred that he would have authorized their subsequent restoration—as he did that of those still in our hands (had he not been under the misapprehension

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in this also that they were held by Ali Morad in his own right). In his memorandum, in reply to mine, Sir C. Napier—indeed—states in reference to this subject that (as far he recollects) he had said he would not interfere to prevent Ali Morad from confiscating these jagheers for the cause assigned. But then he would still have been under the misapprehension that the right of sovereignty in them was vested in Ali Morad and not in us and that it was from him (and not from us) that their confiscation—if merited—should proceed (whereas the contrary was really the case). As Ali Morad has to account to us for their revenue, we are the only party who benefit by the measure. But even if these jagheers had been confiscated for the cause alleged, it may be questioned whether Meer Mahomed's deprivation of them for the four years during which they have since been withheld is not more than sufficient punishment for any failure in his feudal obligations on the occasion referred to. For he states, and I believe in the truth, that he is incapacitated by bodily infirmity from mounting on horseback and that in lieu of personal attendance he had contributed 5,000 Rupees towards Ali Morads expenses in the Hill War. It is from a consideration of all the above circumstances—which I have gathered with some difficulty from the records and from personal inquiry—that I have formed the opinion that the jagheers of both these brothers should be excluded from the proposed cessions to Ali Morad and restored to them."[258]

108. The above statement by the Commissioner is easily susceptible of proof. Shortly after the conquest of Sinde, Sir C. Napier—as Governor of the Province—addressed the following letter to Meer Mahomed Khan Talpoor: "Ameer Mahomed Khan of high rank, I write to you that my sincere friend Meer Ali Morad has promised me that you of high rank will strictly obey all the regulations of the English. For this reason, your jagheers are given to you. On no account will you be injured if you conduct yourself properly."[259] In 1846, Meer Mahomed petitioned for the restoration of his jagheer.[260]

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The Resident of Khyrpore was informed that the Ameer "holds a perwunnah [i.e., letter] of His Excellency the Governor re-granting to him all his lands held in the time of the ex-Ameers to which he must prove his right. Shortly afterwards, the Collector of Shikarpore reported that Ali Morad claimed Gahilpore and Gundhur (adjoining Kussuore), which did not belong to Meer Roostum but to Meer Morad, they must Mahomed), and—at the same time—forwarded a letter from the Resident stating that as these places were in the Boordika District, the whole of which belonged to Ali Morad, they must belong to His Highness."[261] In reply, he was referred to Sir C. Napier's perwunnah re-granting to Meer Mahomed all the lands he held at the time of the Battle of Meeanee to which he must prove his title to his satisfaction. "The Resident, subsequently, submitted seven documents produced by Meer Mahomed in support of his claims—five relating to certain lands he had purchased called Moghlee and two sunnuds [i.e., orders] under seals of Meer Sohrab and Roostum, in which were specified all the various lands held in jagheer by Meer Mahomed.[262] Of these, only three places (Thuna, Chamoree, and Powaree) are in British territory—the remainder in Ali Morad's. The Collector of Shikarpore reported that there is no doubt that Meer Mahomed enjoyed all the jagheers claimed by him up to one month before the Battle of Meeanee (about which time, Meer Roostum having fled, Meer Ali Morad confiscated them by the formal Treaty previously sealed by Meer Roostum). The country from Roree to Subzulkote being ceded to the British Government, Chamoree and Powaree would have been included. The Collector was again informed that what was in Meer Mahomed Khan's possession on the 17th February 1843 must now be restored to him."[263] On the Resident at Khyrpore submitting a letter from Ali Morad—claiming Gahilpore as part of the district of Boordika—he was, in reply, furnished with copy of the perwunnah written to Meer Mahomed by the Governor of Sinde in June 1843 guaranteeing to him "all lands possessed by

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him at the capture of Sinde in February 1843." Written at the instigation of Sheikh Ali Hussein (Ali Morad's Minister), who states that it was His Highness' wish that it should be written. The whole question, therefore, depends upon in whose possession Gahilpore was on the 17th February 1843.[264] In submitting another statement from Ali Morad, the Resident stated that there could be no doubt Meer Mahomed held Gahilpore on the date mentioned (but that, since the conquest of Sinde, it had been in our possession).[265] In reply—after again referring to the terms of Sir C. Napier's perwunnah—he was informed that, "If Meer Mahomed, on the 17th Febraury 1843, only held the lands alluded to in jagheer on a grant from the then Rais of the family, such should now be the terms on which he should now hold them under His Highness Meer Ali Morad." He was directed to enquire into this point. In February 1847, seven original sunnuds produced by Meer Mahomed Khan Talpoor (formerly of Emanghur) were sent to the Collector of Shikarpore with an intimation that, "His Excellency the Governor will confirm him in his rights to all lands within the British territory that may be named therein. After examination, be good enough to return such sunnuds as may require the seal of his Excellency.[266] Such lands as this Ameer held in jagheer (as grants from the Rais) are now, of course, at the disposal of His Highness Ali Morad. The Collector having subsequently described the locality of the several villages, a sunnud (under the seal of Sir C. Napier) was sent to that officer "confirming, from the Spring crop of 1847, to Meer Mohamed all jagheer lands situated within the British territory which he held at the time of the Battle of Meeanee. His Excellency directs that the boundaries of Chandia shall be carefully fixed and laid down by arbitration of competent persons."[267] Meer Mahomed, soon after, claimed the village of Sadoogah (in the Hyderabad Collectorate) when Sir C. Napier negatived it on the ground that the Ameer "can only claim the land laid down in the original sunnud of Meer Sohrab

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and Meer Roostum. In 1848, the Ameer himself and in May 1848 his vakeel, again, petitioned for the village but was told the former decision was final."[268]

109. In March 1843, Meer Mahomed complained that he had been deprived of his jagheers by Ali Morad.[269] On his petition being referred to the Resident at Khyrpore, that officer reported that the possessions, therein alluded to, had been made over by Sir C. Napier in exchange for other lands now in our possession.[270] The Resident was requested to state what exchange he referred and, in reply, stated that, "The exchange by which Meer Mahomed's jagheers came into the possession of His Highness Ali Morad occurred at Sukkur on the return of the troops from the Hill Campaign," and that in article 6 of the draft Treaty (dated Sukkur 1845) Meer Mahomed's jagheers are entered under the name of Burrala Olara.[271] He was not required to point out what lands had been given by Ali Morad in exchange for Meer Mahomed's jagheers, as there was nothing on record in the Commissioner's officer relating to any such exchange.[272] In reply, the Resident forwarded a letter from Ali Morad explaining how the jagheers came into his possession and observed that Meer Mahomed states that he was prevented—by sickness—from accompanying Ali Morad in the Hill Campaign (but that he gave His Highness a considerable sum of money towards defraying the expenses of that expedition on this point).[273] Ali Morad, in his letter, takes no notice and—as the Resident remarks—it is more than probable that (with Sir C. Napier) he was equally silent regarding it. After referring to a proposed exchange of territory between himself and the British Government, Ali Morad explained: "The villages of Burloo, Olara, Meree (belonging to Meer Mahomed Khan) yield annual revenue of 1,400 Rs. When Sir C. Napier went up to the Hills, Meer Mahomed would not go. For this, he incurred his Excellency's displeasure, who took away the above lands from him—on account of the British

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Government—and gave them to me as a portion of the lands intended to be exchanged as mentioned in the Treaty. Exclusive of the 1400 Rs. per annum, the British Government has now in their possession lands—belonging to me—of the minimal value of Rs. 14,000. I beg that you will consider the above facts and you will see that Meer Mahomed had no right whatever to the lands for which he has set forth a claim. I never seized the lands from him. They were taken from him by Sir C. Napier as a punishment for his disloyalty in not joining the Hill Campaign and, afterwards, given to me in exchange for some of my lands. I gave him a portion the revenue, of which he is now enjoying. This is the gratitude I receive for my kindness to him for he is continually complaining to the British Government that I seized his lands. But he is cunning enough not to mention why his lands were taken from him. God knows how people can take upon themselves to fabricate such false complaints. If it is the wish of the British Government that Meer Mahomed should receive his jagheer the same way as he had it before it was taken from him by Sir C. Napier, it will be no loss to me as they will make good to me the full amount of Rs. 33,000 per annum due for lands belonging to me in their possession."

110. His Highness Ali Morad's explanation was forwarded for the particular report of the Collector of Shikarpore.[274] In his reply, Major Goldney—after entering into an elaborate calculation to establish that Ali Morad had greatly over estimated his demands against Government and that the exchange proposed was (in part) founded on erroneous data—observed as follows: "Meer Mahomed Khan Talpoor (nephew of His Highness) labours under a painful complaint which prevents his riding horseback without inconvenience. His vakeel, here, informs me that—by consent of the Meer Ali Morad—his master paid 4,000 Rupees towards the expenses of the Hill Campaign in lieu of personal attendance. I am not aware (continues Major Goldney) of the causes of Sir C. Napier's displeasure. But.

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whatever his Excellency thought fit to resume from Meer Mahomed or Meer Mustapha belongs to the British Government—both these nephews of Meer Ali Morad having forfeited their possessions to us for adhering to the fortunes of Meer Roostum in 1842-43." The Collector, in making this remark, either forgets or was not aware of the perwunnah given to Meer Mohamed by Sir C. Napier in June 1843 confirming him in the possession of all the lands he held on the date of the Battle of Meeanee.[275] The Collector, in conclusion, adds that, "He is not aware of any appendages of His Highness that reverted to the British in exchange for any jagheers of these two brothers (given by his Excellency His Highness). If His Highness did, thereafter, re-grant any part of those possessions to them, he is still responsible to the British Government for the proceeds or for an equivalent in either lands." No such equivalent having—as yet—been given (that I am aware of), though set-forth in His Highness' letter. Annexed to this report are various figured statements in support of the Collector's views. In one of these, Meer Mahomed's jagheers are specified of the annual value of Rs. 39,000 (of which Rs. 26,000 have been enjoyed for 2½ years by Ali Morad and equal to Rs. 23,400 Company currency [in the aggregate to Company's Rs. 80,900]).[276] The remaining 1,300 Rs. is still enjoyed by Meer Mahomed.

111. In October 1848, Meer Mahomed—through his vakeel Hussein Ali—represented that (prior to the Hill Campaign) the produce of all the lands he had specified were enjoyed by him. But that after that campaign, Ali Morad (by force) deprived him of his lands, with the exception of Olara (his usual place of residence) but—even in this village—he confiscated the inundated lands.[277] From Olara, moreover, he also takes sometimes ½ or ¾th of the produce. With the exception of Rs. 13,000 (the produce of Olara), the remainder of his jagheers has been taken by Ali Morad from Rubbee 1256 (1845) up to the present time. In a subsequent petition

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to the Commissioner in Sinde, the Ameer represented that (up to the time of the conquest of Sinde) he ruled over his lands under the wills of his grandfather and father.[278] That—on his deputing a vakeel to Hyderabad to make arrangements for his future welfare—Sir C. Napier gave him a perwunnah confirming him in all his former possessions and encouraged him by promising him that he should not be annoyed. In virtue of this perwunnah, he took possession of and enjoyed his jagheers as formerly. Now, however, without having committed any fault, the jagheers held by right of inheritance and situated to the south of the river have been taken by Ali Morad. On his petitioning for their restoration, Major Goldney was instructed to enquire into the matter. In May 1844, his Excellency Sir C. Napier wrote to Ali Morad that if Meer Roostum had made over to His Highness any lands not his—to the transfer of which the rightful owner did not consent—the British Government would (on proof) of the same take possession of such lands. The lands which petitioner formerly held were held in virtue of sunnuds from Meer Sohrab Khan (his grandfather) and Meer Roostum Khan (his uncle). "Those lands should, therefore, belong to the British Government and that Government clearly made them over to me. He held them under the British Government and he, therefore, hopes they may be restored to him after an examination of his sunnuds."

112. The case of Meer Mustapha very nearly resembles that of his brother Meer Mahomed, except that—in this instance—Meer Ali Morad cannot urge against him neglect of feudal service in justification of his having confiscated his lands. In May 1844, a petition from this Ameer (complaining of his jagheer having been taken from him by Ali Morad) was forwarded to the Resident at Khyrpore with the instructions to report: "What has been the past conduct of this Ameer?" In reply, he reported that the Ameer's jagheer was in Ali Morad's possession and that he had not made his salaam [i.e., oath of allegiance] to His Highness.[279] On this, Sir C. Napier

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remarked that he did not learn from the Resident's letter that the jagheer in dispute was included with Ali Morad's territory.[280] In reply, the Resident submitted the proceedings of the Boundary Commission, suggesting that it had never been made over to Ali Morad and it should be included in British territory subject "to the approval of His Excellency the Governor of Sinde."[281] In April 1847, the Resident at Khyrpore submitted certain documents showing the circumstances under which Ali Morad had obtained possession of Meer Mustapha's jagheers, praying for its restoration and complaining of the treatment he received from His Highness. Among these were certain original sunnuds, which were returned to the Resident in order that they might be given back to the Ameer (with a remark that "the lands formerly held by Meer Mustapha Khan in jagheer appear to have been held at pleasure").[282] But at whose pleasure is not mentioned. From Major Goldney's report, it would appear that this Ameer's jagheer is of the annual value of Rs. 10,325 Khyrpore, equal to Rs. 9,293 Company's currency.[283]

113. The Commissioner in Sinde, being in doubt as to the reasons which had caused the jagheers of Meers Mahomed and Mustapha to be included in the proposed exchange with Ali Morad, sought for information from Sir C. Napier. Mr. Pringle observed: "Among the lands to be ceded by the Treaty to Meer Ali Morad, in exchange for others, are certain jagheers formerly held by his nephew Meer Mahomed. This Meer had previously been confirmed in all his possessions by Sir C. Napier and there is nothing on record to show that they were again resumed, although Ali Morad asserts that they were so and made over to him by Sir C. Napier (in consequence of Mahomed Khan not having accompanied Ali Morad when he joined Sir C. Napier in the Hill Campaign)." Mr. Pringle remarks: "It is so unlikely that a transaction of this kind would have passed unrecorded that I should have been inclined to suspect some unfair dealing on the part of Ali Morad, were it not that credit is undoubtedly taken by

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us for these lands in the exchange as it stands in the draft Treaty (which gives some colour of probability to Ali Morad's account of the matter). Meer Mahomed is urgent in his complaints of the injustice with which he asserts he has been treated by Ali Morad in depriving him of these lands." To this, Sir C. Napier replied: "As far as memory serves me, Meer Mahomed Khan was restive. He would not accompany his Chief and myself to the Hill War. When I came back, I told him that Ali complained of him and that he had given me offence by not going to war as a jagheerdar was bound to do. That Ali Morad was answerable for his (this Meer's) good conduct and, if he behaved ill, I would not prevent Ali from depriving him of his jagheer and I would send him to Calcutta after the other Ameers. This is as nearly as I can recollect the substance of these transactions, with respect to Meer Ghoolam Mustapha's case."[284] Mr. Pringle observed that, "This Ameer possessed jagheers in the southern part of the Khyrpore territory that—as not having fallen by inheritance either to Meer Ali Morad or Meer Roostum—devolved to us in sovereignty. But, in consequence of Ghoolam Mustapha having abandoning them and gone to Mecca soon after the conquest, they remained with Ali Morad (by whom they have been taken possession of, although properly belonging to us the paramount power). When—on his return—Gholam Mustapha petitioned Sir C. Napier for restoration, he was referred to Ali Morad as the holder of the Turban (apparently under the misapprehension that Ali Morad retained them in right of it). But—if such a misapprehension ever existed—it must have been subsequently removed, for we received credit for these lands in the exchange proposed by the Treaty. Ghoolam Mustapha's claim should then have been taken up and disposed of by us. But this does not appear to have been done. I should be inclined now to restore his lands to him unless Sir Charles Napier is aware of any objection." To this, Sir C. Napier replied: "I see no objection to restoring his lands to Meer Gholam Mustapha. I

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do not recollect what is stated in Mr. Pringle's letter but it may be all correct."[285]

114. Finally, Mr. Pringle, in submitting his correspondence with Captain Forbes (the late Resident at Khyrpore), earnestly recommends that a suitable provision should be assigned to the junior Ameers. He observes—in regard to the jagheers of Meers Mahomed and Gholam Mustapha Khan—that, "Those Ameers have been dispossessed of their jagheers and are harshly treated by Meer Ali Morad. His Highness affirms that the jagheers of the former were confiscated by Sir C. Napier (in consequence of his failure to accompany him in the Trukee Campaign) and the latter appears never to have regained his jagheers since our occupation of the country."[286] Unless Meer Mahomed's jagheer was really confiscated on sufficient grounds by Sir C. Napier and unless his Excellency is aware of any good reason for the confiscation of those of Meer Gholam Mustapha, Mr. Pringle is of the opinion they should be restored under the guarantee of the British Government.

115. Under the circumstances above detailed, I have no doubt that the Commissioner's recommendation will be sanctioned. It is quite clear that Sir C. Napier's perwunnah of June 1843 (re-granting Meer Mahomed's jagheers as he held them at the time of the Battle of Meeanee), though issued in the most formal manner, has been violated. It is also quite evident that Sir C. Napier did not—as Ali Morad asserts—authorize the confiscation. The most that he did was to signify to the Ameer his displeasure and to threaten him with confiscation for not having accompanied him in the Hill Campaign. But, admitting that the Ameer was bound to perform this service in palliation of his neglect, it is stated that he was not only incapacitated (by bodily infirmity) from personal attendance but that he actually commuted personal service by a pecuniary payment. As regards his brother (Meer Gholam Mustapha), he appears to have lost his

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jagheers for no offence but merely because—about the period of the conquest of Sinde—he proceeded to Mecca on a pilgrimage. I trust—therefore—that when the case of Ali Morad's is disposed of, an order will be issued for the restoration of all the lands belonging to these two Ameers (whether they are situated within the territories of the British Government or in those of their uncle Ali Morad and, henceforward, that they shall be considered and treated as jagheerdars of the British Government).

116. The Commissioner also refers to the case of a brother of Ali Morad's (by the name Chakur Khan) and his family, who have also complained of the treatment they receive from His Highness and "probably not without reason, though there may be faults on both sides."[287] But Mr. Pringle adds that the will of Meer Sohrab—which forms the basis of our policy in Upper Sinde—not recognizing any independent rights in Meer Chakur, he can only be considered as the object of the holder of the Turban. As such, we cannot—with propriety—interfere between him and his Rais (or sovereign) otherwise than by mutual friendly advice, which has already been given: "If, however, Meer Chakur should continue to be dissatisfied, his only recourse is to remove to our territory, where there could be no objections to offering him an asylum. But, in that case, he would have no claim either on our Government or on His Highness Meer Ali Morad for a maintenance." This is a hard alternative but I am unable to suggest any course by which the situation of this branch of Khyrpore family can be alleviated.

117. I have now arrived at the 5th and last division of my minute, in which I propose to notice several points (alluded to in the Commission's proceedings connected with our relations with Ali Morad) upon which the final instructions of the Most Noble the Governor General of India should in my opinion be solicited.

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118. First of these in importance is the conclusion of a Treaty with Ali Morad. In this matter, His Highness Meer Ali Morad has—as men of his unscrupulous character often do—overreached himself. He grasped at too much and the consequence has been that—although Sir Charles Napier (as far back as May 1845) submitted the draft of the Treaty of 12 articles for the confirmation of the Government of India and was, himself, extremely anxious for its immediate ratification—the subject (in consequence of His Highness claiming so much more than he was entitled to) is still an open question. We are, fortunately, at liberty to dictate to His Highness such a Treaty as may now be considered suitable to the position in which—by his fraudulent conduct—he has placed himself. As the basis of this Treaty will, mainly, depend upon the view which the supreme authority in India may take of His Highness' conduct (as elicited in these proceedings), it would be an unprofitable waste of time to refer—at any length—to the past discussions on the subject. Their actual state (at the period of the assemble of the Sukkur Commission and the causes which prevented the ratification of the Treaty) are very clearly summed up in the document noticed in the margin.[288] If further information is required, it will be found in Mr. Pringle's memorandum (dated the 27th December 1849), the draft Treaty appended thereto, in Sir C. Napier's letter to the Government of India dated the 4th May 1845, the reply thereto of the 24th October 1846 (with Sir Charles Napier's rejoinder of the 18th January 1847, which terminated his share in the discussion of the question).

119. It must be obvious that the principles on which Sir C. Napier desired to conclude a Treaty with Ali Morad were never sanctioned by the Government of India and that they ought not now to be recognized. It must be equally evident that—whatever may have been Ali Morad's claims for consideration—he had by his treachery towards us (in the case of the districts Mahtela, Meerpoor and Mehurkee) forfeited them. All that he can now expect is strict justice

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in deciding what portion of Upper Sinde belongs to him. I am, myself, of opinion that his original claims to consideration were over-rated. For there is abundant reason to believe that—up to a very short period before the war in Sinde—he was as inimical to our interest as any of the other Ameers.[289] It was only when he perceived that—by acting treacherously towards Meer Roostum and his family—his own personal interest would be promoted that he turned against them and sided with us. If all this is admitted, it follows that Ali Morad possesses no right either to the lands which constituted Meer Roostum's private estate, to the lands which constituted the late Mobarick's private estate or to any portion of the territory belonging to the Ameers of Upper Sinde—which Sir C. Napier (under the orders of Lord Ellenborough) summarily confiscated under Proclamation dated the 1st December 1842 (but all these lands are included in Sir C. Napier's draft Treaty of 1845).[290] Although, as I have already shown, they were all specially excepted under the deed by which Meer Roostum ceded the Turban to Ali Morad.[291] It follows, therefore, that any Treaty which we may ultimately conclude with Ali Morad should only recognize (1st) what he held in his own right individually as an Ameer of Upper Sinde and (2nd) the lands in Upper Sinde which appertained to the Turban. With regard to the former, we have Meer Sohrab's will and the schedule prepared by Mr. Ross Bell—showing the villages and districts possessed by each Ameer at Khyrpore in his time—to guide us. From the latter document, we learn that Ali Morad's private inheritance consisted of 64 villages (yielding annually Rs. 295,500). With reference also to the lands appertaining to the Turban, Meer Sohrab's will may be our guide. For although this does not specify the particular lands which belonged to the Turban, it states that they were exactly one half of what Meer Roostum received. To that half, therefore, and no more is Ali Morad entitled and the adjustment is reduced to one calculation.

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120. In concluding this Treaty, it will probably still be considered expedient (as was originally proposed by Sir Charles Napier) to provide for a mutual exchange of territory with the view of consolidating the territory of each state within a more compact and convenient frontier and of adjusting mutual claims (which have arisen from the temporary occupation by one party of lands belonging to the other). When effecting an arrangement for this purpose, the sketch map prepared by Lieutenant Fitzgerald ("showing the exact position of the Khyrpore territory in reference to the British possessions") will be extremely useful.[292] The memorandum prepared by Major Goldney—on the districts included in article 2 of Sir Charles Napier's draft Treaty—may also be usefully referred to (by the officer who may have to arrange the exchange).[293]

121. Another point (on which the instructions of the Governor General of India are required) relates to the compensation that should be granted to Ali Morad for the three forts of Sahgurh, Guttora and Gurseya, which were transferred—by order of Lord Ellenborough—to the Jessulmere state. In his letter to Sir Charles Napier, the Governor General informs him that that the Raja of Jessulmere had already occupied Guttora and was preparing to attack Shahgurh when he heard that it had been garrisoned by Ali Morad with 400 men.[294] It was not known whether the Raja or Ali Morad occupied the third fort (Gurseya). These forts were claimed by the Jessulmere state, as having formerly belonged to it, and also by Ali Morad. But his Lordship—on the authority of Captain French—states: "It is understood they belonged to Meer Roostum and if, as is probable, in right of the Turban they may now be claimed in the same right by Ali Morad. The places in the desert (continues his Lordship) are now safer in the hands of the Rajpoots than in those of Beloochees. From the communication made to His Highness the Raja of Jessulmere, he will have indulged the expectation that the possession of these forts would be obtained by him (even if his own

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troops should fail to take them from the enemy in whose occupation they then were)." He, therefore, directed that the forts should be restored to Jessulmere under the promise that Meer Ali Morad should be indemnified "should it appear that he had good claims to them."

122. The Government of India has observed that, "These forts would appear to have belonged to Meer Roostum and the right of Meer Ali Morad to compensation from Jessulmere would seem to depend on the validity of the transfer of all the property of Meer Roostum to His Highness."[295] If His Highness' right is established, "a territorial transfer of an equivalent might be negotiated (in preference to a money payment) to the extents proposed by His Excellency." Sir C. Napier observed: "His Highness was in full possession of the fortresses. I, therefore, assume that he had a right to them succeeding to the right of his brother Meer Roostum (the one right being consequent on the other). I enclose a copy of Lord Ellenborough's letter relative to the transfer of these fortresses. His Highness would prefer having the forts returned to him rather than receive any payment I believe. He was excessively averse to give them up. To pay His Highness by a transfer of land would be objectionable but, such a mode of payment, might be negotiated. I object to the payment in land because the land of Sinde is very fertile and will eventually yield a vast revenue(!!!)."[296] In his "Recollections," Sir C. Napier observes: "The territorial exchange was prevented by the simple fact that I could execute it but under Treaty. Either Government did not approve of the Treaty and meant to alter it, which would have produced inevitable confusion and interminable trouble (or else the Government approved and were called upon to sign it). Why this was not done is for Sir F. Currie to say. The whole delay lays at his door. Lord Hardinge told me at Lahore he had no objection to it and had ordered it. All is Sir F. Currie's fault I believe. I think Ali Morad had been ill used by the Government and faith broken with him in regard to the forts. He gave up Shahgurh, etc. (at Lord Ellenborough's

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command) to the Jessulmere man with a positive and distinct promise of payment that was never fulfilled. If he tried to cheat us, we did cheat him."

123. The following account, however, will show that Lord Hardinge's Government—or rather Sir F. Currie (who was his Lordship's Secretary)—is made responsible and is not quite so much to blame as Sir C. Napier supposes.[297] The forts are situated in the desert. According to the statements of the Jessulmere authorities, they were built by the rulers of Sinde on land belonging to Jessulmere. They are now in a ruinous condition. Lord Ellenborough—perhaps with some political object—ordered Sir C. Napier to transfer the forts to Jessulmere and to compensate Ali Morad for their loss (by the cession of lands exceeding their value by one third). Ali Morad was highly incensed when he heard of this order and reluctantly withdrew his garrison. Sir C. Napier was disinclined to compensate Ali Morad by a transfer of land, as he considered the land of Sinde to be very fertile and expected that it would eventually yield "vast revenue." "As far I have been able to ascertain (wrote His Excellency) the value of the forts is Rs. 417,000 and revenue they gave 16,450 Khyrpore Rupees. From this, deducting 1/10th, we get 375,300 Company Rupees. To this, add the value of the land and the bill against us is very heavy. Now it appears to me fair that the Raja of Jessulmere should pay for the forts thus made over to him and which he could never have taken by force."[298] Sir C. Napier was informed, in reply, that the Governor General preferred territorial transfer to a money payment. No notice was taken of the proposition to make Jessulmere pay for the forts. Indeed, it would have been rather awkward to make such a demand upon Mahan Rawul—he had already been in possession of the forts for nearly two years and evidently considered them a gift from the British Government. Sir C. Napier again urged his objection to transfer any land to Ali Morad:

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"To pay His Highness by a transfer of land would be objectionable. But I have no doubt such a mode of payment might be negotiated." On the 15th October 1846, Ali Morad complained against the aggressions made on his territory by Jessulmere subjects and took the opportunity of again urging his claim to these forts. His complaint was referred for inquiry and report to the agent at Rajpootana, who was also directed to furnish a statement of the value of the forts and of the revenue of the lands that the Rawul obtained with them.[299] The agent (Colonel Sutherland) forwarded a statement from the Jessulmere authorities containing counter complaints against Ali Morad's subjects and representing that they could not furnish any accurate information regarding the value of the lands attached to them. He was directed, in reply, to procure detailed and accurate information so as to enable the Governor General to come to a proper decision on the claims of Ali Morad. He, afterwards, reported that, as it was his intention to visit Jessulmere at the opening of the season, he would then have an opportunity of obtaining the information required by the Governor General.[300]

124. From the above, it is evident that the requisite information is still wanting to enable the Government to decide what amount of compensation should be paid to Ali Morad for the three forts transferred to Jessulmere. In fact, at the close of the memorandum from which the above account is extracted, the question is put: "What about the compensations which we promised for the desert forts? If he has been compensated by a transfer of land, what was the estimated value of the forts and on what date was such an estimate formed?" In this discussion, however, one material point appears to me to have been overlooked: Lord Ellenborough's promise of compensation to Ali Morad was made on the express condition "that it should appear that he had good claims to them."[301] But I can discover no trace of any inquiry having been instituted. In the deed executed by Meer Roostum ceding the Turban to Ali Morad, the fort

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of Sahgurh is specified but those of Guttora and Gureya are not mentioned (though they may be included in the term "other forts").[302] This, however, ought not to be taken for granted without further inquiry. My remarks on the destruction of the Fort of Emanghur will warn Government not to be misled by the fallacy that all forts in Upper Sinde belonged to the possessor of the "Turban." Emanghur was the private property of Meer Mahomed and was not, therefore, entered in the Treaty by which Meer Roostum ceded the Turban to Ali Morad. If all the fortresses appertained to the Turban, such would—assuredly—have been mentioned in the deed of cession. But another proof of the fallacy of this assumption will be found in Meer Sohrab's will, which although bequeaths the Turban to Meer Roostum, gives his younger brother (Mir Ali Morad) "the fort of Ahmedabad."[303]

125. That some compensation is due on account of the forts, if proved to belong to Ali Morad, admits of no doubt. As an offset against this, we have a demand against His Highness on account of lands temporarily occupied by him at the commencement of the war but which belong to the British Government. In one of his communications to Lord Ellenborough, Sir C. Napier observes: "Meer Ali Morad occupied all the land in northern Sinde when we advanced. The kardars of the other Ameers fled. A general state of pillage was, I feared, about to begin which would be a great loss to the flying Ameers. I, therefore, thought it fair by them to take whatever steps I could to preserve their property. I felt assured that, in the general pillage, His Highness would probably (by means of his kardars) secure the lion's share. So I thought my best plan was to tell him to take all and be accountable for all the revenues when peace was re-established. This he agreed to." Again, Sir C. Napier wrote to the Governor General: "The plan will soon be drawn. Then I shall make the exchanges with His Highness Ali Morad and forward the whole to your Lordship for decision. I hope this will put his Highness

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in better temper with me, though—I fear—there is a disagreeable account of money to settle, which he will not like. He pillaged us abominably and fancies this all to be smoothed over.[304] But I warned him all along that I kept an account which must be balanced at last." Sir C. Napier stated that the amount improperly collected by Meer Ali Morad at Sehwistan was Rupees 47,719 and proposed that the adjustment of this sum should be deferred until the time came for paying the Ameer for his forts.[305]

126. It would further appear from Major Goldney's letter and enclosures (dated the 16th October 1848) that we have a further demand (to the amount of Rupees 50,364) against His Highness Meer Ali Morad on account of lands and appendages strictly belonging to the British Government (or its jagheerdars) in His Highness' possession. The data on which the Collector brings out this balance is clearly detailed in his report. The amount really due will have materially increased by the lapse of time that had occurred since his calculations were made. It will be seen that at that period was due to the British Government:

	Co.'s Rs.
As per Appendix (B.), No. 1 - - - - -	81,900
As per Appendix (B.), No. 2 - - - - -	60,865
As per Appendix (C.) - - - - - -	41,455
Total *Co.'s Rs.*	184,220
From this deduct lands belonging to his Highness Ali Morad, in the possession of the British Government,	
As per Appendix (A.) - - - - - -	1,33,856
Balance due to the British Government - - -	50,364

N. B.—The Collector observes, these valuations are of course subject to revision on production of the accounts of the purgunnahs by his Highness Meer Ali Morad.

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127. In conclusion I, again, beg to apologize to the Board and to superior authority for the length of time I have unavoidably detained these important papers. In addition to the reasons assigned for this delay in my minute of the 18th September, I have further to state that when I was about to close this minute we received from the Government of India the voluminous correspondence related to the Government of Sinde under Sir Napier's administration, which accompanied Mr. Under Secretary Grey's letter No. 1725 (dated the 18th October last).[306] I have availed myself of the authentic materials contained in this correspondence to illustrate several of the questions discussed in my minute. But, to enable me to do this, I was obliged to recast and re-arrange much of what I had before written. Notwithstanding the time and labour I have devoted to the subject, I am by no means satisfied with my performance. But it will be always to me a source of the highest gratification if—at the close of my long and laborious career in India—I have been able successfully to plead the cause of the ruined and oppressed Princes of Sinde and to place their case in such a shape before my superiors as will enable them to afford partial redress for great wrongs. Wrongs (which I venture to predict) will be stigmatized by the future historian in terms most unfavourable to our national reputation; which have undermined (if they have not entirely destroyed) the moral vantage ground we before possessed when pleading with other nations on behalf of the oppressed (and which have been made the subject, and I fear will continue to be so, of severe and recriminatory comment in every quarter of the globe [penetrating, even as we are informed, the great desert of Sahara]).[307] Finally, in the words of one whose policy during the short period he governed India (and more especially in Sinde) has with so much reason been objected to and disapproved: "A reputation for justice goes further in the East (than it does in Europe) in giving strength to a Government and a great name to those to whom it is administered. Justice in the East is a very rare

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quality and certainly it was not one possessed by our predecessors the Ameers. It will be more valued in us."[308] And, again, alluding to the principles on which the territories of Sinde were to be apportioned after conquest, His Lordship observed: "Principles which it has been endeavored to make consistent with equity to all, for this transaction is one which will be scrutinized by surrounding states as well as by the parties more immediately interested. The character of our Government for impartial justice towards our allies is of far more importance than any advantage we might derive from appropriating to ourselves a large portion of this fertile territory."[309] I fervently pray that these just and liberal principles may be applied to the hard case of the sons and nephews of our faithful allies the late Meers Roostum and Sobdar, if not all the Ameers in common.

14th December 1850
J.P. Willoughby

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ENDNOTES

1. Editor's Note: The British Library's India Office Records has a copy of these proceedings filed in its official publications series (BL/OIOC/IOR/V/4-5/ Paper 169). The United States Library of Congress also has a copy of the Sukkur Commission's proceedings (http://lccn.loc.gov/95193962). Finally, the British House of Commons issued it as part of a printed report: R. K. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad (Ameer of Upper Sinde),' *Parliamentary Papers* 1852–1853 (73) LXXVII.1: 137–218.
2. See the very lucid memorandum entitled 'On the First Connection of the British Government with Ali Morad Khan Talpur,' dated 5th July 1849 (Simla) and prepared in the Foreign Office of the Government of India.
3. Miscellaneous, *Correspondence Relative to Sinde: Supplement to Parliamentary Blue Book, 1843*, (London: T.R. Harrison, 1844), 111.
4. 24 July 1843.
5. In a letter dated 10 May 1842, Mr Secretary Maddock on this point, when sanctioning the recognition of Ali Morad's reversionary right to succeed to the Turban, observed that, "At the same time, His Lordship (desirous of prosperity and future tranquility of the State of Khyrpore) cannot but regret the existence in that state of a course of dissent so unreasonable and calculated to produce so much conflict in the Khyrpore family." See, Miscellaneous, *Correspondence Relative to Sinde: Parliamentary Blue Book, 1838–1843* (London: T.R. Harrison, 1843), 429.
6. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence* (5 September 1842). Also see, Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 117–118.
7. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838–1843)*, 246.
8. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (9 to 15 May 1842).
9. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (9 June 1842).
10. Editor's Note: one *khurwar* (or 13 *maunds*) is about 485.2 kilograms.
11. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (12 July 1842).

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12. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (19 July 1842). The minister referred to is Fetteh Mahomed Ghoree.
13. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (25 July 1842).
14. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (2 August 1842).
15. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (4 August and 3 September 1842).
16. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (5 and 13 September 1842).
17. Captain Mylne's *Digest of Intelligence for Lower Sinde*, (13 September 1842).
18. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (13 and 14 September 1842).
19. *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*, (16 September 1842).
20. *Digest of Intelligence for Upper Sinde*, (20 September 1842).
21. *Digest of Intelligence for Upper Sinde*, (27 September 1842).
22. Ibid.
23. In the memorandum prepared for the Commission by the late Captain Brown, it is stated: 'It has long been rumored that the Koran—in which the cession of the two villages by Meer Nusseer Khan had been recorded—had been falsified by additions being made by means of a fresh leaf being inserted in the Koran in place of the original one extracted. Sheikh Ali Hussein, ex-Minister of Ali Morad, now produces the leaf and states as follows regarding the Treaty: 'Meer Roostum came to Ali Morad and wished to make peace. Ali Morad said that, "I have expended lacs of Rupees in this fight and have given jagheers to the Beloochees. How can I make peace?" Meer Roostum then gave him 7 villages from himself and two—namely Mahtela and Dadalo—from Meer Nusseer Khan. He wrote this in the Koran and sealed it. Nusseer Khan and Ali Akbar Khan also sealed it. On this, peace was effected, fighting ceased and a Proclamation was issued that the country beyond Roree was ceded to the British (that belonging to Ali Morad excepted). The Ameer then added in the Koran the word "purgunnah" before the village of "Mahtela." He afterwards added the words "Meerpoor" and "Mehurkee." He discovered that too many words had been inserted and the forgery was evident. He became perplexed and, after some consideration, he resolved that the first page (in which he had attempted to scratch out some portions of words and to correct its appearance) should be extracted. The second, on which were the seals of different parties remained. The matter on the sheet extracted (containing the names of villages ceded) was recopied on a spare leaf in the Koran. The writer of the whole was Peer Ali Gohur. The sheet extracted is with me here. If you order it, I will give it up.'" (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad,' 187–8).
24. Sheikh Ali Hussein says: "At the time the Proclamation was issued, the alteration from 'deh Mahtela' to 'purgunnah Mahtela' was made." Peer Ali Gohur states that, "When the Proclamation was issued by the British Government about the annexation of the country, the word 'deh' (signifying village) was altered in the Treaty into purgunnah and, in doing so, the paper was spoiled."
25. *Digest of Intelligence for Upper Sinde*, (4 October 1842).

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26. Memorandum entitled, 'On the First Connection of the British Government with Ali Morad Khan Talpur,' dated 5 July 1849 (Simla) and prepared in the Foreign Office of the Government of India.
27. Ibid.
28. This allusion to a Treaty (which at the time had no existence) is curious and called forth a mild remonstrance from Meer Roostum: "The result to me is that you have issued a Proclamation that is in accordance with the new Treaty. My country from Roree to the boundary of Subzulkote shall be considered belonging to the British Government from 1st January. As yet, I have not entered into any Treaty to this effect."
29. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 4.
30. This has always been a disputed point. Meer Roostum, from the first to last, asserting that the transfer was compulsory when—by Sir C. Napier's advice—he had placed himself in Ali Morad's power in his stronghold of Dejee Ke Kote.
31. The correspondence between the Governor General and Sir C. Napier on this subject will be found summed up in Exhibit B (No. 1) of the Commission's Report (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad,' 178–82).
32. This is true. On 11 December 1842, Sir C. Napier wrote a letter to Ali Morad assuring him that all his rights should be assured to him. (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 3).
33. For a more full account of Captain Pope's proceedings, I beg to refer to Exhibit C (No. 1, 2, 3 and 4) of the Appendix to the Commission's Report (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad,' 185–7).
34. On 11 August 1843, Captain Pope submitted a sketch of the country between Roree and Subzelkote and observed: "As the whole of the country in question was (by a Proclamation issued by his Excellency in December 1843) declared to be British territory from and after the 1st January, His Highness Ali Morad cannot found a claim to any portion of it either on the cession to him by Meer Roostum of the whole of his kingdom subsequent to the issue of the Proclamation adverted to."
35. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 180.
36. On the 21 September 1849, Sir C. Napier informs Mr Pringle: "When I gave Ali Morad what he claims (namely Meerpore Mahtela, I think) as having been made over to him in the Koran by Meer Roostum, I was pretty well aware that he had no right to the district (which was rich and that he had only right to the village)—which was (an affair as he told me himself on the March to Enamgurh) trifling in amount. When we came afterwards to settle our accounts and boundaries, he claimed the district with some 40,000 Rupees annually. He produced the Koran and, in a leaf of it, was written that this district he received on the field of battle (I forget the name but it was fought near Roree in the end of 1842). I was aware of the trick he was playing but had no proof. I was, however, on the look out. Just before I left Kurrachee, I

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discovered the forgery he had committed and made of the proofs to Mr Pringle or, at least, I gave them to Captain Brown (Secretary).'

37. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 197.
38. In his final examination before the Commission, he states: He "was His Highness Ali Morad's full accredited Minister from the beginning of the year Hijree 1256 (A.D. 1840) to within a few months of the end of 1259 (A.D. 1843) and again, for a short time during 1260 (A.D. 1844), when a temporary reconciliation took place between us. We soon after quarreled again and I left his service altogether." In a letter from Ali Morad to Captain Brown, he is designated by His Highness as 'my faithful servant Sheikh Ali Hussein' and this is repeated in a subsequent letter reporting the Battle of Nownahar and the Treaty which followed (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 199-200). Sir C. Napier, in a memorandum of instructions to Captains Malet and Tait (appointed to settle boundaries) dated 26 November 1843, says of him: "He was very useful to me during the war and, as far as I could judge, a faithful servant."
39. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 193–4.
40. See paragraph 5 of this Minute.
41. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad,' 191 and 191–2.
42. He names them: 1. Khan Sukhan; 2. Abyanee; 3. Bacha; 4. Dherrae, 5. Ghunkna; 6. Royina; 7. Palluga. In reference to Exhibit F (No. 10) it will be seen that these exactly correspond to the names of the villages specified in Meer Roostum's letter to his eldest son dated the day after the Battle of Nownahar, (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 211).
43. Letter from Lieutenant Younghusband (Lieutenant of Police in Sinde) dated 4 January 1849 (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 189–90).
44. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 181–2. This appears, to me, to be a very probable solution to the difficulty and it is by no means unlikely that the piece of waste paper—on which Peer Ali Gohur tried his hand before he wrote the new leaf—is the identical leaf (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 209).
45. It must be borne in mind that these remarks were written before the Commission assembled at Sukkur. They contain, therefore, no allusion to the important evidence afterwards obtained from the late Major Clibborn's moonshee (Towur Mull) and from Meer Roostum's eldest son (Meer Mahomed Hussein) included in my summary.
46. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 208.
47. Ibid., 209.
48. Ibid., 210.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 210–11.
51. In a postscript to the memorandum prepared by Mr Pringle for the Governor General, he states: "Since the paper was written, I have received information tending to show that two genuine copies of the Treaty of Nownahar were, at

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one time, on the records of the Sinde Government but were surreptitiously abstracted from them and a spurious one, containing the present interpolations, substituted. This took place in March 1843, one month after the Battle of Meeanee and five months before the alleged fraud in the Koran (which was perpetrated 20 days before Captain Pope proceeded to Khyrpore to examine the deed—also in the Koran—in which the public cession of the Turban was made and took the opportunity of examining this one also when, of course, it would correspond with its present appearance). I have not the means of verifying immediately this information and may not perhaps be strictly accurate in its details, but these are the circumstances which give to its general substance a considerable primea-facie appearance of probability."

52. It appears that his person was either at Mooltan or Bhawulpore as he obtained service from Bhawul Khan and Sheikh Ali saw him at Mooltan during the siege of that place.
53. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 210–1.
54. Ibid., 196–203.
55. Ibid., 196.
56. Ibid.,197.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 198.
60. Ibid., 199–200.
61. Ibid., 200.
62. Ibid., 202–3.
63. Ibid., 211.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. This document is admitted by Ali Morad to be genuine. It is merely to the effect that it will be delivered by Hafiz Hukoomut and that the party addressed might consider any message to be true. It is in Ali Morad's own handwriting. Hafiz appeared before the Commission and admitted that he was sent with the first letter and a message but denies being sent a second time. The second letter being shown to him, he denies having taken it.
67. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 211.
68. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 5.
69. It is dated 25 April 1850 and is recorded on the Commission's proceedings of the following day.
70. See a paper on the Commission's Proceedings dated 28 April 1850 remarking on the discrepancies in their evidence. They do not affect, however, the main story. Although minor variations are noticed, they are not of such a nature as to affect their general credibility.
71. At the conclusion of the inquiry, Ali Morad addressed a sort of remonstrance to the Commission (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 214). In this he observes: "I abandoned all connection with my brethren and relations

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and formed a strict alliance with Government [i.e., the East India Company] and fought with its enemies." Again he states: "I have become the enemy of my brothers and relatives by fighting with them under the allegiance I formed to Government and throwing them out of their homes and possession. They, consequently, all united against me and are engaged in these seditions."

72. See their note dated 27 April 1850. The Commission examined these records and satisfied themselves that only a portion of Ali Morad's correspondence had been entered in them. They also saw reason to believe that another letter produced by His Highness had been tampered with.
73. See his reply on the Commission's Proceedings dated 30 April 1850.
74. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 211. For Ali Morad's remarks on this document, see his explanatory memorandum recorded on the Commission's Proceedings and dated 30 April 1850.
75. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 212. Letter from the Government of Sinde to the Government of India, dated 12 November 1847, requesting copies of the replies to the letters addressed by Colonel Outram (late Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan) to the Government of India dated 21 and 22 April 1842 (relating to disputes between His Highness Meer Ali Morad and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore)—as the originals are supposed to have been carried off in a box of records stolen from the secretary's office at Hyderabad and the reply thereto (dated the 12 May 1842) furnishing copies of the letters required.
76. See paper dated 21 September 1849 (Simla) and headed 'Recollections'.
77. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 182. It is necessary here to observe that Mr Pringle was averse to a public inquiry into Ali Morad's conduct but suggested that the case should be decided again him ex parte. This Government thought it would be unjust to condemn the Ameer without first affording him an opportunity of defence and appointed the Commission for that purpose.
78. George Clerk, 'Report of Sir G. Clerk on the Administration of Sinde (Appendices and Reports of Mr Pringle and Mr. Freer)', *Parliamentary Papers* 1854 (483) XLIX.1: 23.
79. Memorandum entitled, 'On the First Connection of the British Government with Ali Morad Khan Talpoor,' dated 5 July 1849 (Simla) and prepared in the Foreign Office of the Government of India.
80. His letter of 25 November 1849 (No. 85 of the Appendix of to Sir George Clerk's Minute) states: "As regards Ali Morad's treatment of his relations, it has been and is most illiberal to say the least of it (and this—in particular—towards his eight nephews, the sons of the late Meers Roostum and Mobarick). There is not one of His Highness' principal shikarees [i.e., hunting servants] who is not, in most respects, far better off than they are. They have been reduced, by want, to the sale of their wives' ornaments and cloths. Shooting, hunting and hawking (their chief amusements in their better days) are now denied them. But a few days back, Meer Shere Mahomed (4th son of the late

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Meer Roostum) appeared a suppliant for subsistence before the door and is now living on the bounty of her who, in his father's lifetime, was a low courtesan in the Khyrpore bazaar and who is now the favorite wife of His Highness Meer Ali Morad—enjoying an income of nearly three lacs a year.'

81. Clerk, 'Administration of Sinde', 22.
82. Namely by the 5th article of the Treaty of Khyrpore (negotiated by Sir Alexander Burnes dated the 25 December 1838), which stipulates: "The Ameer and his heirs and successors will not commit aggression on anyone. If by accident any dispute arise with anyone, the settlement of it shall be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government", (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838-1843]*, 118). This was made applicable to Meer Ali Morad by a separate Treaty dated the 28 December 1838, (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838-1843]*, 112).
83. See his cross-examination by the Commission.
84. The ex-Minister here explaining that if "tuppa" had been written it must have been entered before each place, whereas "purgunnah" included all three. The reason why "Mahtela" alone was first written and Mehurkee afterwards added was that, as above stated, they had been separated and Ali Morad included all three. Besides this—as Meer Mahomed Ali's seal was not affixed to the Treaty and Meer Nusseer Khan had no interest in the tuppas of Mahtela and Mehurkee—if Meerpoor alone had been alluded to the two other tuppas would have been excluded.
85. See Ali Morad's remarks on the discrepancies of the evidence dated 28 April 1850 in the Commission's Proceedings.
86. This information is condensed from a correspondence between Major Goldney (the Collector of Shikarpoor) and the Commission, which is recorded in the appendix to their proceedings (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 178–84).
87. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 182.
88. This, I believe, was received from the Government of India.
89. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 18–21.
90. The whole of this correspondence will be found in the series D of the papers prepared by Mr Pringle for the Governor General (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 195–203).
91. Letter dated 8 August and reply thereto of 25 November 1848.
92. Meer Ali Akbar Khan, Meer Ali Mudhan Khan, Meer Shere Mahomed Khan, Meer Gholam Mahomed Khan, Meer Doss Mahomed Khan.
93. Meer Mahomed Ali, Meer Ali Mahomed Khan, Meer Wullee Mahomed Khan, Meer Ali Muddut Khan, Meer Ali Ahmed Khan, Meer Ali Buksh Khan, Meer Ameer Bukul Khan.
94. The *Digest of Intelligence of Sinde*, towards the end of 1842, establishes the fact that the property of these Ameers at Khyrpore did fall in to Ali Morad's hands.
95. This appears to have been furnished by the Meer to Sir C. Napier in February 1847.

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96. On 16 August 1843, Sir C. Napier informed the Governor General: "By reference to my letter and proclamations, it will be seen that I premised to preserve to all the Ameers their rights. I, more than once, repeated to His Highness Ali Morad and Meer Roostum that all should be supported in their rights and possessions." In a subsequent part of my Minute, I have denied that these Ameers were personally engaged in hostilities against us and I repeat that the information contained on the *Sinde Digests of Intelligence* corroborates the opinion. I entertain that the Upper Sinde Ameers never entertained hostile designs against us. Their hostile feelings were against Ali Morad and not against the British Government. The cause of their hostility was his treatment of their Chief Meer Roostum. Thus, on 4 January, it is noted a letter had been received from the Lower Sinde Ameers (calling upon Ali Morad to reinstate Meer Roostum in all his possessions and rightful authority and stating that if he declined they would join the latter): "They are all most inveterate against Ali Morad and are determined to resist his authority with arms in their hands." On 8 January it was generally understood that they (the Ameers of Dinghee) had been written to by Meer Roostum to abstain from any hostilities with the English. But, when the British forces made down towards Hyderabad, the whole of the Ameers were to assemble and destroy Meer Ali Morad—against whom the bitterest feelings are excited and chiefly from his conduct towards Meer Roostum. On 9 January the general opinion is "that the Ameers have been given to understand by Meer Ali Morad that, if captured by the General, they will be imprisoned. They have no intention of hostility against the English but they foster the idea that, as British troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan and Shikarpore, at no remote period they will also be withdrawn from Sinde and then they meditate the destruction of Meer Ali Morad." 21 January: "The feeling of indignation against Ali Morad was very strong." No idea of hostility is thought of among them.
97. Meer Mahomed Hussein Khan, Meer Ali Murdhan Khan, and Meer Mahomed Ali Khan.
98. Letters to Mr Pringle dated 14 September 1848 and 16 August 1849 and reply thereto of 1 September 1849.
99. Dated 13 September 1849.
100. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad,' 95–6.
101. This is a mistake. The cession of Meer Roostum's patrimonial lands has never been recognized by us, only that of the Turban.
102. Meer Mahomed Ali Khan and Meer Ali Mahomed Khan.
103. Dated 10 January 1849.
104. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 97–8.
105. Dated 6 May 1844.
106. Dated 24 August 1844.
107. This is a mistake. Only one of Meer Roostum's sons, according to Captain Forbes, was personally engaged in hostilities.
108. Dated 4 April 1847.

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109. See paragraph 35 of this Minute.
110. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 101–2.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., 104–6.
113. Ibid., 96.
114. Ibid., 95–6.
115. Dated 21 November 1848.
116. This is the truth. There is, in fact, proof that Meer Roostum was not on cordial terms with his eldest son a short time before the Battle of Nownahar in September 1842 and that much persuasion was requisite before he could be induced—on that event—to come to Meer Roostum's aid. Mr Ross Bell, in a letter to his assistant dated 23 December 1846, when alluding to the intrigues of Minister Futteh Mahomed Ghorree observed: "The consequence has been that numerous and serious quarrels have arisen in the family of His Highness Meer Roostum, whose eldest son (Meer Mahomed Hussein) along with his brothers Meer Ali Akbar and Meer Morad Hyder have in consequence been obliged to retire in disgrace to the estates granted to them by their father. It has been the care of Futteh Mahomed Ghorree to foment not only the disputes which have arisen among the children of his master but those of longer standing which existed between Ali Morad and Nusseer Khan, the other branches of the Khyrpore family." (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 284–5).
117. Dated 28 April 1847 and reply thereto of 17 May 1847.
118. Dated 14 June 1847.
119. Letter from Major Golding dated 5 July 1848.
120. See Lieutenant James' report dated 9 November 1848.
121. Letter dated 13 December and reply thereto of 30 December 1848.
122. Letter from Mr Pringle dated the 12 June 1849.
123. Letter from Sir H. Elliot dated the 3 August 1849.
124. Mr Pringle's letter dated the 13 May and my Minute thereon concurred in by the Bombay Council Board dated 30 May 1850.
125. In my Minute dated 9 December 1849.
126. Letter dated 13 May 1850.
127. This document has been recited at length in paragraph 3 of this Minute.
128. Memorandum drawn up in the Foreign Office of the Government of India on our first connection with Ali Morad entitled 'On the First Connection of the British Government with Ali Morad Khan Talpur,' dated 5 July 1849 (Simla).
129. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 4. In a previous letter (No. 8 of the same compilation [Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 3]), Sir C. Napier had informed Meer Roostum Ameer: "I have received my orders and I will obey them. I laugh at your preparations for war. I want to prevent blood being shed. Listen to my words. Consult with your brother His Highness Ali Morad. Your own blood will not deceive you. Your servants will."
130. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 6.

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131. Ibid., 97–8.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. The whole of this very remarkable document well worthy of perusal. It is No. 15 of the Supplement to the Sinde Blue Book (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 6-7).
136. See paragraph 77.
137. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 39–40.
138. Ibid., 7–8.
139. Ibid., 32–3.
140. Ibid., 7–8.
141. Ibid., 37–8.
142. Letter to the Governor of Bombay (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 75–6). In an appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 123–4) dated 18 September 1843, from his prison at Sassoor, Meer Roostum repeats this statement.
143. See paragraph 59.
144. Nothing could more clearly prove Sir C. Napier's predisposition to receive and believe statements to the prejudice of the Ameers than this assertion: Meer Roostum was in possession of his faculties up to the time of his death at Poona. He was bowed down by the weight of fourscore years and five and was subdued by the terrible calamities in which his family had at that age been involved. In regard to his being a habitual drunkard, the medical officer in charge of him promptly replied: "Meer Roostum Khan now upwards of 80 years of age is in full possession of his faculties—his memory is good, he is most strict in his religious observances, his mode of living is abstemious (eating meat only once a day) and his sole beverage water or milk," (Letter from Dr Peart dated 17 July 1843).
145. These will be found in No. 155 Supplement to Sinde Blue Book and are dated 10 August 1843 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 112–5). They are merely an expression of that most pernicious doctrine 'might makes right,' or as Sir Charles Napier expressed himself: 'The intrigues of these people are very silly and like a tangled web we can cut the Gordian Knot, as Alexander did. We are too strong to take the trouble to untie it.' (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 17–8).
146. For instance (on 18 December 1843), Meer Roostum was thus addressed: 'My letters have been stopped near Khyrpore. This has either been done by your order or without your consent. If by your order, you are guilty. If without your consent, you cannot command your people. In either case, I order you to disband your armed followers instantly. I will go to Khyrpore to see that this order is obeyed.' (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 4).
147. The Sinde Prize money distributed amounted to Rupees 5,644,701.7, of which 1/8th or Rs663,926 was adjudged to Sir Charles Napier. (See General

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Orders by the Government of India dated 31 December 1847, 21 July 1849, and 3 April 1850).

148. See paragraph 11. For the Moonshee's statement (made on 16 August 1843) long after the conquest of Sinde, see: No. 160 of supplement to Sinde Blue Book. (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 118).
149. On 22 January 1843, the warning voice of Major Outram informed Sir Charles Napier: "Ali Morad basely lies in saying that Meer Roostum sent any such message as he (Ali Morad) represented to you. Ali Morad is the last person on whose tender mercies or liberality Roostum would rely." (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 14–5).
150. This is letter F (No. 9) of appendix to the Commissions.' Proceedings (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 211).
151. This extract from a speech by Captain Eastwick (on the case of the Ameers of Sinde at a special court held at the India House on 26 January 1844), whose able advocacy of their cause is the more valuable because he served with distinction in the Province of Sinde and because he was personally acquainted with the Ameers and was cognizant of the important services they—but more especially Meer Roostum—had (in times of difficulty and disaster) rendered to the British Government. (William Eastwick, *The Speech of William Eastwick On the Case of the Ameers in Sinde, 3rd Edition*. [London: James Ridgway, 1844]).
152. See paragraphs 83, 84, and 85.
153. Government General Order by Sir Charles Napier dated 2 April 1843.
154. Letter dated 15 May 1843.
155. Letter dated 16 June 1843 in reply to one from Sir Charles Napier of 29 May 1843.
156. Was it free? This is the disputed point and one which, I think, this Minute will set at rest forever.
157. Letter to the Governor General dated 28 June 1843.
158. See paragraph 62.
159. Dated 23 July 1843.
160. Lord Ellenborough observes: "You do not consider that any act done by Meer Roostum can have the legal effect of giving a property in these lands to Ali Morad and, in this opinion, I entirely concur."
161. See paragraph 59.
162. I have elsewhere observed that the bitter feud which existed between Meer Roostum and Ali Morad opposes the belief that the transfer was voluntary. The records of the day contain abundant evidence of the rancorous nature of the enmity. For instance, the *Sinde Digest* of 14 October 1842 reports: "The same preparations are going on the part of Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan. The former declaring that nothing short of the transfer of the fort of Dejee Ke Kote by Ali Morad and his dropping all rights to the canal which runs past Khyrpore and Dejee will satisfy him. This done, he will receive Ali Morad as a brother. The latter replies that he will part with his fort only with his life."

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Sir C. Napier arrived at Sukkur the very day the above was written and immediately interpreted the preparations really intended against Ali Morad as signs against the British Government.

163. Letter to Lord Ellenborough dated 16 August 1843.
164. Letter dated 9 August 1843 in reply to Sir Charles Napier's letters of 13 and 18 July 1843. See also the Governor General's letter, dated 26 June 1843, suggesting that information on the subject might be sought for (from some of the officers formerly employed by Meer Roostum).
165. Letter to the Governor General dated 24 July 1843. For the will itself, see paragraph 3 of this Minute.
166. Letter to Sir Charles Napier dated 17 August 1843.
167. Dated 13 July 1843.
168. Reply (to 13 July 1843 letter) dated 11 August 1843.
169. Letter dated 16 August 1843.
170. Dated 26 August 1843.
171. See enclosure of his report (i.e., Pope's) marked B.
172. This was furnished by Lord Ellenborough to Sir C. Napier on 13 September 1843. There are other translations on the Commissions proceedings but I select this as the most correct. It is in No. 12 of Supplement to the Sinde Blue Book. (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 5).
173. Dated 21 September 1843.
174. On this subject the reader should consult the Sinde Blue Book, but more especially No. 281 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 278–279) and Major Outram's notes of conferences with the Ameers on the 8, 9, 12, and 13 February 1843 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 28–41). The conduct of these wild clansmen was noble (thus rallying around their respected chief in the hour of distress) and makes us regret the more that shortly afterwards they should have made a chivalrous—though useless—sacrifice of their lives in his defence on the fatal fields of Meeanee and Dubba. Of them, Sir Charles remarks: "The Beloochees are as fine looking race as the Sindees and even finer and resolute to the last degree. I never saw one of them run away. They invariably walked away when defeated and this accounts for the immense slaughter we made at Meeanee—unequalled, I believe, in modern war. A more noble race of men does not exist nor one more full of self-respect. I do not see much of the bigotry of the Mahomedan religion among them. However, as I cannot speak with them all, my acquaintance is confined and little worth." (Letter from Sir Charles Napier to Lord Ellenborough dated 10 April 1844).
175. Letter dated 24 October 1845.
176. Lord Hardinge assumed the Government on the 23 July 1844.
177. For this very remarkable document see No. 165 of the supplement to Sinde Blue Book. (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 120-2). The question was not fairly put for it assumes that the gift was voluntarily made. Besides which, it is in evidence that Meer Roostum had previously bestowed the same lands on his eldest son Meer Mahomed Hussein.

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178. See paragraph 3.
179. Dated 18 January 1847.
180. That is, Sir C. Napier considers the answer of the law officers at Calcutta—described above as 'full of technicalities and conditional contingencies'—settled the whole question. A singular mode, truly, of disposing of a great political question in dispute.
181. Dated 8 August 1847.
182. In the statement, marked E of Mr Pringle's collection, will be found an "estimate of the result of the proposed exchange of territory and settlement of the pecuniary claims between the British Government and His Highness Ali Morad framed on the supposition that the districts claimed by the latter in virtue of their alleged cession by Meer Nusseer Khan in the Treaty of Nownahar are disallowed by us but a portion of them ceded to Meer Ali Morad in exchange for others."
183. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 18–21.
184. These notes were not addressed to Major Outram but the Governor General long after the conquest of Sinde.
185. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 41–3.
186. Ibid., 45–6.
187. Ibid., 9.
188. Letter to the Secret Committee (dated 29 June 1843) in Supplement to the Sinde Blue Book No. 50 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 28) and being his Lordship's remarks on the notes of conferences between Major Outram and the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde from the 8 to 13 February 1843. I beg to refer to paragraph 61 of this Minute contending that—as Meer Roostum had placed himself in Ali Morad's power by Sir C. Napier's advice—the latter was bound by every principle of honour and justice to see that foul play had not been resorted to, especially as the advice was given to secure a political object.
189. Mr Pringle's letter dated 5 March 1850.
190. Dated 13 March 1850.
191. See paragraph 77.
192. See the examination of Duleh Khan taken before G. Inverarity, Esquire on 14 January 1850, an accompaniment to Mr Pringle's letter of 15 January 1850.
193. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 199–200.
194. Corresponding with 20 December 1842.
195. Appendix D (No. 15) of the Commission's Proceedings is another translation with trifling verbal alterations made by Lieutenant Younghusband, Lieutenant of Police (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 201).
196. See paragraph 77.
197. Before Lieutenant Younghusband on 29 December 1849. See No. 13 of Appendix D of the Commission's Proceedings (Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 200).
198. Pringle, 'Papers Relating to Meer Ali Morad', 200.

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199. Ibid., 201.
200. See paragraph 28.
201. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838–1843)*, 8–10.
202. Ibid., 18.
203. Ibid., 22–3 and 33–5.
204. Ibid., 40.
205. Ibid., 54.
206. Ibid., 69.
207. Ibid., 105–6.
208. Ibid., 106–111 and 117–9.
209. Ibid., 138.
210. Ibid., 148–9.
211. Ibid., 160–1 and 177–82.
212. Ibid., 118–9.
213. Ibid., 126–7.
214. Ibid., 144.
215. Ibid., 136–7.
216. See paragraph 28.
217. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838-1843)*, 1.
218. Noor Mahomed broke into a passionate exclamation at the evils that had already resulted from the British connection: "We ought (he said) never to have granted a road through our territories. That was my act alone. All the Beloochees predicted what would happen. This is the consequence of friendship." Lieutenant Eastwick's letter to the Resident in Sinde Blue Book No. 143 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 144). See also the last paragraph of Colonel Pottinger's letter to the Governor General dated 7 March 1839 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838-1843]*, 188).
219. Dated 4 April, 20 April, and 22 April 1832 and 23 December 1843 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 2–5).
220. See correspondence in the *Sinde Blue Book* of this period.
221. In particular, the draft Treaty proposed by Colonel Pottinger of 23 Articles and Lord Auckland's remarks thereon with the amended draft Treaty.
222. See note at the end of paragraph 62.
223. By a General Order dated 24 October 1842, the Governor General directed that the functions and allowances of all officers holding political appointments in Sinde and Beloochistan (and on the right bank of the Upper Indus) and of all persons composing their several establishments shall cease on 15 November. The effect of this order was to vest Sir C. Napier with full powers to determine when peace should end and war commenced.
224. Nothing was more calculated to create mistrust and suspicion in the minds of the Ameers than this measure. They were in a feverish state of anxiety as to our intentions in consequence of the arrival of Brigadier England's force from Candahar and Prince Timoor. Lieutenant Mylne in his *Digest of Intelligence* at the commencement of November notes: "The Ameers continue much agitated

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regarding the force at Sukkur and Meer Khan is about to leave for Khyrpore to endeavour to ascertain the object of so large an assemblage of troops." Major Outram, in his very last *Digest*, notes: "The daily intelligence he had received during the past week displays the temper of the Chiefs under the alarm caused by the suspicious appearance of the troops delaying here [i.e., Sukkur]. All their measures and preparations, however, are defencive merely and will lead to nothing offensive I think." Lieutenant Brown also, in his *Digest* of 13 November notes: "The Ameers are wholly at a loss to comprehend the reason of the withdrawal of the Agency of Sinde and Beloochistan as announced to them by Major Outram and look upon it as preparatory to their country being abandoned to the pleasure of the Afghan tribes. During the past week each day has brought a message from one or another of the Ameers begging that some one might be permitted to remain at Hyderabad in a political capacity."

225. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838–1843)*, 362–7.

226. Letter dated 23rd January 1843 in supplement to the *Sinde Blue Book* No. 32, (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 17–8). The words underlined however being omitted.

227. In the *Sinde Digest of Intelligence* (25 September 1842), it is noted: "At an early hour this morning, deputations from the Ameers—composed of their most respectable sirdars—began to arrive at the agency to wait on Sir C. Napier. A hundred trays of sweetmeats were presented in the evening, a palanquin of state and several of the Ameers' favourite riding camels were sent for the purpose of conveying the Major General and his staff to the durbar [i.e., court]. We were met at some distance from the town by a deputation consisting of the relations and principal sirdars of the Ameers and, a little further on, by the sons of Meer Sobdar and Nusseer Khan. The reception was with every mark of cordiality and friendship and with every assurance of inviolable attachment to the British Government. Their Highnesses were very handsomely apparelled and the durbars were crowded with a number of well-dressed attendants. Sir C. Napier desired me (Lieutenant Mylne) to express to His Highness the gratification he experienced from the very flattering manner in which he had been received and that this mark of their friendship for the British Government could not fail to meet the approval of the Governor General (to whom he would report it)." In like manner, the *Upper Sinde Digest* of 5 October records: "Khyr Mohamed, son of the Minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, was deputed by Meer Roostum Khan to wait upon Sir C. Napier and enquire after his health." On 10 October, a second deputation from Khyrpore waited on the Major General consisting of Meer Ali Buksh Khan (younger son of Meer Roostum Khan), Meer Wullee Mahomed Khan (younger brother of Meer Nusseer Khan) and the Minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree. The chief topic of conversation was the great friendship the Ameers had for the British Government. We find also that these hostile chiefs were amusing themselves at this period by firing salutes in honour of the victories gained by Major

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General Pollock in China. On 8 October it is noted: "A salute was fired from the fort at Hyderabad in honour of victories gained by Major General Pollock and Nott and our success in China. 'The Ameers assured Lieutenant Mylne that in everything they feel the interests of the two to be interwoven.'" On 21 October 42 guns were fired in honour of our victories in China at Khyrpore.

228. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838–1843)*, 433.
229. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 4.
230. This appears from Sir C. Napier's letter to Major Outram (dated 20 January 1843) enclosed in one to the Governor General of 16 August 1843: "I so far agree with you that I should prefer the plan proposed to Lord Ellenborough. I object, but have not objected to the donation to Bhawulpore. I should prefer the simple exchange I proposed of tribute against land but am wholly unauthorized to object to orders issued by such high authority surrounded by the sources of all Indian information. Had Lord Ellenborough asked me, I should have stated my opinion again, for my proposal was a clear and deliberate exposition of my opinion in the first instance. The draft Treaty I, therefore, consider as His Lordship's end determination. I have only to execute my orders to the best of my abilities."
231. The oversight was pointed out in November 1842 but, unfortunately, no reference was made until 30 January 1843. His Lordship, on 9 February, promptly replied: "If you should be of the opinion that the cession originally demanded presses too heavily on the Ameers, I shall be glad to receive any suggestion you may wish to offer for its modification." This expression of the Governor General's readiness to rectify a grievous error arrived too late—the Battle of Meeanee had been fought. In a letter to Sir C. Napier (dated 10 September), Lord Ellenborough "admits the value of the tract in question is much larger than had been supposed."
232. For this see, *Sinde Blue Book* No 405 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–184]*, 450–1). Et sequens [i.e., the one that follows]: One of the articles outraged the religious feelings of the Ameers (vide article 3). Stringent as it was, it was—by compulsion—agreed to by the Ameers both of Upper and Lower Sinde. It is but justice to the Governor General to notice that it was clearly his intension that inquiry and an opportunity of defence should precede punishment. On 8 May 1842, his Lordship observed: "There must be clear proof of the Ameers' faithlessness and that it must not be provoked by the conduct of the British agent producing apprehensions in the minds of any chief that the British Government entertains designs inconsistent with his interests and honour." (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 339–41). On 11 September Sir C. Napier was informed that his Lordship would not proceed to punishment without the most ample and convincing evidence of the guilt of the person accused and that the Governor General entirely relies upon his sense of justice. He is convinced that whatever report he may make upon the subject after full investigation will be such as he may safely act upon (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 359–60 and Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 1).

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233. See note at the end of paragraph 62. On 27 December 1842, Sir C. Napier informed the Governor General: "I made up my mind that, although war has not been declared (nor is it necessary to declare it), I would at once march upon Emanghur and prove to the whole Talpoor family (both Khyrpore and Hyderabad) that their desert—nor their negotiations—can protect them from the British troops. While they imagine they can fly, with security, to their deserts they will never be quiet." (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 483–4). For Sir C. Napier's defence of this exploit, when its injustice was questioned, see supplement to *Sinde Blue Book* No. 143 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 103–4). It is thus noticed in the *Sinde Digest of Intelligence*: "On 4 January 1843, Major General Sir Charles Napier marched to Dejee Ke Kote (the fort of Meer Ali Morad) and, the next night, moved with a small force, lightly equipped, towards Emanghur—a fort distant 80 miles in the desert belonging to Meer Mahomed Khan (nephew of Meer Roostum Khan). This fort had, hitherto, been considered by the Ameers inaccessible to our troops and, as from its position in the centre of the desert it was looked upon as a refuge for the disaffected. It was with the concurrence of Meer Ali Morad, who accompanied the General, destroyed by minning."
234. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 8.
235. Ibid., 2.
236. Ibid., 3.
237. Ibid., 3–4.
238. Ibid., 4 and 6–7. It has been asserted that this was one of the devices resorted to by Ali Morad to embroil Meer Roostum with the British General. That Sir C. Napier suspected Ali Morad of stopping his dawks [i.e., mail] is quite clear, for on 4 February 1843, he thus writes to Major Outram: "The miscarriage of the mail is a strange affair. I am very suspicious of this matter. I think Ali Morad may have stopped it." (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 25).
239. On 14 December 1843, Lord Ellenborough himself writes: "The designs of the Ameers would seem, by the intelligence transmitted, to be of a defencive character only." The fact is, as His Lordship remarked on 8 October 1842: "The assembly of men by the Khyrpore Ameers was only for the settlement of a quarrel amongst themselves and had nothing in it of hostility to us." (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 1). "It is not against all probability (observed Captain Eastwick). Can it be believed that the Ameers would have stood our staunch friends in the day of defeat and adversity to break with us at the moment when our armies were returning flushed with victory? Is it credible that, with the experience of our success in Afghanistan, under Pollock and Nott, they would rush head long into so unequal a contest?"
240. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838–1843)*, 485–6.
241. Nothing more strongly indicates this than Meer Roostum's conduct when Sir C. Napier proceeded against Emanghur. That officer admitted that he could not conceal his march (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 489–93) and, although unopposed, the guns he took with him were found ineffectual to

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destroy it. Mining was therefore resorted to: "On the evening of 15th January 1843 the demolition of Emanghur was completed. Thirty-four mines were sprung. The last finishing the whole of the powder in the fortress, about 20,000 pounds." For a description of the great strength of the fortress, see *Sinde Blue Book* No. 468 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 502–7). Now it must be obvious that, had the Ameers of Upper Sinde been hostilely disposed, they would have opposed Sir C. Napier and could easily have defied even so skillful a commander, with a small force and limited means he could bring to bear against the fort. It was only because he was unopposed that he was able to destroy this stronghold. But what did Meer Roostum do on this occasion? The *Sinde Digest* of 9 January informs us: "About 12 o'clock at night a hurkarah [i.e., messenger] came conveying a letter from Meer Roostum to Meer Mahomed Hussein, Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Ali Murdhan. It was announced to them that the General had entered the Thurr, or desert, and was in full march for Mahomed Khan's fort. He desired that, on receiving the letter, they would instantly fly or the English force would be on them and make them prisoners. In accordance with Meer Roostum's letter, they mounted their horses and accompanied by a large body of Beloochees took the route to Kotree."

242. See his Lordship's letters to the Ameers of Hyderabad and to Meer Nusseer Khan in which their guilt is assumed as early as 4 November 1842 and the new Treaty imposed upon them as the penalty (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 448–50).

243. This important document would, in all probability, have never seen the light had not Major Outram—under conviction that the notes must have been communicated to the Governor General—alluded to them in his communications with Her Majesty's Ministers when endeavouring to obtain some amelioration of the Ameers' hard fate. On 26 October 1843, Major Outram informed Sir C. Napier: "It never could have occurred to me that these notes could otherwise then have been transmitted, being strictly of an official nature and, in fact, the only opportunity afforded to the Princes of Sinde for formally communicating their sentiments to the representative of the British Government (and through him to the Governor General) on an occasion so important to their own interests as receiving a new Treaty seriously affecting them (which I had been delegated to require this acceptance of)." For Sir C. Napier's explanation for why the notes were not forwarded to the Governor General see Supplement to the Blue Book Nos. 145 and 146 (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 105–8).

244. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 94.

245. In his appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors, (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 123–4) Meer Roostum observes: "When the Beloochees near Hyderabad perceived that the General would pay no sort of attention to peaceful proposals and saw me—an old man of 85 years—expelled from my country, separated from my family, deprived of all my possessions (which they

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knew had been given to my younger brother Meer Ali Morad) and when they heard—moreover—of the seizure of Hyat Khan by Sir C. Napier, in despair, 'they washed their hands of their lives' and marched out of the fort. I accompanied. Had I determined on fighting, I had 15,000 Beloochees at my back at Khyrpore and I could have brought them. But, at last, seeing there was no remedy we were driven to desperation."

246. The case of this Ameer is melancholy in the extreme. He himself and his son—a fine young man of 21 years of age—have both died in captivity at Calcutta. At the time of the Battle of Meeanee, he was making preparation for the marriage of his children, little dreaming of the reward he was about to receive for his constant attachment to British interests. The marriage trousseau fell into the hands of the conqueror of Sinde and constituted a portion of the Sinde booty. Not only was he excepted from the penal Treaty but Sir C. Napier, more than once, acknowledged his fidelity. On 23 December 1842, he tells Ali Morad all the Ameers were in league against us—except His Highness Meer Sobdar and himself and that we required "friendly rulers like himself and Meer Sobdar," (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 6). On 27 January 1843, three weeks before the Battle of Meeanee, he commended Meer Sobdar "for his loyal and true conduct towards the British Government", (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 21). See also, the Ameers' appeals to the Court, (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 132–4). He was unable, however, to restrain his Beloochee retainers and he suffered as severely as any of the Ameers. It was no excuse for him that (on or about 14 February 1843) the Meer's Minister informed Major Outram that, "the fat man" (meaning Nuseer Khan) having assembled all the Beloochee sirdars in a garden and sworn to them on the Koran that anyone that does not join him to oppose the English will be imprisoned and that your people whom you had called in from Kohera and elsewhere that they should not join the enemies of the British have accordingly turned against your Master (Meer Sobdar) and will no longer obey him. The Meer himself, if he does not move out, will be murdered. But that he will not move out and that he will do his utmost to serve the British, but that if he suffers in consequence, "it will be on the Sirdars head" (see enclosure to Sir C. Napier's letter to the Governor General dated 16 August 1843).

247. See note at the close of paragraph 64. It was undoubtedly Lord Auckland's policy to divide and rule. He therefore entered into separate Treaties with the four principal Ameers, which were to be regarded as a great charter and obtained from the goodwill of the paramount power of India "for the future security of their independence and of their possessions," (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 190–2). With a stroke of his pen Sir C. Napier abrogated this solemn engagement and adopted the more convenient but most unjust policy of making the Ameers, in common, responsible for the acts of one another.

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248. Clerk, 'Administration of Sinde,' 1-43. Editor's Note: The original copy of Clerk's Minute is in the Maharastra State Archives' political department files from 1848 (MSA/BR/P/1848/143-2150/1-490).
249. The most exaggerated estimates have been formed of the value of Sinde. In a paper designated, 'Observations on the Defence of Sinde and on the Numerous Forts Therein,' dated 19 May 1844, Sir C. Napier observed: "The conquest of Sinde (instead of weakening India) has added to the security of her Northwest Frontier and so far from adding to the expenses of our Indian Government will diminish that expense and add to the revenue of the Honourable Company not only by the excess of revenue beyond the expenditure but also by obviating the necessity of so large a force upon the Sutledge and from Feerozepore down to Cutch inclusive (as must have been maintained had Sinde been in the hands of the Ameers and especially when Gwalior was insecure). By Lord Ellenborough, Sinde was compared in fertility to Egypt!" See also, Sir C. Napier's letter to Lord Ellenborough dated 20 January 1844.
250. Editor's Note: Willoughby quotes here from William Shakespeare's *Othello* (1.1.381).
251. See, 'Requisition to the Honourable Court of Directors by Certain East India Proprietors,' (dated 16 January 1844).
252. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book (1838–1843)*, 195–6.
253. Dated 15 May 1843.
254. Mr Pringle's Memorandum (paragraph 27) dated 27 December 1849 and prepared for the Most Honourable the Governor General of India.
255. See paragraphs 91–8.
256. See the Genealogical Table annexed to my Minute.
257. For this, see Sinde Blue book No. 124, (Miscellaneous, *Blue Book [1838–1843]*, 126). I am not aware that this Treaty has ever been annulled. Meer Mahomed—although in a time of peace destroyed his fort of Emanghur as shown in the text—never acted toward us hostilely. How, therefore, can we say this Treaty has become null and void? We are therefore bound to restore his jagheers for we engaged never "to covet one seed of the revenue of the share of Sinde in his possession nor to interfere in its internal management."
258. Mr Pringle's Memorandum (paragraph 25) dated 27 December 1849 and prepared for the Most Honourable the Governor General of India.
259. See enclosures to Captain Forbes' letter to Mr Pringle dated 2 February 1849.
260. Resident at Khyrpore's letter dated the 24 April and reply thereto of 4 August 1846.
261. Dated 6 May and reply thereto of 13 May.
262. Dated 3 June 1846.
263. Dated 13 July 1846.
264. Dated 31 July and reply thereto of 18 August 1846.
265. Dated the 18 and reply thereto of 24 August 1846.

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266. For my remarks on the destruction of Emanghur, see proceeding comments. I have said that Meer Mahomed never injured the British Government in word or deed. The restoration of his jagheers by Sir C. Napier proves this fact—for had the Ameer been guilty of any act of hostility against us he would, doubtless, have been transported with the other Ameers to Calcutta.
267. Dated the 3 and reply thereto of the 8 March 1847.
268. Dated the 26 and reply thereto of the 30 August 1847.
269. Petition dated 30 March 1848.
270. Dated 5 April reply thereto of 23 May 1848.
271. Dated 5 June 1848.
272. Dated 12 June 1848.
273. Dated 11 and 26 July 1848.
274. Letter dated the 2 August (reply thereto of 16 October 1848). On the 10 August, we received petitions from Meer Mohamed and his brothers reiterating their complaints, which were—on receipt—referred to Mr Pringle.
275. See paragraph 108.
276. See Appendix B (No. 1) of the Collector's Report.
277. Dated 22 October 1848.
278. Dated 31 January 1849.
279. Dated the 8 and reply thereto of 16 May 1844.
280. Dated the 25 and reply of 29 May 1844.
281. Dated 24 April 1844.
282. Dated the 9 and reply of 14 April 1847.
283. Dated 16 October 1848 Appendix No. 2.
284. See paper dated 21 September 1849 (Simla) and headed 'Recollections'.
285. Ibid.
286. Letter dated 3 October 1849. In his letter to the Commissioner, dated 2 February 1849, Captain Forbes observes: "There is nothing on the records of this office to prove that any of Meer Mahomeds jagheers were thus confiscated by the late Governor of Sinde and actually transferred to His Highness Ali Morad and suggests that His Highness should be required either satisfactorily to show he was authorized to take possession of these jagheers or, if unable to do this, to furnish now—in writing—the complaints he made verbally against Meer Mahomed to enable Government to judge after a fair investigation: 1st of their correctness and 2nd then, if found correct, if they are of such a nature as to make it probable that Sir C. Napier decided as Ali Morad states." If the jagheers are restored, the Resident recommends that they be held of the British Government in every way independent of Ali Morad, "as the enmity between these parties is already so great as to render this necessary for the protection of the weaker of his rights and privileges. He can with perfect safety be withdrawn from His Highness' guarantee and be allowed to reside in any of his jagheers in the Shikarpore Collectorate."
287. See paper dated 21 September 1849 (Simla) and headed 'Recollections'.

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288. Memorandum, entitled, 'On the First Connection of the British Government with Ali Morad Khan Talpur,' dated 5 July 1849 (Simla) and prepared in the Foreign Office of the Government of India.
289. In the *Digest of Intelligence from Sinde* of 10 October 1842, it is noticed that the Chiefs of Upper Sinde—including Ali Morad—had concluded an armistice in consequence of a British force at Sukkur and the approach of Prince Timoor. On the 31 October, it is recorded that Ali Morad had agreed to make common cause with the other Ameers. On 2 November, it is also recorded that Ali Morad made friends with Nusseer Khan and "they all swore on the Koran before Meer Roostum that all former differences were at an end and that were all united under his orders." Ali Morad was appointed by Meer Roostum chief over all his forces. On 9 November, it is noticed that Ali Morad had—by general consent—been invested with full powers to treat with the English General, and that the Talpoors intended to abide by his decision, whether it be for friendship or hostility. On 26 November, it is recorded that Meer Ali Morad, writing to Meer Roostum, tells him that he has seen the whole English force and that the Ameers need not be under any apprehension to encounter it and that they may remain in perfect security at Khyrpore.
290. In a letter to Lord Ellenborough, dated 29 September 1843, Sir C. Napier observes, "With regard to the claim of Meer Ali Morad to any portion of the territory ceded to Bhawulpore, all that passed between him and His Highness was as follows, 'Conversing on the march to Emanghur, the Ameer told me that he possessed one or two small villages in the midst of the territory rendered to Bhawulpore but,' he added, throwing up his head that, 'These are trifling things and the Governor General is welcome to them.'"
291. See paragraphs 92–100.
292. This was forwarded by Sir C. Napier to the Government of India on 9 August 1847.
293. Dated 4 January 1846.
294. Dated 6 August 1843.
295. Dated 24 December 1846.
296. Dated 18 January 1847. Editor's Note: These are Willoughby's exclamation points. Markers of alarm aimed to highlight a "ludicrous" statement, they are all removed from printed versions of the Minute.
297. Memorandum entitled, 'On the First Connection of the British Government with Ali Morad Khan Talpur,' dated 5 July 1849 (Simla) and prepared in the Foreign Office of the Government of India.
298. This is not quite correct. From Lord Ellenborough's letter of 6 August 1843 (see paragraph 118), it appears that Jessulmere had actually taken Guttoora. Demi-official letter to Sir Henry (now Lord Hardinge) dated 4 May 1845.
299. Among the papers prepared by Mr. Pringle, there is an estimate marked F, in which the annual revenue of the 3 forts is stated to be Rs.14,000 or, for seven years, Rs.98,000. The estimated value of the ceded forts is set down at Rs.

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300,000, which seems to be a very high estimate with reference to their very dilapidated condition.

300. Letter dated 14 June 1847.

301. Letter to Sir C. Napier dated 6 August 1843.

302. Miscellaneous, *Blue Book Supplement*, 5.

303. See paragraph 3.

304. He also pillaged his brother as much as he did us. The *Sinde Digest* of 22 December notices that his Minister had taken possession of Khyrpore and on 22 January that, "Ali Morad has seized in Khyrpore from Soolimaun (Meer Roostum's confidential servant) 150 *khurwars* of jowar [i.e., sorghum] and 50 *khurwars* of wheat and from Meer Ali Akbar's *toshakhana* [i.e., storehouse] a larger amount of valuable property in gems, swords and cloth. He had also seized from Meer Mahomed's fort of Oobuoree a vast quantity of all kinds of grain, several bricks of gold of ½ *seer* weight [i.e., about 28 pounds or a mass worth 40 local rupees] and some silver. On the Ameers leaving Khyrpore, Meer Mohamed Khan's son left Khyrpore and all the valuables it contained."

305. Memorandum drawn up in the Foreign Office of the Government of India. In a letter, dated 18 January 1847 to the Government of India, Sir C. Napier stated he understood from Lord Ellenborough's letter of the 17 August: "First that Ali Morad has no right to any territory north of Roree because we had—by the draft—Treaty seized upon the whole as a punishment to be inflicted on the Khyrpore Ameers; second that, when the Battle of Meeanee made us masters of Sinde (and of this district along with the rest), then we were to give to His Highness the Turban lands in the district of Roree not as a right but as a gift. These lands, however, were never made over to him by me. He kept possession of all the lands of Meer Roostum by my permission (he having previously taken them) because the kardars—taking advantage of the interregnum caused by the flight of Roostum—were plundering both Ameers until the Governor General should decide on his claims (and then he was to account for the revenues of any that the Government chose to return to Meer Roostum), for the war had not then began and after the conquest Roostum's territories became ours. As it had been decided at Calcutta that His Highness had a right to all the lands made over to him by Meer Roostum in other parts of Sinde, I considered. . . ."

306. Clerk, 'Administration of Sinde', 1–838. Editors Note: Also see, the Maharastra State Archives 1848 political department file: MSA/BR/P/1848/143-2150.

307. Mr J. Richardson, in his *Narrative of his Personal Adventures in the Great Desert* (volume 1, page 232), details a conversation with "the famous, rich and powerful Haj Ben Mansa, Ettanee, the quasi-Sultan of the Ben Wulud at Ghadames." He states: "He is a man of a great age, nearly blind and the chief of the most numerous and influential family of Ghadames. Ettanee was attended by two or three servants, one carrying a skin and another a cushion to recline on. These arranged, the old gentleman mounted upon the stone-

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bench and took his seat, everybody making way for him with the greatest alacrity. Having heard I was present, after a short silence, he addressed me: 'Christian, do you know Sinde?' (N.B. [i.e., nota bene or note well]—Most of the people here have heard of Sinde but their knowledge of it is very imperfect.) I replied, 'I know it.' 'Are not the English there?' he continued. 'Yes,' I said. He then turned and said something to the people in the Ghadamus language (N.B.—I afterwards learnt it was: 'You see these Christians are eating up all the Mussulman countries.') My conversation with them was always in Arabic. He abruptly turned to me, 'Why do the English go there and eat up all the Mussulmans? Afterwards, you will come here.' I replied: 'The Ameers were foolish and engaged in a conspiracy against the English of India but the Mussulmans in Sinde enjoyed the same rights and privileges as the English themselves.' 'That's what you say,' he rejoined and then continued: 'Why do you go so far from home, to take other people's countries from them?' I replied: 'The Turks do the same. They came here in the desert.' 'Ah! You wish to be such oppressors as the Turks,' he continued very bitterly and then told me not to talk any more. No one present dared to put in a word. This painful silence continued for some time. I was anxious to get off (feeling very disagreeable) and, beginning to move, he said to somebody: 'Who's that?' (for he couldn't see much being nearly blind). They told him it was the Christian going. He cried out: 'Stop!' He then added that, 'You have books with you but you English are not Christians. You deceive us. Nor are the Danish, the Swedes or the Russians Christians. They have no books.' He meant religious books. The same opinion, I found afterwards, was entertained by Haji Ibrahim, a very respectable and intelligent Moorish merchant of Tripoli."

308. Letter from Lord Ellenborough to Sir Charles Napier dated 3 September 1843.

309. Letter from Lord Ellenborough to Sir Charles Napier dated 19 September 1843. See also the circular issued by his Lordship to all political officers prescribing the principles by which he desired they should regulate their intercourse with the princes and chiefs to whom they were deputed (dated 26 April 1842).

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GLOSSARY

Ameers	Rulers of Sindh, 1783–1843
Bamae/Bumae/Bama	Along With
Bu/Wu	And
Buhal-ust	Confirmed
Bungys	Hindu Untouchables
Cossid	Mail Carrier
Darogah	Official
Deh	Villages
Dewan	Finance or Chief Minister
Durbar	Royal Court
Guddee	Throne
Illaqua	Area of Jurisdiction
Jagheers	Feudal Lands
Kardars	District Officers
Kazee	Islamic Judge
Khidmutgars	Servants
Khood	Itself
Khurwars	Unit for Grain Measurement
Koomor	Salt Hill
Koss	A Unit for Distance Measurement
Kote	Fort

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Lacs	One Hundred Thousand
Moonshee	Indigenous Secretary
Nawab	Governor
Nullah	Ravine
Pugree	Turban or Symbol of Sovereignty
Purgunnahs	Districts
Purwannah	Government Order or Letter
Ryots	Peasants
Salaam	Oath of Allegiance
Shikarees	Hunting Trips
Shikargarhs	Hunting Grounds
Sircar	British Government
Sirdars	Chieftains
Soobedar	Indigenous Military Rank in the Company's Army
Sowars	Cavalrymen
Sunnuds	A Government Order or Deed
Syed	Honorific Title for Descendents of the Prophet
Tasheebejee	Prayer Beads
Tuppas	Revenue Collection District
Vakeel	Legal Representative
Zamindar	Landlord
Zenanna	Women's Quarters

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Introduced and Edited by MATTHEW A. COOK

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